Several of my colleagues on the Harvard Faculty have recently been casualties in the cross-fire between fiscal austerians and stimulators. Economists Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff have received an unbelievable amount of press attention (although they were already famous – or, more precisely, because they were already famous), ever since they were discovered by three researchers at the University of Massachusetts Amherst to have made a spreadsheet error in the first of two papers that examined the statistical relationship between debt and growth. They quickly conceded their error.
Then historian Niall Ferguson, also of Harvard and even more famous, received much flack when -- asked to comment on Keynes’ famous phrase “In the long run we are all dead” -- he “suggested that Keynes was perhaps indifferent to the long run because he had no children, and that he had no children because he was gay.” There is more to be said about each of the two cases. (i) Reinhart and Rogoff’s 2010 estimates had already been superseded by a subsequent 2012 paper of theirs written along with Carmen’s husband, Vincent, which used a more extensive data set where the error does not appear. (ii) “Some of Ferguson’s best friends are gay.” Keynes was actually bi-sexual; and (iii) he tried to have children. And so forth. Most of this has already been said many times by now. Apparently people are even more fascinated by Harvard than they are about macroeconomic theory.
But what does this all have to do with the debate between austerians and stimulators? Nothing, other than that the battle lines of the austerians have been wavering lately under the continuing onslaught of facts (most notably the recessions in Europe and Japan’s recent conversion to stimulus), and the stimulators find the missteps of Reinhart-Rogoff and Ferguson to be convenient stones to throw into the attack as well. But they are barking up the wrong tree. Sorry; they are throwing the wrong stones.
The Reinhart-Rogoff controversy is not in fact relevant to the question whether governments should expand or contract at a given point in time. The basic finding in their papers continues to hold up (that subsequent growth tends to be lower among countries with debt/GDP ratios above 90% than below 90%), but neither that finding nor their policy advice was designed so as to support the proposition that a recession is a good time to undertake fiscal contraction. The Ferguson controversy is even less relevant, because the phrase “in the long run we are all dead” was neither about fiscal policy when Keynes wrote it nor an argument against deferred gratification. Nor was Keynes in favor of uninhibited fiscal stimulus regardless of economic conditions; he argued, rather, “the boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury.” Fix the hole in the roof when the sun is shining, not when it is raining.
Neither of the controversies bears on the policy proposition that is important at the moment, which is the Keynesian claim that under conditions of high unemployment, low inflation, and low interest rates (the conditions that hold in rich countries today, as in the 1930s), fiscal expansion is expansionary and fiscal contraction is contractionary.
Some research by yet another highly valued colleague at Harvard does bear much more directly on this important proposition. Alberto Alesina has not been receiving his “fair share of abuse.” His influential papers with Roberto Perotti (1995, 1997) and Silvia Ardagna (1998, 2010) found that cutting government spending is not contractionary and that it may even be expansionary.
It is true that sometimes a country may have no alternative to fiscal “consolidation,” if its creditors insist on it, as has been the case with Greece and some other euro members. But that does not mean austerity is expansionary, especially if the currency cannot depreciate to stimulate exports.
As with Reinhart and Rogoff, the Alesina papers themselves are much more measured in their conclusions than one would think from the claims of some conservative politicians that academic research finds fiscal austerity to be expansionary in general. Nevertheless, the conclusions are clear: “Even major successful adjustments do not seem to have recessionary consequences, on average” (1997). And “several fiscal adjustments have been associated with expansions even in the short run” (1998). And “spending cuts are much more effective than tax increases in stabilizing the debt and avoiding economic downturns. In fact, we uncover several episodes in which spending cuts adopted to reduce deficits have been associated with economic expansions rather than recessions” (2010, p.3). Most recently, a May 2013 paper with Carlo Favero and Francesco Giavazzi finds “that spending-based adjustments have been associated, on average, with mild and short-lived recessions, in many cases with no recession.”
Alesina’s recent policy advice is that the US should cut spending “right away.” By contrast, the advice of Reinhart and Rogoff seems to favor postponing fiscal adjustment (trim entitlements in the future, but increase infrastructure spending today) and considering financial repression. In more far-gone cases like Greece, they lean toward restructuring the debt. If the thunderstorm is too severe and the roof is too far-gone to be fixed, it may be necessary to rebuild from scratch.
A new attack on Professor Alesina’s econometric findings comes from an unlikely source: Perotti, the co-author of the first two of the five articles, has now recanted (2013a, b). He points out some problems with the methodology (including the papers that Alesina wrote with Ardagna). Under the dating scheme, the same year can count as a consolidation year, a pre-consolidation year, and a post-consolidation year. It turns out that some of what have been treated as large spending-based consolidations, though announced by the governments, were in fact never implemented. Currency devaluation, reduced labor costs, and export stimulus played an important part in any instances of growth, for example, the touted stabilizations of Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s. His conclusions: “the notion of ‘expansionary fiscal austerity’ in the short run is probably an illusion: a trade-off does seem to exist between fiscal austerity and short-run growth” and so “the fiscal consolidations implemented by several European countries could well aggravate the recession” (2013b, p.10). To me, this is a more powerful indictment of the reasoning behind recent attempts at fiscal discipline during recession than is a spreadsheet error or a too-flippant line about Keynes’ sexuality.
References
Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna, 1998, “Tales of Fiscal Adjustment,” Economic PolicyVol.13, no, 27, October, 487–545.
Alberto Alesina, and Silvia Ardagna, 2010, “Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes versus Spending,” in Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 24 (University of Chicago Press).
Alberto Alesina, Carlo Favero and Francesco Giavazzi, 2013, “The Output Effect of Fiscal Consolidations,” IGIER, May.
Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti. 1995, “Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments in OECD Countries,” Economic Policy, October. NBER Working Paper 5214.
Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, 1997, "Fiscal Adjustments In OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol.44, no.2, June, 210-248.
Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, 1990, “Can Severe Fiscal Contractions be Expansionary?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5, Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, editors (MIT Press) p. 75 – 122.
Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin, 2013, “Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff,” Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series 322,University of Massachusetts Amherst, April.
Roberto Perotti, 2013a,“The ‘Austerity Myth’: Gains Without Pain?” A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi, eds.: Fiscal Policy After the Financial Crisis (University of Chicago Press). BIS Working Paper 362. NBER Working Paper no. 17571.
Roberto Perotti, 2013b, “The Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe: Lessons from the Past, Questions for the Future,” Academic Consultants Meeting , Federal Reserve Board , Washington DC , May 6 , 2013. Bocconi University.
Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, 2010, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” AER, 100, May, 573–578.
Carmen Reinhart, Vincent Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff, 2012, “Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced-Economy Episodes Since 1800,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.26, No.3—Summer, 69–86.
Comments
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CommentedGustave Kenedi
Could you please provide a link to Perotti 2013b? For some odd reason, I can't seem to find this paper.
Thank you very much.
CommentedJeffrey Frankel
Reply to Gustave Kenedi:
This paper, the second of two recent papers by Roberto Perotti recanting his earlier work, was presented by him earlier this month at an Academic Consultants Meeting of the Federal Reserve Board, Washington DC (to Governors Bernanke, Yellen, et al). I believe that he has not posted it yet, but that he plans to do so. He also told me that he hope to write a Vox piece summarizing it.
If he doesn't post it soon, and you can't find what you want in the first of his two recantation papers (which I have already provided a link to), let me know. I can urge him to post it, or ask his permission to provide it myself to those who want to see it.
JF
CommentedTom Whelan
The ratio of government debt to GDP seems to be the wrong metric for analyzing the effects of government debt levels on future economic growth for much the same reason that increases government spending and deficits are not necessarily expansionary and decreases in spending and deficits do not necessarily reduce real growth.
The debt to GDP ratio, like the supposed effects of changes in spending and debt levels, overlook, or underestimate, the critical variable that determines whether public spending, however financed, helps or hinders future growth: the economic return on a given public expenditure. To paraphrase Mr Carville, it's, the returns stupid.
Public loan expenditures invested in assets that generate positive economic returns contribute positively to future GDP, national income, and most importantly, future growth potential. Public loan expenditures used to finance consumption or investment in unproductive assets drag down economic growth, reduce disposal incomes, and lower economic growth potential going forward. The lack of economic return generated by any asset purchased with taxes (collected now) or with public debt (taxes to be collected in the future) reduces private disposable after tax income, now or later, and in the case of debt financing, it also increases the relative burden of debt service on future incomes which reduces the capacity to spend in the future. It’s not the size of the debt or deficit, in and of itself, that helps or hinders GDP growth, but the relationship between the size of the debt or deficit and the returns, more precisely, the all too prevalent lack thereof, generated by the assets purchased with taxes or public debt (future taxes).
Two bridges tell much of the tale. Spending $1000 to build a bridge between Milltown and Wheatville employs 100 bridge builders for a year. But its real contribution to employment, to future economic growth, and to the expansion of output capacity is lower transportation costs, which only begins once the bridge is finished. After it is built, the new bridge cuts Farmer Jones’ travel time in half, from two days a week to one, cuts his out-of-pocket travel costs in half, saving him $125 in travel costs, which more than offsets the $100 he pays annually in additional taxes to finance the bridge. Even though Farmer Jones gets the same price for his wheat at the mill (his reported income remains the same), the new bridge raises his enjoyment income (it frees a day for leisure or to do more work) and increases his real income by lowering his cost of living. Instead of spending $250 on travel, Farmer Jones spends $125 on travel and $100 in additional taxes, leaving him free to spend, save, or invest the $25 that he used to spend on travel. Farmer Jones standard of living goes up, even though the revenue from farming and measured GDP do not. Because this kind of public investment produces a real income stream in the form of lower costs in excess of its cost, it is self-financing, makes the private sector more competitive, and increases living standards. But the fact that high debt to GDP ratios do not correlate with higher growth suggests this kind of economically productive public loan expenditure is rare.
Contrast the new bridge between Milltown and Wheatville with the infamous bridge to nowhere. Building a $1000 bridge to nowhere employs the same 100 bridge builders for a year and adds $100 to Farmer Jones tax bill, but no one in Milltown or Wheatville uses the darn thing. Building it provides work to 100 men for a year, but it consumes their labor, puts wear and tear on the equipment, and strands the cost of the material used to build it in a permanently unproductive form. The bridge to nowhere provides no valuable services, no income stream, that offsets its cost. The bridge to nowhere imposes real opportunity costs and monetary losses. Farmer Jones enjoyment income stays flat (he does not gain a day every week), and he and the economy lose the opportunity to gain a day of leisure or a day to work on something else. The money cost, $100 a year in higher taxes, lowers Farmer Jones’ disposable after tax disposable income and standard of living by $100 every year until the bridge is paid off. Farmer Jones has paid $100 a year for a bridge he cannot productively use, and he must forego spending $100 a year he otherwise could have spent on other useful goods and services, which, in turn, reduces his spending and the contribution his spending would have made in the out years to GDP. Increased government outlays on bridges to nowhere make a nation poorer.
Tracing these stocks and flows across time exposes the growth inhibiting financial constraints that actually result from the inefficient, as opposed to the efficient, allocation and use of resources. There is no positive multiplier effect from unproductive public or private investments.
The pitiful lack of return on far too much public “investment" is a bigger continuing and compounding drag on employment and growth than allegedly inadequate levels of public spending or investment on wasteful, or unproductive, public boondoggles.
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