NEW YORK – Nothing illustrates better the political crosscurrents, special interests, and shortsighted economics now at play in Europe than the debate over the restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt. Germany insists on a deep restructuring – at least a 50% “haircut” for bondholders – whereas the European Central Bank insists that any debt restructuring must be voluntary.
In the old days – think of the 1980’s Latin American debt crisis – one could get creditors, mostly large banks, in a small room, and hammer out a deal, aided by some cajoling, or even arm-twisting, by governments and regulators eager for things to go smoothly. But, with the advent of debt securitization, creditors have become far more numerous, and include hedge funds and other investors over whom regulators and governments have little sway.
Moreover, “innovation” in financial markets has made it possible for securities owners to be insured, meaning that they have a seat at the table, but no “skin in the game.” They do have interests: they want to collect on their insurance, and that means that the restructuring must be a “credit event” – tantamount to a default. The ECB’s insistence on “voluntary” restructuring – that is, avoidance of a credit event – has placed the two sides at loggerheads. The irony is that the regulators have allowed the creation of this dysfunctional system.
The ECB’s stance is peculiar. One would have hoped that the banks might have managed the default risk on the bonds in their portfolios by buying insurance. And, if they bought insurance, a regulator concerned with systemic stability would want to be sure that the insurer pays in the event of a loss. But the ECB wants the banks to suffer a 50% loss on their bond holdings, without insurance “benefits” having to be paid.
There are three explanations for the ECB’s position, none of which speaks well for the institution and its regulatory and supervisory conduct. The first explanation is that the banks have not, in fact, bought insurance, and some have taken speculative positions. The second is that the ECB knows that the financial system lacks transparency – and knows that investors know that they cannot gauge the impact of an involuntary default, which could cause credit markets to freeze, reprising the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008. Finally, the ECB may be trying to protect the few banks that have written the insurance.
None of these explanations is an adequate excuse for the ECB’s opposition to deep involuntary restructuring of Greece’s debt. The ECB should have insisted on more transparency – indeed, that should have been one of the main lessons of 2008. Regulators should not have allowed the banks to speculate as they did; if anything, they should have required them to buy insurance – and then insisted on restructuring in a way that ensured that the insurance paid off.
There is, moreover, little evidence that a deep involuntary restructuring would be any more traumatic than a deep voluntary restructuring. By insisting on its voluntariness, the ECB may be trying to ensure that the restructuring is not deep; but, in that case, it is putting the banks’ interests before that of Greece, for which a deep restructuring is essential if it is to emerge from the crisis. In fact, the ECB may be putting the interests of the few banks that have written credit-default swaps before those of Greece, Europe’s taxpayers, and creditors who acted prudently and bought insurance.
The final oddity of the ECB’s stance concerns democratic governance. Deciding whether a credit event has occurred is left to a secret committee of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, an industry group that has a vested interest in the outcome. If news reports are correct, some members of the committee have been using their position to promote more accommodative negotiating positions. But it seems unconscionable that the ECB would delegate to a secret committee of self-interested market participants the right to determine what is an acceptable debt restructuring.
The one argument that seems – at least superficially – to put the public interest first is that an involuntary restructuring might lead to financial contagion, with large eurozone economies like Italy, Spain, and even France facing a sharp, and perhaps prohibitive, rise in borrowing costs. But that begs the question: why should an involuntary restructuring lead to worse contagion than a voluntary restructuring of comparable depth? If the banking system were well regulated, with banks holding sovereign debt having purchased insurance, an involuntary restructuring should perturb financial markets less.
Of course, it might be argued that if Greece gets away with an involuntary restructuring, others would be tempted to try it as well. Financial markets, worried about this, would immediately raise interest rates on other at-risk eurozone countries, large and small.
But the riskiest countries already have been shut out of financial markets, so the possibility of a panic reaction is of limited consequence. Of course, others might be tempted to imitate Greece if Greece were indeed better off restructuring than not doing so. That is true, but everyone already knows it.
