At the onset of the US-led war in Iraq, two competing views shaped predictions about the outcome. The first contended that overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime would usher in a democratic era in Iraq that would serve as a model and catalyst for democratic change regionally.
Derided by detractors as a new "domino theory," this view presented intervention in Iraq as similar to America's role in post-WWII Japan. Against the optimism of that "Japan scenario," pessimists argued that a "Somalia scenario" was more likely. They staked their claim on the tribal, sectarian, and multiethnic nature of Iraq, which, in the absence of dictatorship, would supposedly incite Iraq's collapse into a "failed state," with rampant warlordism, ethnic and religious feuds, and harboring of terrorist organizations.
But the main question now is whether Iraq will drift along lines somewhere between these two scenarios, increasingly resembling Afghanistan. This "Afghan scenario" implies a weak state with nominal power over effectively autonomous fiefdoms that are headed by strongmen who are represented in the central government.
Bad as it sounds, this prospect appears to be a "realistic" compromise between the supposedly utopian vision of a flourishing, unified democracy and the wretchedness of a failed state. Many of the actions and policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), as well as higher-level Bush administration decisions, seem to point to a resigned acceptance that early hopes that Iraq would embrace Western-style democracy were misplaced.
Indeed, such hopes were misplaced. Iraq's political culture - and that of most of the Middle East - is incompatible with the basic components of a recognizable Western-style democracy: notions of individual rights and responsibilities are lacking, the concept of a patriarchal state is deeply rooted, and individual cultural identity is rarely tied to the national community.
On the other hand, much circular logic figures in analyses that consider the "traditional" nature of Iraqi society an obstacle to liberal democracy. For these analyses are hardly neutral, but unwittingly enter an ongoing confrontation.
Secure your copy of PS Quarterly: The Climate Crucible
The newest issue of our magazine, PS Quarterly: The Climate Crucible, is here. To gain digital access to all of the magazine’s content, and receive your print copy, subscribe to PS Premium now.
Subscribe Now
In Iraq, as elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim worlds, a cultural war is being waged between two paradigms: grand narratives that accept and promote a collectivistic understanding (nationalism, socialism, Islamism), versus an implicit paradigm of individualistic modernity that is locally rooted yet informed by the global experience. The frontlines of this war are notions of the individual, cultural identity, civil society, and the nation-state.
The religious Islamic component in Iraqi social life should not be underestimated. But it also should not be equated with the political Islamism that strives to capitalize on it.
Nationalist and leftist political discourses did leave an imprint on the Iraqi value system, but they are not its sole components. Indeed, the nominal acceptance of grand narratives of "democracy" and "human rights" as common bases for political discourse represents a crucial shift in demarcating the cultural battle.
This cultural debate is not limited to the Arab scene. There are also vigorous discussions in the West about the applicability of democratic institutions to the Arab context.
Advocates of the notion of "Arab exceptionalism," which questions the ability of Arab societies to adapt democratic systems are in fact objectively allied with "grand narrative" ideologues - and also with the beneficiaries of the Arab world's patronage-based political order.
The models used in the West, both in political circles and in academia, for the analysis and interpretation of Arab societies are seriously deficient. In particular, many analyses nowadays promote an ethnic model, reducing Iraq to an artificial construct that rests atop a fragmented "reality" of separate communities.
Some have even suggested hastening the outcome predicted by this faulty view by dividing Iraq into its "genuine" original components: Sunni, Shi`i, and Kurd. In fact, Iraqi society is more complex than this.
The reception and adoption of democracy is not a function of sectarian belonging, but a reflection of the multi-dimensional historical, cultural, religious, and political identities of Iraqi individuals. Given the right circumstances, it is eminently possible to mobilize Iraqi society towards a democratic formulation of its state-to-be. The fall of Saddam ushers in the right circumstances.
Indeed, the seeming failure of a recognizable democratic core to emerge in Iraq within the first few months of the collapse of Saddam's dictatorship is due more to idiosyncrasies of the process than to any presumed essential nature of Iraqi society. Upon Saddam's fall, a large "middle ground" existed in Iraq that was positively disposed towards democratic discourse and practice. Policy mistakes and reversals eroded this middle ground, opening a path for ideological Islamism and a reconstituted neo-Ba`athism.
The key mistake was the failure of occupation forces to equip and empower the small group of Iraqi liberal democratic figures to tap into this middle ground. As a result, the space for a liberal democratic outcome receded. But to treat this setback as a failure would be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Iraqi democrats must re-assess and develop a clear public strategy. The CPA, and the world community, must not prejudice the outcome of their efforts by accepting a facile and bogus view of Iraqi society.
Even if such efforts succeed, the road to a full-fledged democratic system in Iraq will still be arduous and expensive. But instead of succumbing to a "Somalia scenario," dreaming of a "Japan scenario," or settling for an "Afghanistan scenario," Iraq may yet become a "scenario" for successful intervention in the 21 st century.
To have unlimited access to our content including in-depth commentaries, book reviews, exclusive interviews, PS OnPoint and PS The Big Picture, please subscribe
The finance underpinning supply chains is crucial, but too many small businesses in emerging and developing economies cannot access it, cutting them off from the benefits of global trade. Plucking this relatively low-hanging fruit can drive progress toward many development goals at once.
show how a lack of supply-chain finance keeps many businesses and economies on the sidelines.
