破解企业高管操纵股票期权的难题

美国坎布里奇­——

高管薪酬是当今企业董事会和政府监管者关注的焦点之一。而在关于高管薪酬的争论之中,有一个问题需要更深入的研究:对于作为激励手段给予企业高管的股权型报酬,高管自身在其兑现时间上应具备多大自由度。在标准的薪酬制度下,高管对于何时卖出股份、执行期权享受很大自由度。这种自主权既无必要、也无益处。

如果高管有权决定何时兑现此类报酬,他们就能够凭借其掌握的关于自己公司的独家信息,在股价下跌前抛出股票。虽然据认为,关于内幕交易的法规能够防止高管利用“硬”信息,但他们通常唾手可得的“软”信息也能使其在市场上占据优势。事实上,有充分的证据表明,企业高管通过自己公司的股票交易获得了可观的“非正常利润”,即高于市场平均水平的收益。

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