China is notoriously secretive; its government mechanics inscrutable. The constitution says that power belongs to the people, but in reality the rights of the people belong to the Communist Party and its leaders, from whom workers and peasants receive scant attention. The CCP claims to have delivered a democratic revolution, but the country remains one of the world's most undemocratic. So irreconcilable are these paradoxes that the 16th Party Congress that will convene next week cannot hope but to show itself as a democratic sham.
The highest party posts will change hands at the Congress, including the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the General Secretary of the Party, and several Politburo Standing Committee members. According to the CCP Charter, all of those positions (save the leadership of the Military Commission) should be determined by the votes of members of the 16th Central Committee. The 16th Party Congress should in turn elect the 16th Central Committee, Party Congress representatives should be elected by each provincial party congress, and so on.
In fact, these elections will be characterized by opacity and the absence of any real democratic process. Indeed, the only elections in China in which truly independent voters choose candidates occur at the village committee level, but this democratic mummery is staged mainly for the benefit of outside observers. All other Chinese elections share two main characteristics: candidates are selected to preserve party leaders, and the leaders decide the number of candidates.
China holds two types of election: "equal quota elections" and "differential quota elections." In equal quota elections, the leaders present three candidates, leaving voters the task of picking one. This is a sacred rule of Chinese politics, one that is considered entirely legitimate. In the past 50 years, all "elected" officials, including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, were designated in ways that delivered the illusion of choice but without the element of uncertainty.
After the Cultural Revolution, and despite widespread protest, "differential quota elections" were introduced, albeit in a limited fashion. The 13th Party Congress, in tune with the rising democratic sentiments of the time, was the first to use the differential system for electing members of the Central Committee.
This constituted a breakthrough in party tactics. By presenting voters with more candidates than positions, Deng Liqun, a member of the ultra-left Old Guard, was denied a seat. Deng Xiaoping, at that time the paramount leader, and Chen Yun, another representative of the powerful Old Guard, were furious at this result.
Of course, no one, even in China, thinks of differential quota elections as being truly democratic. All the candidates remain handpicked by the leadership, even if the least popular figures can be removed. In the event, the differential system was a short-lived experiment. Since 1989 the Party has relentlessly consolidated its central leadership, internal party democracy has been suppressed and voting procedures have actually degenerated.
The Party Congress has its origins in the mass gatherings and propaganda campaigns of the Mao era, and can bring together as many as two thousand delegates. The First and Second Party Congresses had only a few dozen representatives, who possessed the power to question the party's highest officials. That sort of accountability is long gone. During its half-century in power, the CCP has developed a method called da hui xiao kai (big conference held small), which breaks the Congress down into myriad small-group sessions.
The forthcoming 16th Party Congress will be comprised of these small-group sessions. None will have a clear mandate, and any debate will be emasculated. Delegates are confused about their roles and powers, and the conditions are perfect for creating a silent majority. Each session is like an afternoon tea party where representatives offer random reflections, praise the correctness of the leadership's reports and attempt to show how conscientiously they have studied them and how deeply they comprehend them.
The suggestions raised by representatives at tea parties are never made a subject for debate by the Congress as a whole. Instead they are given to the staff members of the Secretariat to "process." Some minor revisions to the final report might be made, but the procedures of a real parliamentary democracy-proposal, debate, and resolution-remain absent.
The grave realities that confront China-for example, corruption and the ever-widening social gap-will not be raised as matters for debate. CCP members will never get the chance to address any concerns that they may hold before a wide audience. They will not get to discuss the protection of citizen's rights, relaxation of harsh media controls, the rights of peasants to migrate or take up jobs in the cities, or whether to tolerate workers who organize independent unions.
So how important will this 16th Party Congress be?
It certainly will not provide a forum for debating any of the long awaited, urgently needed, and unavoidable political reforms that China must launch. By rescheduling it for November (apparently Jiang Zemin had double-booked himself by promising to travel to Texas to stay with President Bush on his Crawford ranch), the 16th Party Congress, at which the next generation of China's leaders will be anointed, may play second fiddle to a diplomatic visit.