Diane Coyle
advocates a new public philosophy that rejects viewing “government” and “market” as opposites, explains why time-use data must shape technological development, warns that policymakers are devising AI regulation in a thick conceptual fog, and more.
Log in/Register
Please log in or register to continue. Registration is free and requires only your email address.
At the onset of the US-led war in Iraq, two competing views shaped predictions about the outcome. The first contended that overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime would usher in a democratic era in Iraq that would serve as a model and catalyst for democratic change regionally.
Derided by detractors as a new "domino theory," this view presented intervention in Iraq as similar to America's role in post-WWII Japan. Against the optimism of that "Japan scenario," pessimists argued that a "Somalia scenario" was more likely. They staked their claim on the tribal, sectarian, and multiethnic nature of Iraq, which, in the absence of dictatorship, would supposedly incite Iraq's collapse into a "failed state," with rampant warlordism, ethnic and religious feuds, and harboring of terrorist organizations.
But the main question now is whether Iraq will drift along lines somewhere between these two scenarios, increasingly resembling Afghanistan. This "Afghan scenario" implies a weak state with nominal power over effectively autonomous fiefdoms that are headed by strongmen who are represented in the central government.
Bad as it sounds, this prospect appears to be a "realistic" compromise between the supposedly utopian vision of a flourishing, unified democracy and the wretchedness of a failed state. Many of the actions and policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), as well as higher-level Bush administration decisions, seem to point to a resigned acceptance that early hopes that Iraq would embrace Western-style democracy were misplaced.
Indeed, such hopes were misplaced. Iraq's political culture - and that of most of the Middle East - is incompatible with the basic components of a recognizable Western-style democracy: notions of individual rights and responsibilities are lacking, the concept of a patriarchal state is deeply rooted, and individual cultural identity is rarely tied to the national community.
On the other hand, much circular logic figures in analyses that consider the "traditional" nature of Iraqi society an obstacle to liberal democracy. For these analyses are hardly neutral, but unwittingly enter an ongoing confrontation.
Secure your copy of PS Quarterly: The Climate Crucible
The newest issue of our magazine, PS Quarterly: The Climate Crucible, is here. To gain digital access to all of the magazine’s content, and receive your print copy, subscribe to PS Premium now.
Subscribe Now
In Iraq, as elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim worlds, a cultural war is being waged between two paradigms: grand narratives that accept and promote a collectivistic understanding (nationalism, socialism, Islamism), versus an implicit paradigm of individualistic modernity that is locally rooted yet informed by the global experience. The frontlines of this war are notions of the individual, cultural identity, civil society, and the nation-state.
The religious Islamic component in Iraqi social life should not be underestimated. But it also should not be equated with the political Islamism that strives to capitalize on it.
Nationalist and leftist political discourses did leave an imprint on the Iraqi value system, but they are not its sole components. Indeed, the nominal acceptance of grand narratives of "democracy" and "human rights" as common bases for political discourse represents a crucial shift in demarcating the cultural battle.
This cultural debate is not limited to the Arab scene. There are also vigorous discussions in the West about the applicability of democratic institutions to the Arab context.
Advocates of the notion of "Arab exceptionalism," which questions the ability of Arab societies to adapt democratic systems are in fact objectively allied with "grand narrative" ideologues - and also with the beneficiaries of the Arab world's patronage-based political order.
The models used in the West, both in political circles and in academia, for the analysis and interpretation of Arab societies are seriously deficient. In particular, many analyses nowadays promote an ethnic model, reducing Iraq to an artificial construct that rests atop a fragmented "reality" of separate communities.
Some have even suggested hastening the outcome predicted by this faulty view by dividing Iraq into its "genuine" original components: Sunni, Shi`i, and Kurd. In fact, Iraqi society is more complex than this.
The reception and adoption of democracy is not a function of sectarian belonging, but a reflection of the multi-dimensional historical, cultural, religious, and political identities of Iraqi individuals. Given the right circumstances, it is eminently possible to mobilize Iraqi society towards a democratic formulation of its state-to-be. The fall of Saddam ushers in the right circumstances.
Indeed, the seeming failure of a recognizable democratic core to emerge in Iraq within the first few months of the collapse of Saddam's dictatorship is due more to idiosyncrasies of the process than to any presumed essential nature of Iraqi society. Upon Saddam's fall, a large "middle ground" existed in Iraq that was positively disposed towards democratic discourse and practice. Policy mistakes and reversals eroded this middle ground, opening a path for ideological Islamism and a reconstituted neo-Ba`athism.
The key mistake was the failure of occupation forces to equip and empower the small group of Iraqi liberal democratic figures to tap into this middle ground. As a result, the space for a liberal democratic outcome receded. But to treat this setback as a failure would be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Iraqi democrats must re-assess and develop a clear public strategy. The CPA, and the world community, must not prejudice the outcome of their efforts by accepting a facile and bogus view of Iraqi society.
Even if such efforts succeed, the road to a full-fledged democratic system in Iraq will still be arduous and expensive. But instead of succumbing to a "Somalia scenario," dreaming of a "Japan scenario," or settling for an "Afghanistan scenario," Iraq may yet become a "scenario" for successful intervention in the 21 st century.