PARIS: Having effectively turned its back on the Cold War era by accepting three former Warsaw Pact countries as members, NATO must now focus its efforts in two directions: making certain that enlargement enhances security and stability in Europe; and renovating its command structures so as to meet the military challenges of today and tomorrow. An unusually favorable combination of skillful statesmanship (and plain good luck) will be required if this reconstruction of NATO is to succeed in strengthening, rather than diminishing, security. Four areas will be of vital importance:
1. managing relations with Russia:
2. defusing the transatlantic burden-sharing debate
3. dealing with the effects of France’s policy toward NATO
4. coping with the dilutive effects of expansion
Relations between Russia and NATO appear to have benefitted from a convergence of skill and good fortune. Although the Russians continue to express unhappiness with NATO enlargement, they have accepted it to the point of signing a substantive, balanced, and politically-binding document that draws Moscow closer to the West in institutional terms. Russia’s membership of what has become the G-8 plays a similar role.
Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.
Subscribe Now
But Russian grievances are not extinguished. An unfortunate chain of political events in Russia, or insufficient care by NATO in its handling of Russian interests and sensitivities could contribute to the strengthening of a "Versailles Treaty" syndrome in Russia. Territorial and ethnic tensions between Russia and its new NATO neighbors could incite similar results. Conversely, NATO must avoid the temptation of a US-Russian condominium making decisions above the heads of NATO’s European members.
Initially, the costs associated with enlargement were not a politically significant issue. After all, NATO expansion was essentially a political and strategic act, not a military one, given the absence of any significant threat against the countries of Western and Central Europe. However, the current mood of the U.S. Senate (best described as a mix of unilateralism and neo-isolationism), may make this the key issue in next spring’s debate to ratify NATO enlargement. Arguments will likely revolve around the scale of the expenditure (estimates range from $20 billion to $100 billion) and how these costs will be split between the U.S. and other NATO members.
America seems to assume a that Europe’s share will be anywhere between 66% and 85% of the total. Cash-strapped European countries, however, are unlikely to agree, so guaranteeing inflamed ratification debates in Europe, too. Moreover, America seems to expect NATO’s new members to devote 3% of their GDP to defense, above current Czech, Hungarian and Polish levels. Is it really sensible for transition economies to divert scarce budget resources towards increased defense spending? The paradox is that these countries would probably not contemplate such increases in the absence of NATO membership.
The American decision to limit the first intake of new members to three can be read as a pre-emptive move to limit the effects of the Senate’s burden-sharing debate. So, in a sense, the pace of NATO expansion is already dictated by American domestic political considerations.
Fraught relations between France and NATO are also an issue. France’s status as a member of NATO but not of its military command structure would normally be a side issue, as it was during the Cold War. In purely military terms, the problem is not of the first order: Frances’ absence from NATO’s command structure has not prevented effective, if sometime complicated, cooperation in coalition operations as in the Gulf, or Bosnia. However, France’s special status has taken on a new, and major, political dimension.
In the absence of the Soviet threat, American power is essentially untrammeled. This is good in the face of a common enemy, but also means that there is no countervailing influence in Europe to what the French call, with the zest of hyperbole, American hegemony. But a healthy alliance implies balance between its US and European pillars.
A European defense and security "identity", to use official jargon, can emerge in either of two ways. The first is a distinct European defense entity alongside NATO: a strategic and financial non-starter today. A more realistic alternative is to "Europeanize" elements of NATO’s command structure. Without a united core of European countries -- including France -- no meaningful European pillar can be built within NATO. Unfortunately, as was evident in Madrid, there is little harmony between French and US diplomacy: disagreement on NATO renovation and therefore on French integration in the command structure; painful agreement on the number of countries to be admitted into NATO in the first round; disagreement on costs...
Last but not least, is the challenge to avoid the loss of efficiency stemming from the growth in membership in a body where decisions are made on the basis of unanimity. A NATO with nineteen, and subsequently twenty-five or so members, will be cumbersome. In practice, it may be necessary to delegate some of alliance business to a subgroup of states. This now occurs to some extent in the framework of the"Quad", as meetings of senior officials from America, France, Germany, and the UK are known. Establishing a formal standing group (such as existed before France withdrew from the command structure in 1966) may be necessary, with Italy possibly included. However, such a body would not prevent acrimonious debate, particularly in view of the absence of any of the "new" NATO members.
In all these areas great care -- and also the hand of providence -- will be required if NATO is to remain a meaningful, positive organization from the standpoint of security and defense. The potential dilutive effect of enlargement, the inward-look of part of the U.S. body politic, and intra-alliance disagreements may well reduce NATO to marginal relevance or even reduce, rather than enhance, its contribution to international peace and security. There is however a serious chance of avoiding such a negative outcome.
To have unlimited access to our content including in-depth commentaries, book reviews, exclusive interviews, PS OnPoint and PS The Big Picture, please subscribe
Adekeye Adebajo
argues that Israel’s war in Gaza is accelerating the trend toward global apartheid, highlights the strengths and weaknesses of United Nations peacekeeping missions, criticizes the militarization of US engagement with Africa, and more.