The ECB’s behavior should not be surprising: as we have seen elsewhere, institutions that are not democratically accountable tend to be captured by special interests. That was true before 2008; unfortunately for Europe – and for the global economy – the problem has not been adequately addressed since then.


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MATTHEW MITOLA
I agree with Mr. Ganns comment. In 2008, perhaps even earlier via the Enron scandal, there was an opportunity to get it right by regulating and forcing the CDO/CDS onto a transparent exchange. If that is what collectively, society not government believes is the answer.
An sound argument can be made that the shadowy world of derivatives even moved into the bright light of an exchange would not heal the problem. Fictional based assets, such as derivatives and their associated high leverage ratios, realistically have no real place essentially in markets. They did not improve capital flow other than within inter/intra banks. That is, all benefit accrues only to the financial sector.
I would presume that the reason for the "inactivity" is a combination of all 3 reasons presented in the article. My question is why has not any one exposed the truth that none of these so called "haircuts" are write downs at all. They are merely swapping old debt with new future debt, in many cases at higher interest rates. A win to banks, private bond holders, a loss to sovereign nations and their taxpayers.
Moreover, although the FED and ECB has flooded the market with liquidity, the current M1 M2 money supply is slowing. This could have been expected applying some simple green eye shaded accounting. Even after transferring a great deal of their toxic assets to the central banks balance sheet, any quick review of the major banks assets still reveals depreciated, lousy or worthless assets. The FED and ECB balance sheets have doubled and tripled and perhaps are at the breaking point. And it really does not matter when you have a swaps market that is $700T more than 10X world GDP. The full throttle liquidity hose sprayed onto the majors balance sheet in reality was a small thin garden hose with a trickle given the size of the problem.
De leverage it looks like will only come in the disorderly fashion when the EU falls apart probably mid June, since global politicians so "owned" and indentured to the bankers lack any will to orderly wind down the non sense.
Lets hope that when the house of cards collapses, there is a return to real regulation on banks (Glass Steagall and repealing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 2000) and a return to banks that are beholding to a nation, a region or a local community.
"Our" collective experiment in "Global One" finance has been a dismal failure. We need to return to more "sizable" senses of community.
Jonathan Lam
Gamesmith94134: global finance’s Supply-chain Revolution
“Open feedback mechanisms ensure a supply chain’s ability to respond to a changing environment, but, in the case of financial supply chains, feedback mechanisms can amplify shocks until the whole system blows up.” It was because there is no firewall available during the crisis, and the pipeline was open with few operators in the financial control like Mr. Sheng said, also, there is even fewer currencies like Euro-dollar only was available in most transactions, even though the public funds like sovereignty debts were being privatized in the open trade, and it create the explosion by volume in sum of money was credited. Firewalls I took off the technical terminology means there is no safety transitory zone established physically, that our financial system allowed the flow in the supply chain freely as the computerized transaction allowed, and there is less time available for reexamination on application of control, source of origin, birth of credits.
Especially, when the parties took the international reserves for granted that Fed and ECB cut it interest rates to its minimal for the non-inflationary measure that many would consider money are free if they can beat the time.
Generally, the 22 players turned the international financial market into their casino. When their governments were the ones who called to upbeat its economies from the recession after the expansion of the debts hitting it fiscal ceiling, and the slow down cut their productivity in near recession. At the same time, the rigid exchange rate went lopsided that created the tension between the debtor and creditor. It exploded.
At present, the financial system must evolve itself with firewalls that stop contagion of the collateral damage over the money with no backing, and shrink the pool of cash for credit lending. Some might call it deleverage of the past 20 years mishaps, or change of climate in our global financial that the supply-chain must stop and check itself; besides, most of us would know by now that money supply and productivity are not on the same parallel at certain point under the influence of inflation an deflation. Without the assurance of the balance payment or imbalance of its exchange rates, the supply-chain will reverse itself.
