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التكلفة الاقتصادية لأردوغان

Aug 24, 2018 Timur Kuran , Dani Rodrik

دورهام / كمبريدج ــ لطالما فقد النموذج السياسي لتركيا بريقه، لكن الأزمة الدبلوماسية الحالية مع الإدارة الضالة للرئيس الأمريكي دونالد ترامب دفعت اقتصاد البلاد إلى أزمة العملة الخانقة. و على مدى الإثني عشر شهراً الماضية، فقدت الليرة التركية ما يقرب من نصف قيمتها. وبما أن البنوك والشركات التركية لديها الكثير من الديون بالعملات الأجنبية، فإن السقوط السريع لليرة يهدد بانهيار معظم شركات القطاع الخاص.

بعد فوزه في الانتخابات الأولى التي أجريت في يونيو / حزيران، بعد تحول رسمي لتركيا من النظام البرلماني إلى النظام الرئاسي، بدأ الرئيس رجب طيب أردوغان يحكم البلاد بشكل رسمي. وهو يعتمد على وزراء الحكومة الذين يعينهم على أساس ولائهم (أو وجود روابط عائلية مع أردوغان)، بدلاً من كفاءاتهم.

ومنذ أكثر من عقد من الزمان، أعطت الأسواق المالية امتيازات لأردوغان، الذي شغل منصب رئيس الوزراء حتى عام 2014، وقدمت قروضا كبيرة للاقتصاد التركي. وأصبح النمو الاقتصادي يعتمد على التدفق المستمر لرأس المال الأجنبي، الذي تم من خلاله تمويل الاستهلاك المحلي والاستثمارات النشطة في الإسكان والطرق والجسور والمطارات. نادرا ما تنتهي هذه الأشكال من النمو الاقتصادي بشيء جيد. وكان السؤال الحقيقي الوحيد هو متى سيحدث هذا بالضبط.

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Timur Kuran

Writing for PS since 2011
6 Commentaries

Timur Kuran is Professor of Economics and Political Science at Duke University and the author of The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East.

Dani Rodrik

Writing for PS since 1998
151 Commentaries

Dani Rodrik is Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is the author of The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science, and, most recently, Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy.

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Alexey Tuzikov Dec 6, 2018

"As in Russia and Venezuela, a few courageous dissidents are allowed to exist on the margins of public discourse, to provide a semblance of free speech." In the US there are even fewer courageous criticts of American hawkish totalitarian world dictatorship behavior that ruined so many good countries or hit its population hard by whim sanctions. The US media "is packed with yes-men (and some token yes-women), who strive to satisfy [the American] sense of omniscience and magnificence". - any journalist, academic, think tank fellow, politician or businessman who would try to suggest to look at American foreign policy (for example towards Russia) differently, would be mocked, ridiculed, ostracized, fired, and would lose orders.

I have great respect for Mr. Kuran and Mr. Rodrik, but mentioning issues with one system and not the other they just reveal their bias.
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j. von Hettlingen Aug 26, 2018

