The re-election of Presidents Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales for unlimited periods in Venezuela and Bolivia, respectively, reflects a phenomenon – caudillismo – that has never been far from the surface of Latin American politics. The weaker a country’s institutions, the more evident the inequalities, and the more concentrated the resources, the greater the caudillo’s powers will be.
LA PAZ -- The re-election for unlimited periods that Presidents Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales have sought in Venezuela and Bolivia, respectively, reflects a phenomenon – caudillismo – that has, sadly, never been far from the surface of Latin American politics. At least Russian president Vladimir Putin had the decency to honor the form of his country’s constitution when he recently promised to step down and run for parliament.
Of course, several recent Latin American presidents succeeded in changing their countries’ constitutions to lengthen their terms in office. Argentina’s Carlos Menem, the heir to Peronism, the continent’s most enduring form of caudillismo , was one such example, but his was a soft caudillismo , which basically maintained democratic norms .
C audillismo has two key facets. First, because it is, above all, a form of political representation, it can have its own local particularities. Second, although caudillismo personalizes politics, it depends less on the characteristics of the caudillo than on the social, political, and economic conditions of the country in which caudillismo takes root. In other words, although a caudillo ’s charisma matters, he or she is a social creation.
These two ideas are helpful in understanding Chávez and Morales. Like the old caudillos , they concentrate representation of their supporters in themselves. Whereas representation in democratic countries is based on people’s confidence that they can achieve a better future under their elected leaders, in countries like Venezuela and Bolivia nowadays, representation is based on a simple identification with the leader: “He’s one of us.”
The way “us” is defined links the caudillo with his supporters by building an uncomplicated and easily invoked collective identity that facilitates communication and political mobilization, while also implying submission by all citizens. Morales and Chávez always emphasize their humble origins in order to appeal emotionally to those who share those characteristics with them, and to blackmail those who do not.
This image is strengthened each time the caudillo engages in confrontation with some large, and usually vaguely defined, enemy: the Empire or the United States, the oligarchies, the traditional parties, or the transnational corporations.
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But caudillos have other uses for conflict: it allows them to strengthen the unity of their popular bases and evade the management responsibilities that exercising political power entails. They construct politics in such a way that there will always be an enemy to blame for any problems that arise.
Chávez and Morales have been accumulating power by dismantling their societies’ fragile institutional checks and balances, while permanently weakening their adversaries. Traditional parties and the administrations that preceded the caudillo are dismissed as corrupt and elitist. It follows from this that constitutions must be changed to reduce the role of Congress, subordinate the judiciary, and centralize economic resources. In such schemes, Chávez has so far had more success than Morales, whose Constitutional Assembly has not yet been able to organize itself. President Rafael Correa of Ecuador looks like he also wants to move in the same direction.
The rise of these modern caudillos reflects a crisis in political parties and an acute intensification of social unease across the continent. Latin America’s economic and social structures remain marked by great inequality, weak institutions, and an abundance of natural resources. Chávez and Morales, each in his own way, have taken advantage of this situation, worsening conditions to enfeeble their opponents and living off the wealth generated by natural resources, not new economic activity.
With a popular base that demands change – and that knows that change requires gaining access to state-owned wealth – social attitudes have developed that are receptive to the promises made by the caudillos . The weaker a country’s institutions, the more evident the inequalities, and the more concentrated the economic resources, the greater the caudillo’s powers will be.
Concentration of resources is probably the key factor, because it increases both the discretionary power of whoever controls them and the population’s social expectations, which in the end cannot ever be met, because the caudillo’s power depends on maintaining that concentration of resources. Caudillismo will be weakened only if profits are not captured by the state, but directly shared with citizens in a stable and continuous manner.
A decline in extreme poverty and inequality, and the creation of trustworthy institutions, can be achieved in the country’s beguiled by caudillismo only if the caudillo loses control of the wealth that sustains his rule.
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LA PAZ -- The re-election for unlimited periods that Presidents Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales have sought in Venezuela and Bolivia, respectively, reflects a phenomenon – caudillismo – that has, sadly, never been far from the surface of Latin American politics. At least Russian president Vladimir Putin had the decency to honor the form of his country’s constitution when he recently promised to step down and run for parliament.
Of course, several recent Latin American presidents succeeded in changing their countries’ constitutions to lengthen their terms in office. Argentina’s Carlos Menem, the heir to Peronism, the continent’s most enduring form of caudillismo , was one such example, but his was a soft caudillismo , which basically maintained democratic norms .
C audillismo has two key facets. First, because it is, above all, a form of political representation, it can have its own local particularities. Second, although caudillismo personalizes politics, it depends less on the characteristics of the caudillo than on the social, political, and economic conditions of the country in which caudillismo takes root. In other words, although a caudillo ’s charisma matters, he or she is a social creation.
These two ideas are helpful in understanding Chávez and Morales. Like the old caudillos , they concentrate representation of their supporters in themselves. Whereas representation in democratic countries is based on people’s confidence that they can achieve a better future under their elected leaders, in countries like Venezuela and Bolivia nowadays, representation is based on a simple identification with the leader: “He’s one of us.”
The way “us” is defined links the caudillo with his supporters by building an uncomplicated and easily invoked collective identity that facilitates communication and political mobilization, while also implying submission by all citizens. Morales and Chávez always emphasize their humble origins in order to appeal emotionally to those who share those characteristics with them, and to blackmail those who do not.
This image is strengthened each time the caudillo engages in confrontation with some large, and usually vaguely defined, enemy: the Empire or the United States, the oligarchies, the traditional parties, or the transnational corporations.
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Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.
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But caudillos have other uses for conflict: it allows them to strengthen the unity of their popular bases and evade the management responsibilities that exercising political power entails. They construct politics in such a way that there will always be an enemy to blame for any problems that arise.
Chávez and Morales have been accumulating power by dismantling their societies’ fragile institutional checks and balances, while permanently weakening their adversaries. Traditional parties and the administrations that preceded the caudillo are dismissed as corrupt and elitist. It follows from this that constitutions must be changed to reduce the role of Congress, subordinate the judiciary, and centralize economic resources. In such schemes, Chávez has so far had more success than Morales, whose Constitutional Assembly has not yet been able to organize itself. President Rafael Correa of Ecuador looks like he also wants to move in the same direction.
The rise of these modern caudillos reflects a crisis in political parties and an acute intensification of social unease across the continent. Latin America’s economic and social structures remain marked by great inequality, weak institutions, and an abundance of natural resources. Chávez and Morales, each in his own way, have taken advantage of this situation, worsening conditions to enfeeble their opponents and living off the wealth generated by natural resources, not new economic activity.
With a popular base that demands change – and that knows that change requires gaining access to state-owned wealth – social attitudes have developed that are receptive to the promises made by the caudillos . The weaker a country’s institutions, the more evident the inequalities, and the more concentrated the economic resources, the greater the caudillo’s powers will be.
Concentration of resources is probably the key factor, because it increases both the discretionary power of whoever controls them and the population’s social expectations, which in the end cannot ever be met, because the caudillo’s power depends on maintaining that concentration of resources. Caudillismo will be weakened only if profits are not captured by the state, but directly shared with citizens in a stable and continuous manner.
A decline in extreme poverty and inequality, and the creation of trustworthy institutions, can be achieved in the country’s beguiled by caudillismo only if the caudillo loses control of the wealth that sustains his rule.