Perhaps, I like it better if the sovereignty debt and private investment should not be classified as same in enjoying the low interest rate, that sovereignty debt should be handled separately by the Central Banks and World Bank if it does affect the exchange rate when evaluated by IMF for it answer to lack of control.
Transfer Unions must be established to void unsafe transaction and the Trans-continental Zoning to confirm the source of the origin on all transactions when the transaction is registered to enter its zones, or cut hot cashes that undervaluing ones currency from another that influences the international currency exchange rate. Besides, I see the floating rate system is a joke if it put sovereignty in defensive; and it should go with its yardstick like performance that values at each quarters.
Finally, international banks are “too big to fall” should became a legend only, and they must be downsized that international is not licensed to evade sovereignty. There are more of reforms available in regional account and obey to safety net where it allows. Perhaps, if the banker can purchase these sovereignty bonds and metro bonds from the central bank like FED or ECB instead of chasing the wild goose in the open market; the general public can have some credits available for doing business.
If someone question on the equities dealing among the banks, why only the politicians who talk over the policy on financial and there is no financial police system to oversight the banking as a whole. I think the United Nations Security Council can build a better division on financial security than G7 or G20, and it is inclusive for the globalized finance and my past experience tells me so. Evolve or not, we may stand by and watch the outcome of our present crisis and it not over yet till everyone would feel safe from hegemony through these firewalls. If some suggest cooperation from community in forgiving ones’ debt, it would be worse than my New Year project in losing weight every year, and I have been laughing at myself all my life. Without firewall in safeguard one’s wealth, each would isolate itself from contagion for a long, long time.
May the Buddha bless you?
Stephen R. Ganns
Dr. Stiglitz,
Nice commentary: which gets to the heart of the matter.
The Bank for International Settlements has been warning on this topic of hyper-leverage in these “efficient markets” for years. The truth is that at the heart of this crisis, has always and forever been the OTC Swaps markets. It’s why we can’t clear the various asset classes. The basic “gap” is and has been quantifiable—but the leak could not be staunched as in earlier times—no matter how much stimuli. The variability of appended derivatives adds onerous pressures. Probably the correct action in mid 2008 would have been to suspend trading of all OTC swaps, confirm the trades, assess the “naked” transactions, and establish houses or exchanges for clearing post haste. Once quantified and done, calculate the real default severity and execute a modern Biblical Jubilee (or principal adjustment, we were due for one anyway)—then markets could have cleared and GDP could have had a real chance at recovery.
It’s as if Moses came down from the mountain with modern synthetic stone tablets; and the “Words” carved into these tablets courtesy of computer aided graphics of course, was: “Let the small businesses Plow Under, let the homeowners be foreclosed on wings of Hellfire, let the unemployed be stultified with rough-edged Brimstone: but at all costs and no matter what, save the “swaps” markets. This sadly, has given us not too big to fail, but its new evolutionary progeny “TOO Big to Bailout”.
Stephen R. Ganns
www.theindependnetfiduciary.org
Paul A. Myers
An excellent look at the policy shortsightedness of one of the great institutions of the policy elite.
But let's talk about the "weights and measures" dimension of this problem. The financial system needs standardized financial instruments, not lots of "one off" contracts that lack transparency and are easily manipulated. Standardized instruments would be more predictable, an important aspect of financial transactions.
Today, we have a complex financial system made up of too many nonstandardized parts. So we have something of a mess.
If we want to have a complex financial system--which might usefully serve many purposes--then we should look to standardized parts which can be arranged into highly complex structures. But the structures would ultimately be understandable and deconstructable. It seems to me that markets achieve their greatest efficiency when dealing with standardized products. And the finance system needs a lot of work to make sure that both sides of financial transactions operate efficiently.
What happens if we come out of the present European crisis with a financial system that is still messy and complex? One answer is that the game would begin all over again. Not much of a solution for a lot of pain.