Ever since democracy appeared in ancient Athens, it has generated suspicion among those who believe that humanity’s highest purpose is virtue, not freedom. We may not share such critics' disdain for democracy, but they have a legitimate point: how can high ethical standards be ensured when democratic elections tend to reward self-interest and the lowest common denominator?
WARSAW -- Ever since democracy appeared in ancient Athens, it has generated suspicion among those who believe that humanity’s highest purpose is virtue, not freedom. In the Eighth Book of The Republic , Plato rather unceremoniously defines political leaders in a democracy as “those who deprive the rich of their estates to distribute them among the people, at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves.” Of course, Plato’s disdain for democracy is never far from the surface of his prose, yet he has a legitimate point: how, after all, can high ethical standards be ensured when democratic elections tend to reward self-interest and the lowest common denominator?
WARSAW -- Ever since democracy appeared in ancient Athens, it has generated suspicion among those who believe that humanity’s highest purpose is virtue, not freedom. In the Eighth Book of The Republic , Plato rather unceremoniously defines political leaders in a democracy as “those who deprive the rich of their estates to distribute them among the people, at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves.” Of course, Plato’s disdain for democracy is never far from the surface of his prose, yet he has a legitimate point: how, after all, can high ethical standards be ensured when democratic elections tend to reward self-interest and the lowest common denominator?