Timur Kuran and Dani Rodrik are right about how a country’s economy could change from good to worse within a decade. While external factors may play a role, Turkey’s woes are home-grown. After a sharp downturn in 1999-2001, economy grew by 5% a year on average, since Erdogan’s AK party came to power in 2002. The staggering annual inflation rate of up to 100% was reduced to single digits, while GDP rose by more than 45% in real terms.
Turkey was stable, despite wars and turmoil in the region. Its banks avoided the boom-bust cycle of the past, having learned from the banking crisis in 2000-2001. Inequality had fallen. And the government won three consecutive elections, each time with a greater share of the popular vote. In his 2014 new year's speech, Erdogan renewed his goal to bring the country into the top 10 world economies by 2023, the year of the republic's centennial.
But Turkey’s economy was debt-fuelled, boosted by “easy credit.” Its growth relied heavily on a “steady flow of foreign capital to finance domestic consumption and flashy investments in housing, roads, bridges, and airports” – all first class infrastructure thanks to advanced engineering. A high-speed railway links Ankara with other parts of the country. Despite the lack of oil and gas resources, its industry and services were competitive. Tourism alone attracted some 36 million visitors in 2012, making Turkey one of the world's top destinations.
Unlike today – Erdogan’s ministers are “selected more for their loyalty (and family ties to him) than for their competence” – Turkey’s economy was managed by a team of technocrats, led by the deputy prime minister, Ali Babacan, who stuck to basics and looked to the long term. Step by step, his strategy to rebuild the banking sector, get the budget under control, and invest heavily in infrastructure, education, health, and technology, bore fruit.
Before Erdogan ditched science and introduced a new school curriculum focusing on more Islam, Turkey's universities were flourishing. Ankara became a hub of higher education, attracting students from Africa and Asia, offering top programmes in English, while ensuring that Turkey would attract an increasing number of international students. It began to invest in sustainable technologies, taking advantage of its wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy, hopping to become a global exporter of advanced green innovations.
On the diplomatic front Turkey was a staunchly moderate voice in a region dogged by Islamist extremism. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was the architect of its “zero problem with the neighbours’ policy,” which aimed to help Turkey not only to maintain its own internal balance, but also to win markets and keep friends without the heavy baggage and risks of divisive geopolitics.
Turkey's political stability began to unravel after the eruption of a corruption scandal that led to the resignation of four cabinet ministers and a summer of street unrest in 2013, shaking Erdoğan's international credibility. The investigations triggered a record low of the Turkish lira and a huge sell-off of Turkish stocks. Since then the country descended gradually into autocracy. The failed coup in July 2016 led to a massive crackdown involving “80,000 arrests, 170,000 firings, the closure of 3,000 schools, dormitories, and universities, and the dismissal of 4,400 judges and prosecutors.”
The author says, Erdogan “claims credit for whatever goes well and blames dark forces – often unnamed foreign conspirators – for failures.” His self-veneration, self-delusion of infallibility, “and ultimately political survival are portrayed as Turkey’s supreme goals.” Everything else that does not serve his interests, “takes a back seat to strengthening his rule. And in return for his sacrificial services to the Turkish nation, he is entitled to be above all laws and to enrich himself and his close associates.”
This self-serving behaviour “harks back to the Ottoman ‘circle of justice’ that divided the population into taxpaying masses and a small tax-exempt elite headed by a sultan who was subordinate only to the Sharia (Islamic law), though in practice he himself defined what it meant. The ‘circle of justice’ was officially repealed in 1839, through an edict that ushered in an era of restructuring. Nearly two centuries later, Erdogan has taken Turkey back to a past that generations of reformers tried to leave behind.”
Now he has fallen out with the Trump administration, that has decided to use sanctions “(and the threat of more)” to press Turkey to release Andrew Brunson, an American evangelical pastor based in Izmir, who was arrested during the purges following the 2016 failed coup. It remains to be seen whether Erdogan will win this tug-of-war, and whether he is still optimistic that Turkey would join the exclusive club of the world’s top ten economies in 2023 to mark its centenary as a republic.
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Barry Rosenfeld Aug 26, 2018

A very informative article, but it fails to ascertain the degree to which Erdogan pushed for economic growth and prosperity, good things in themselves, in order to enhance his personal political power. Now he has emerged as a typical Middle East tyrant. Another disappointment for the fantasists in the West who had hoped for something different, a model of how a country in that region could become a pluralistic democracy.

Europe needs an economic revival in Turkey (not to keep Erdogan from unleashing another refugee tsunami), but because several major European banks are heavy creditors of Turkish banks and businesses who borrowed in Euros and dollars. Unlike Greece, however, European institutions cannot browbeat Turkey into surrender. Erdogan probably will choose to follow the well-trod paths of Third World dictators and sell the country to China, which is awash is hard currency. Mercantilism pays!
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Aycan Hickey Aug 26, 2018

Financial markets have indeed given Erdogan the benefit of the doubt, aided and abetted by politicians. I doubt these are naïve enough to believe Erdogan and his regime’s narrative, but in self-interest they probably will continue to do so. Your excellent piece touches on many facets of Turkey’s problems. The question is where do we go from here? Foreign powers and players may know what is the right thing to do but probably don’t have the incentive to take hard actions.
Ultimately the message has to reach Turkish citizens. I have no hope, short of a miracle, of reaching the people who are willing to believe whatever Erdogan says, at least not in the short-term, even as they see their purchasing power eroding. How to unite the other ~50% of the voting population to address the many issues? Economy is certainly a good starting point; education, agriculture, technology, industry … all require rebuilding and will create opportunities for many. The solutions need to come from Turkish citizens, with the hope that the foreign players, who your article has the potential to reach, take a longer-term view and are supportive.
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Turgay Sanac Aug 26, 2018