China is notoriously secretive; its government mechanics inscrutable. The constitution says that power belongs to the people, but in reality the rights of the people belong to the Communist Party and its leaders, from whom workers and peasants receive scant attention. The CCP claims to have delivered a democratic revolution, but the country remains one of the world's most undemocratic. So irreconcilable are these paradoxes that the 16th Party Congress that will convene next week cannot hope but to show itself as a democratic sham.
The highest party posts will change hands at the Congress, including the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the General Secretary of the Party, and several Politburo Standing Committee members. According to the CCP Charter, all of those positions (save the leadership of the Military Commission) should be determined by the votes of members of the 16th Central Committee. The 16th Party Congress should in turn elect the 16th Central Committee, Party Congress representatives should be elected by each provincial party congress, and so on.
In fact, these elections will be characterized by opacity and the absence of any real democratic process. Indeed, the only elections in China in which truly independent voters choose candidates occur at the village committee level, but this democratic mummery is staged mainly for the benefit of outside observers. All other Chinese elections share two main characteristics: candidates are selected to preserve party leaders, and the leaders decide the number of candidates.
China holds two types of election: "equal quota elections" and "differential quota elections." In equal quota elections, the leaders present three candidates, leaving voters the task of picking one. This is a sacred rule of Chinese politics, one that is considered entirely legitimate. In the past 50 years, all "elected" officials, including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, were designated in ways that delivered the illusion of choice but without the element of uncertainty.
After the Cultural Revolution, and despite widespread protest, "differential quota elections" were introduced, albeit in a limited fashion. The 13th Party Congress, in tune with the rising democratic sentiments of the time, was the first to use the differential system for electing members of the Central Committee.
This constituted a breakthrough in party tactics. By presenting voters with more candidates than positions, Deng Liqun, a member of the ultra-left Old Guard, was denied a seat. Deng Xiaoping, at that time the paramount leader, and Chen Yun, another representative of the powerful Old Guard, were furious at this result.
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Of course, no one, even in China, thinks of differential quota elections as being truly democratic. All the candidates remain handpicked by the leadership, even if the least popular figures can be removed. In the event, the differential system was a short-lived experiment. Since 1989 the Party has relentlessly consolidated its central leadership, internal party democracy has been suppressed and voting procedures have actually degenerated.
The Party Congress has its origins in the mass gatherings and propaganda campaigns of the Mao era, and can bring together as many as two thousand delegates. The First and Second Party Congresses had only a few dozen representatives, who possessed the power to question the party's highest officials. That sort of accountability is long gone. During its half-century in power, the CCP has developed a method called da hui xiao kai (big conference held small), which breaks the Congress down into myriad small-group sessions.
The forthcoming 16th Party Congress will be comprised of these small-group sessions. None will have a clear mandate, and any debate will be emasculated. Delegates are confused about their roles and powers, and the conditions are perfect for creating a silent majority. Each session is like an afternoon tea party where representatives offer random reflections, praise the correctness of the leadership's reports and attempt to show how conscientiously they have studied them and how deeply they comprehend them.
The suggestions raised by representatives at tea parties are never made a subject for debate by the Congress as a whole. Instead they are given to the staff members of the Secretariat to "process." Some minor revisions to the final report might be made, but the procedures of a real parliamentary democracy-proposal, debate, and resolution-remain absent.
The grave realities that confront China-for example, corruption and the ever-widening social gap-will not be raised as matters for debate. CCP members will never get the chance to address any concerns that they may hold before a wide audience. They will not get to discuss the protection of citizen's rights, relaxation of harsh media controls, the rights of peasants to migrate or take up jobs in the cities, or whether to tolerate workers who organize independent unions.
So how important will this 16th Party Congress be?
It certainly will not provide a forum for debating any of the long awaited, urgently needed, and unavoidable political reforms that China must launch. By rescheduling it for November (apparently Jiang Zemin had double-booked himself by promising to travel to Texas to stay with President Bush on his Crawford ranch), the 16th Party Congress, at which the next generation of China's leaders will be anointed, may play second fiddle to a diplomatic visit.