Just one year ago, few people would have bet that the European Union, still reeling from the trauma of the Constitutional Treaty’s rejection in 2005, would be poised to ratify the new Reform Treaty, adopted in Lisbon last December. The price is a treaty with many shortcomings, but critics should not allow the best to become the enemy of the good.
ROME -- A year ago, few people would have bet that the European Union, still reeling from the trauma of the Constitutional Treaty’s rejection in 2005, would be poised to ratify the new Reform Treaty, adopted in Lisbon last December. For some, the fact that the United Kingdom might ratify it even earlier than traditionally “pro-European” countries like Italy merely underscores the Treaty’s lack of new and bold initiatives to accelerate European unification. But they are wrong.
To be sure, impatient dissatisfaction has been a driving force behind European integration since its initial years. But, as Robert Schuman wrote in his Declaration in 1950, Europe could not be built all at once. Likewise, Altiero Spinelli, another of the EU’s founding fathers, wrote late in life that without visionary Europeans there would be no Europe, but without pragmatic statesmen, the visionaries would have gotten nowhere.
The Reform Treaty’s shortcomings are obvious. Abandoning the name “Constitution” was probably necessary to bring all member states on board. But not equally necessary is the enduring uncertainty about the common political platform upon which Europe’s voice in foreign policy will have to rely. Moreover, the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice still requires unanimity for essential decisions in the fight against crime and terrorism and therefore, implying excruciating slowness. Nor does the Treaty do enough to strengthen coordination of Europe’s economic and budgetary policies.
But it is equally obvious that, as the European Parliament’s Resolution of February 20 puts it, “the Treaty of Lisbon is a substantial improvement on the existing Treaties, which will bring more democratic accountability to the Union and enhance its decision making.” The adoption of EU legislation will be subject to a level of parliamentary scrutiny (both at the European and national levels) that exists in no other supranational or international structure.
Moreover, agencies such as Europol and Eurojust will be similarly subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny, and the budgetary procedure will be simpler and more democratic. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will become legally binding and the judicial protection of citizens will be enhanced by facilitating their access to the European Court of Justice and by extending the Court’s jurisdiction. The Union’s capacity as a global actor will be enhanced by merging the High Representative with the Commissioner for External Relations and establishing a single diplomatic service.
The list could continue, but we already have reason enough to conclude that getting the best out of the new Treaty will be the best that the EU and its member states can do. The first ingredients of a common collective identity have been injected into the EU’s enlarged membership, which is still marked by diverse positions, sensitivities, and expectations. Asking everyone to do more than what everyone is unanimously ratifying would undermine Europe’s fragile harmony.
Nothing, however, prevents smaller groups of member states from aiming at bolder goals through separate agreements, if their mutual trust and similarities encourage them to do it. After all, this was how the Schengen Treaty – which later became part of the acquis communitaire (the body of EU law) – came into being. More recently, the Prun agreement has elevated police cooperation to police integration among the participating states.
There is reason to hope that some of the EU’s member states will embark on this venture in fighting crime and terrorism, defense matters, or in financial and budgetary harmonization. In whatever area, a group of more deeply integrated member states would give the Union a noyau dur (a hard core) , which might be very helpful in strengthening the EU as a whole. But let them do it separately, and in the meantime let the Union be energized by the improvements that it has already adopted. Fifty years later, this is the lesson for us of the Schuman’s declaration.
ROME -- A year ago, few people would have bet that the European Union, still reeling from the trauma of the Constitutional Treaty’s rejection in 2005, would be poised to ratify the new Reform Treaty, adopted in Lisbon last December. For some, the fact that the United Kingdom might ratify it even earlier than traditionally “pro-European” countries like Italy merely underscores the Treaty’s lack of new and bold initiatives to accelerate European unification. But they are wrong.
To be sure, impatient dissatisfaction has been a driving force behind European integration since its initial years. But, as Robert Schuman wrote in his Declaration in 1950, Europe could not be built all at once. Likewise, Altiero Spinelli, another of the EU’s founding fathers, wrote late in life that without visionary Europeans there would be no Europe, but without pragmatic statesmen, the visionaries would have gotten nowhere.
The Reform Treaty’s shortcomings are obvious. Abandoning the name “Constitution” was probably necessary to bring all member states on board. But not equally necessary is the enduring uncertainty about the common political platform upon which Europe’s voice in foreign policy will have to rely. Moreover, the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice still requires unanimity for essential decisions in the fight against crime and terrorism and therefore, implying excruciating slowness. Nor does the Treaty do enough to strengthen coordination of Europe’s economic and budgetary policies.
But it is equally obvious that, as the European Parliament’s Resolution of February 20 puts it, “the Treaty of Lisbon is a substantial improvement on the existing Treaties, which will bring more democratic accountability to the Union and enhance its decision making.” The adoption of EU legislation will be subject to a level of parliamentary scrutiny (both at the European and national levels) that exists in no other supranational or international structure.
Moreover, agencies such as Europol and Eurojust will be similarly subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny, and the budgetary procedure will be simpler and more democratic. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will become legally binding and the judicial protection of citizens will be enhanced by facilitating their access to the European Court of Justice and by extending the Court’s jurisdiction. The Union’s capacity as a global actor will be enhanced by merging the High Representative with the Commissioner for External Relations and establishing a single diplomatic service.
The list could continue, but we already have reason enough to conclude that getting the best out of the new Treaty will be the best that the EU and its member states can do. The first ingredients of a common collective identity have been injected into the EU’s enlarged membership, which is still marked by diverse positions, sensitivities, and expectations. Asking everyone to do more than what everyone is unanimously ratifying would undermine Europe’s fragile harmony.
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Nothing, however, prevents smaller groups of member states from aiming at bolder goals through separate agreements, if their mutual trust and similarities encourage them to do it. After all, this was how the Schengen Treaty – which later became part of the acquis communitaire (the body of EU law) – came into being. More recently, the Prun agreement has elevated police cooperation to police integration among the participating states.
There is reason to hope that some of the EU’s member states will embark on this venture in fighting crime and terrorism, defense matters, or in financial and budgetary harmonization. In whatever area, a group of more deeply integrated member states would give the Union a noyau dur (a hard core) , which might be very helpful in strengthening the EU as a whole. But let them do it separately, and in the meantime let the Union be energized by the improvements that it has already adopted. Fifty years later, this is the lesson for us of the Schuman’s declaration.