All in all, Turkey has been a proud sovereign state for centuries, will finally be able to defeat "The ongoing, primarily US-driven, trade attack/war"and the following tsunami of speculations, even without requesting for urgent foreign aid; and will remain so in current borders eternally. Meanwhile, indeed a key/rightful question has been arising regretfully: Is NATO a really reasonable/reliable/trustworthy alliance for Turkey at all/nowadays? On The Turkish Markets not only "Noise and Dust" day by day. On the contrary to the basic/deliberate/traditional pessimistic narrative in Europe, we are currently experiencing also "positive appraisals/reflections/thoughts" from other corners of the world; especially pretty friendly, encouraging forecasting from China. Finally; Are we standing actually before an immediate launch of "An Eurasian Triangle" by Turkey, Iran and Russia, associated with a (tri- or multilateral) platform for "Free-Trade/Currency, Capital & Goods Exchange/Own Rating Agencies (very possibly "powered by Blockchain Technology")?. I personally, and pretty frankly hope so.
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vivek iyer Aug 25, 2018

Turkey has had periodic crises because it has never been well managed. Nor has it been politically stable. Kuran and Rodrik may believe that they themselves represent the great mass or ordinary Turks. They are completely wrong. The truth is that the typical Turkish grandmother is to the Left of Seyla Benhabib and teaches LGBT studies at a Liberal Arts College.

Why pretend Erdogan is uniquely villainous? At least his power is based on elections. No doubt, there is an ongoing shake-out and many developers and other entrepreneurs will face ruin. Still, the next boom is likely to be based on higher productivity and real wages.
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Maurice Simpson Aug 24, 2018

There are major differences between Erdogan and Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey.

The latter worked from his vision for a future anchored on cultural/social/constitutional reforms, all detached from religious dogma, and where economic growth came as a consequence -- and without depending on foreign credit.

The former discovered that you could borrow from foreigners and induce economic growth without needing to show a blueprint on how to sustain it. That, combined with the deconstruction of the secular state which has now evolved into an autocracy , makes it even more critical that he obtains and maintains the support of consequential foreign powers. Can he?
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Peter Schaeffer Aug 24, 2018

A very different point here is that Europe loves Erdoğan. Europe claims to hate him, but the truth is otherwise. As long as Erdoğan keeps "refugees" (illegals migrants) out of Europe, Europe will kowtow to him as need be. To state this bluntly, Erdoğan is doing Europe's dirty work for it. As a consequence, he is indispensable and he knows it.
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Peter Schaeffer Aug 24, 2018

No one (including me) can predict the future of Turkey. However, contrary to some claims, the future may be a lot brighter than the neoliberals claim. Modern economic history records quite a few episodes where a highly indebted country devalued its currency, defaulted (in some cases), and then thrived. Of course, neoliberal orthodoxy predicts disaster in all such cases. Learning from reality is a not a strength of neoliberals.

Consider Canada in the 1990s, Canada massively devalued its currency (falling from 1.1302 CND per USS in Nov of 1991 to 1.5997 CND per USD in Jan of 2002), but did not default. Did devaluation help? Sure it did. Export growth drove Canadian growth for years. Consider Argentina after 2001. Argentina both massively devalued and defaulted. Growth after 2002 was very strong. Consider Russia. Russia both devalued and defaulted after 1998. Russia’s economy rebounded sharply. Consider Iceland. Iceland massively devalued after 2008. In some respects, Iceland defaulted as well. The boom in Iceland continues to this day.

Of course, the mother of all devaluations was the U.S. in the 1980s. The dollar peaked (see FRED series TWEXBPA) in March of 1985 at 128.437. It then fell to 90.493 in Apr/1988. Of course, the current account balance promptly righted itself. Of course, the real “mother of all devaluations” was when the U.S. went off the Gold Standard in 1993. However, that is another story.

The bottom line is that economic history shows that massive devaluations and even defaults can have a happy ending. Predicting disaster for Turkey simply reveals the prejudices of the neoliberal, cosmopolitan class. History suggests than ignoring the neoliberals may produce superior outcomes.
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Emanuel Müller Aug 24, 2018

The West is very likely to regain it's pre-industrial era peripheral status, while Turkey and colleagues regain mid-peripheral status and China and or India regain center status. As a consequence, Turkey might not align itself on the west politically from now on. As the technological edge of the West erodes, the relevance of its political system becomes discrete.
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