English

Iran’s Iraq Calculations

Sep 16, 2014 Alex Vatanka

With the spread of ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq, Iran’s image as an island of stability in a conflict-ridden Middle East may prove to be short-lived. Its government now faces serious questions over its Iraq policy, which could eventually threaten Iran’s own national security.

WASHINGTON, DC – With the spread of ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq – brought to new levels of terror by the rise of the Islamic State (IS) – Iran’s image as an island of stability in a conflict-ridden Middle East may be short-lived. Its government – already struggling to manage a decrepit economy and tricky nuclear negotiations with the international community – now faces serious questions over its Iraq policy and a “winner-takes-all” mindset that could eventually threaten Iran’s own national security.

Iran’s policy toward its western neighbor appears to have two main goals: preservation of influence there, and prevention of any spillover of Iraq’s ethnic conflicts into its own multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society. But, as Iran steps up military support for the Iraqi government, Iranian officials fear, quite reasonably, that intervention could suck the country into an open-ended sectarian civil war.

Iran took a big step in that direction following the fall of Mosul on June 10, when regular Iraqi army units disbanded and fled in the face of a few hundred IS fighters. With Iraq’s then-prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, losing his grip on the country, Iran quickly decided to send military advisers, drones, and, by some accounts, Iranian-piloted fighter jets.

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0 Comments on this paragraph, 2 Comments on this article

j. von Hettlingen Sep 17, 2014

Alex Vatanka, "Iran's Iraq calculations" focus on a review of Tehran's interests and objectives vis-a-vis its neighbours and its historic rival - Saudi Arabia. Above all other considerations, Tehran seeks to prevent Iraq from breaking up into "separate Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish states".
It's true that an "independent Kurdistan" could inspire Iran's and Turkey's Kurdish minority to follow the Iraqi example. While Iran has a Sunni minority - "some 10% of the population", with "militant elements that could mobilize against the government", Sunni states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE share the same concern about their own Shiite minority. So an interfaith dialogue could help overcome trust deficit. The question is, whether both rivals are ready to get off their high horses and stop making "geopolitical calculations in zero-sum terms". Relationships in the Middle East are forged on personal level. Before the 1979 Iranian Revolution the Shah and the Saudi King got on with each other.
In this power struggle over hegemony in the region, Tehran is willing to take the short-end of the stick, like approving "the removal of Maliki in favor of Haider al-Abadi." It knows that its support for Maliki's sectarian policies were the roots of today's evil, on which ISIS had built up a powerbase - by exploiting Sunni resentments towards the Shia-led government in Baghdad.
Yet Iran, like Pakistan has a powerful military, which is generally seen as a "state within a state" and which often doesn't respond to the civilian leadership. The elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards is made up of hardliners, who are anti-American and adhere to Iran's right to nuclear programme. They had fought in Syria alongside Assad's forces and they have much influence on the Shiite militias in Iraq, apart from strengthening the Iraqi forces.
President Hassan Rouhani is often at loggerheads with the hardliners, who don't favour a nuclear agreement with the West, as it would set an end to their clandestine economic activities. With a stalling economy, Iran may not be able to "step up military support for the Iraqi government", fearing, "that intervention could suck the country into an open-ended sectarian civil war".
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hari naidu Sep 16, 2014

I notice this guy is employed by US Air Force think-tank...on Iran and its strategic policy matters. He also writes for Jerusalem Post...

The views expressed by him have no evidence of Iranian context or policy. Yet Iran has reached out to Saudi's on IS - inside Syria-Iraq. Iran has also reached out to Erdogan - not least because IS recruits are (also) coming from Turkey. Egypt and Sunni's generally oppose Turkey's policy towards Muslim Brother's and Hamas.

In the midst of sectarian violence and whatnot in ME, Iran appears to be an island of historical stability. Even Obama/Kerry have tried to involve Iran against IS sectarian warfare in the region. But they have been refused by the Iranian Mullah's.

The argument that Iran - P5+1 negotiations on NPT nuclear safeguards clauses under IAEA is subject to political blackmail (Israel!) may not be plausible when, in fact, both sides have now made clear an agreement is in interest of both parties. EU, in particular, favours an agreement by Nov 2014 deadline.

Let's try to be a little more factual about who is financing IS and its earlier links to CIA and currently GCC (Qatar). To bring about regime change in Syria, Obama approved military financing of IS and its earlier consorts.
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