The world has been transfixed by the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian election. But a different assertion of democratic and parliamentary power, this time in the Gulf sheikdom of Kuwait, which possesses 10% of world oil reserves, may prove to be equally important. Every sign indicates that the wave of democratization in Kuwait is irreversible, and the impact of these changes extends beyond Kuwait to all the other oil-rich Gulf countries, which are also ruled by emirs and sheikhs.

Indeed, these rulers now have much to ponder. The death of Kuwait’s ruler, Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah, on January 15, 2006, was followed by unprecedented national disquiet, which led to the rapid abdication of his designated successor, Saad Al Sabah. Nothing like this had ever hit the Al Sabah family, which has ruled Kuwait for two centuries.

Traditionally, the role of ruling Emir alternated (according to a tacit agreement) between two rival branches of the Al Sabah family – the Al Jaber and the Al Salem.  The succession was always strictly a family affair, and any disputes remained behind closed doors. However, with Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah’s death, the succession was not only subjected to feverish public debate, but the Kuwaiti press and Parliament were key actors in determining the outcome.

Kuwait’s political system is considered the most modern among the Arab Gulf sheikhdoms and monarchies, because all citizens – men and women alike – elect its parliament. Elections with universal suffrage, combined with a relatively free press, meant that the succession became a public issue, debated in the media and by academics for months as Sheikh Jaber was dying.

With the taboo on discussing the succession broken, talk about the physical and mental fitness of the likely successor became commonplace, and members of the ruling family who objected to the prospect of being ruled by a severely incapacitated crown prince came to enjoy broad support.

Thus, immediately after Jaber al-Sabah’s death, the succession became a national concern. What in the past would have been a straightforward palace coup spilled out onto the pages of newspapers and into the corridors of Parliament. The Crown Prince’s abdication became inevitable.

The cabinet of ministers affirmed the succession of Sabah al-Sabah as the new ruler, which was then ratified by Parliament. For the region, this was an historic moment. For the first time, an Arab parliament had voted a head of state out of office and asserted its will in choosing the successor. Parliamentary supremacy, one of the key issues in any country’s democratization, appears to be at hand in Kuwait.

Of course, Kuwait will now experience enormous tensions between the transparent rule of a true parliamentary government and the still powerful legacy of a hidden family-run state. But the old rule of force and intrigue by which other Gulf rulers have been deposed has been replaced by a modern principle – the Al Sabah have surrendered their exclusive control over the succession to the will of Parliament, which alone could provide the legitimacy that the new Emir needs.

The consequences of this assertion of parliamentary authority will be enormous.  Parliamentary ratification did not simply provide a rubber stamp to a palace coup; its approval was conditional. Emirs who need parliamentary approval to secure popular legitimacy must now reckon with the need to share power.

In exchange for voting to pass over the unfit Crown Prince, Kuwait’s parliament is now demanding even more political and economic reforms, including the formal legalization of political parties, the separation of the position of prime minister from that of crown prince, and even for the prime minister to be chosen from outside the Al Sabah family. This was a true parliamentary revolution.

According to Kuwait’s constitution, the new ruler has one year to appoint a crown prince, but he has to appoint a prime minister immediately. The delay is significant, because Kuwaitis are unaccustomed to this kind of parliamentary influence. The new Emir will now need to navigate skillfully between the Al Sabah family’s factions and a newly empowered parliament.

The victory of Parliament in Kuwait’s succession crisis is likely to lead some of Kuwait’s neighboring autocracies to stiffen their resolve against modernity and democracy. But Kuwait shows that there will invariably come a moment when holding onto feudal ways is no longer an option. The Kuwaiti model may be risky, but the alternative – simply ignoring the need for change – could prove fatal.