Paul Lachine

绑架欧洲央行

纽约—关于欧洲眼下的政治分歧、特殊利益和短视经济考虑,没有比重组希腊主权债务争论更好的写照了。德国坚持要实行深度重组,至少要债权人“牺牲”50%,而欧洲央行坚持债务重组必须是自愿的。

换做从前——比如20世纪80年代的拉美债务危机——急于平息事态的政府和监管者可以把债权人(主要是大型银行)关进小黑屋,威逼利诱一番,然后就达成了协议。但是,随着债务证券化时代的到来,债权人数量比以前有了暴增,对冲基金等监管者和政府很难对其施加影响的投资者也被包括了进来。

此外,金融市场的“创新”使得证券所有者可以获得保险,这意味着他们也入了局,不再是“事不关己”了。他们确实有利益在其中:他们想获得保险,这意味着重组必须是“信用事件”,也就是违约。欧洲央行坚持“自愿”重组——也就是说,避免了信用事件的发生——无异于站到了债权人的对立面。其中的讽刺之处在于,监管者坐视这一怪胎体系的产生。

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