Thanks for the note.
1. What you describe as "Fubini" data are simply the data I collect on the RePEc/Ideas website, both for 2006 and 2015. Therefore, if that data should be corrected with "better" data, that applies to the RePEc ranking in the first place. Not to "Fubini" data. I have not made it up or massaged it in any way. I have just used the material made available on your website.
2. Please note that I have used the data on the basis of the info on it that is made available. And that info does specify on your website that the data is already discounted by citation age. That "aging factor", if I can call it this way, applies both to 2006 and 2015. Therefore, based on all available data and info, there is no reason to think the rankings are not comparable. RePEc/Ideas claims they are already discounted by citation age, and you certainly confirm that they are over the last decade.
3. I have some doubts about the comparison between 2006 and 2015 the way you make it. On the one hand you have a series from a precise point in time (2006) back to infinity with no "aging factor". On the other hand you have a finite series spanning a decade (2015-2006) with an "aging factor". It sounds to me rather like matching two radically different concepts. So I doubt this kind of (new) presentation, that we didn't know about previously, is really "better" or, rather, useful for the issue at hand.
4. Just one word on what your describe as my "mischaracterization". I do recognise that many of the economists on the list have made tremendous contributions and of course ideas do change slowly. My point is different, however - it is not a matter of how good people were at predicting the inflection point of a crisis, but how hindered were some of them at reading the underlying imbalances, as they were misled by theory (REH, perfectly self-regulating markets, and the like). This stays with us and is relevant still today.
5. After all, your findings about the top 10, 20, 50, and 100 slots do confirm stickiness at the top and lack of geographic/gender balance, if somewhat less dramatic. We can argue on this and I am sure much else can be said one way or another. But I feel the main points (persistence, lack of geographical and gender dispersion) will stay with us anyway.
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