Comments 1

值得欢迎的放射性元素银行

Aug 24, 2015 Gareth Evans

堪培拉—世界从伊朗核传奇中学到的众多教训之一是其领导人在20世纪60年代谈判核不扩散条约式犯了一个错误，没有做任何事情约束铀浓缩和钚再处理。这一错误显然源自一个早就在铀问题上被证明错误的信念——仅有的那些有可能拥有这一技术能力的国家要么已经拥有了核武器，要么（如德国）承诺永远不会拥有该能力。

结果，任何成员国都可以主张根据核不扩散条约拥有追求核燃料循环任何阶段的“不可侵犯的权利”。尽管这一权利只适用于“和平目的”活动，但存在巨大的漏洞。任何有技术能力的国家——目前有几十个之多——都可以建造核浓缩设施，只要官方目的是为核能或研究性反应堆生产能源，但它们当然都有能力制造核武器所需要的更高级别的燃料。

这些设施被称为“核弹发射装置”不是没有道理，伊朗在这方面取得进展——不管是否有意设计成具有潜在武器突破能力——让国际社会的许多国家恐慌不已。因此才会有如此大的压力促成了现在摆到台面上的协议，该协议极大地限制了伊朗的核浓缩能力。

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Gareth Evans

Writing for PS since 2010
70 Commentaries

Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia (1988-1996) and President of the International Crisis Group (2000-2009), is currently Chancellor of the Australian National University. He co-chairs the New York-based Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect and the Canberra-based Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. He is the author of The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All and co-author of Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015.

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Archana Rajarajan Aug 26, 2015

A nuclear fuel bank was in the offing for too long a time and the upcoming facility in Kazakhstan is a very practical step towards containing proliferation by denying an oft-cited excuse to uranium enrichment and reprocessing by states that harbour military dimensions to their nuclear programme. But will this option really appeal to all those states with a large civilian nuclear programme and who are wary of the enhanced monitoring of IAEA through the operation of the additional protocol ( e.g. Egypt and Brazil ) or worse the states that question the very edifice of the NPT (e.g. India and Israel )? The Fuel Bank will not make much of a difference in the above two cases but will largely benefit states that possess a modest civilian nuclear programme at times of disruption of nuclear fuel. In any case this is a welcome step in troubled times for the NPT. !!