The models are in place to achieve clean cooking for all, which would have enormous benefits for the climate, health, and gender equality. Now rich-country governments, the private sector, and international organizations must agree to provide the necessary funding at this week’s IEA Summit on Clean Cooking in Africa.
urge global leaders to provide the financing to end a practice with dire effects for health and the climate.
The dollar's strength, particularly against major Asian currencies, has triggered a wave of skittishness in financial markets. Can anything be done to stem the greenback's rise, and even if something can be done, should it?
asks whether anything can or should be done about the greenback's strength, especially against Asian currencies.
PARIS: Having effectively turned its back on the Cold War era by accepting three former Warsaw Pact countries as members, NATO must now focus its efforts in two directions: making certain that enlargement enhances security and stability in Europe; and renovating its command structures so as to meet the military challenges of today and tomorrow. An unusually favorable combination of skillful statesmanship (and plain good luck) will be required if this reconstruction of NATO is to succeed in strengthening, rather than diminishing, security. Four areas will be of vital importance:
1. managing relations with Russia:
2. defusing the transatlantic burden-sharing debate
3. dealing with the effects of France’s policy toward NATO
4. coping with the dilutive effects of expansion
Relations between Russia and NATO appear to have benefitted from a convergence of skill and good fortune. Although the Russians continue to express unhappiness with NATO enlargement, they have accepted it to the point of signing a substantive, balanced, and politically-binding document that draws Moscow closer to the West in institutional terms. Russia’s membership of what has become the G-8 plays a similar role.
Subscribe to PS Digital
Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.
Subscribe Now
But Russian grievances are not extinguished. An unfortunate chain of political events in Russia, or insufficient care by NATO in its handling of Russian interests and sensitivities could contribute to the strengthening of a "Versailles Treaty" syndrome in Russia. Territorial and ethnic tensions between Russia and its new NATO neighbors could incite similar results. Conversely, NATO must avoid the temptation of a US-Russian condominium making decisions above the heads of NATO’s European members.
Initially, the costs associated with enlargement were not a politically significant issue. After all, NATO expansion was essentially a political and strategic act, not a military one, given the absence of any significant threat against the countries of Western and Central Europe. However, the current mood of the U.S. Senate (best described as a mix of unilateralism and neo-isolationism), may make this the key issue in next spring’s debate to ratify NATO enlargement. Arguments will likely revolve around the scale of the expenditure (estimates range from $20 billion to $100 billion) and how these costs will be split between the U.S. and other NATO members.
America seems to assume a that Europe’s share will be anywhere between 66% and 85% of the total. Cash-strapped European countries, however, are unlikely to agree, so guaranteeing inflamed ratification debates in Europe, too. Moreover, America seems to expect NATO’s new members to devote 3% of their GDP to defense, above current Czech, Hungarian and Polish levels. Is it really sensible for transition economies to divert scarce budget resources towards increased defense spending? The paradox is that these countries would probably not contemplate such increases in the absence of NATO membership.
The American decision to limit the first intake of new members to three can be read as a pre-emptive move to limit the effects of the Senate’s burden-sharing debate. So, in a sense, the pace of NATO expansion is already dictated by American domestic political considerations.
Fraught relations between France and NATO are also an issue. France’s status as a member of NATO but not of its military command structure would normally be a side issue, as it was during the Cold War. In purely military terms, the problem is not of the first order: Frances’ absence from NATO’s command structure has not prevented effective, if sometime complicated, cooperation in coalition operations as in the Gulf, or Bosnia. However, France’s special status has taken on a new, and major, political dimension.
In the absence of the Soviet threat, American power is essentially untrammeled. This is good in the face of a common enemy, but also means that there is no countervailing influence in Europe to what the French call, with the zest of hyperbole, American hegemony. But a healthy alliance implies balance between its US and European pillars.
A European defense and security "identity", to use official jargon, can emerge in either of two ways. The first is a distinct European defense entity alongside NATO: a strategic and financial non-starter today. A more realistic alternative is to "Europeanize" elements of NATO’s command structure. Without a united core of European countries -- including France -- no meaningful European pillar can be built within NATO. Unfortunately, as was evident in Madrid, there is little harmony between French and US diplomacy: disagreement on NATO renovation and therefore on French integration in the command structure; painful agreement on the number of countries to be admitted into NATO in the first round; disagreement on costs...
Last but not least, is the challenge to avoid the loss of efficiency stemming from the growth in membership in a body where decisions are made on the basis of unanimity. A NATO with nineteen, and subsequently twenty-five or so members, will be cumbersome. In practice, it may be necessary to delegate some of alliance business to a subgroup of states. This now occurs to some extent in the framework of the"Quad", as meetings of senior officials from America, France, Germany, and the UK are known. Establishing a formal standing group (such as existed before France withdrew from the command structure in 1966) may be necessary, with Italy possibly included. However, such a body would not prevent acrimonious debate, particularly in view of the absence of any of the "new" NATO members.
In all these areas great care -- and also the hand of providence -- will be required if NATO is to remain a meaningful, positive organization from the standpoint of security and defense. The potential dilutive effect of enlargement, the inward-look of part of the U.S. body politic, and intra-alliance disagreements may well reduce NATO to marginal relevance or even reduce, rather than enhance, its contribution to international peace and security. There is however a serious chance of avoiding such a negative outcome.