Christianity's holiest days always seem to incite fresh disputes between Roman Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy, between the first Rome and the third Rome. This Easter is no different. What's new this time is that the current storm came out of the blue.

Last year, Russia's Patriarch Aleksei gave his blessing to a visit to Moscow by the Catholic girls' choir of the Saint Danilov monastery. Soon after, and more importantly, the Patriarch raised the level of Orthodoxy's representation at an ecumenical prayer called by Pope John Paul II in Assisi on January 24 ^th . This was to be followed by a visit to Moscow by a senior Vatican cleric, Cardinal Walter Kasper, President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity and the man who helped organize last year's papal visits to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Armenia. An invitation for the Pope to visit Moscow (a cherished dream of John Paul II) seemed near at last.

This budding goodwill ended when the Vatican announced plans to reorganize Catholic structures overseas, including within Russia. A Roman Catholic arch-diocese (headed by either a Cardinal or Archbishop) was to be created for Moscow. Four other apostolic districts in Russia were to be turned into dioceses. These changes were intended to ``grant greater opportunities for Catholic believers,'' according to Dr. Joaquin Navarro-Valls, the Vatican press officer.

The pope's press secretary called this a matter of mere ``technical change'' with nothing to do with ``proselytism.'' Similar measures, indeed, had recently been undertaken by the Moscow Patriach in relation to Orthodox parishes in Berlin, Vienna and Brussels.

Moscow's reaction was quick and withering. Archbishop Clement of Kaluga and Borovsk, the vice-chairman of Department for External Church Relations, declared that ``the actions outlined by the Vatican are in contravention of the canonical principles and norms of interchurch relations and stand as a serious obstacle to the development of dialogue between the two churches.'' Soon after, Cardinal Kasper's visit was canceled.

Not to be outdone, Russia's foreign ministry joined the fray. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov expressed ``regret'' at the Vatican's actions and, for the first time in many years, failed to make the obligatory call on the Holy See on his trip to Rome this March. A resolution to ``save Orthodoxy'' was rushed through the Duma and street protests aimed at the papal nuncio took place.

All of this was taking place around the time that Pope John Paul II was making a ``virtual'' pilgrimage to Moscow via the internet. This was accomplished through a televised transmission which connected the Apostolic Palace of the Vatican with the Church of the Immaculate Conception in Moscow. Speaking on gigantic television screens, Karol Wojtyla blessed Catholic believers in Russian. But this rather innocuous meeting did not go off without problems as, until the very last moment, the customs office at Moscow's international airport refused to approve the import of electronic equipment for the televised transmission.

Why is it that, at a time when America and Russia can begin to work together, Catholicism and Orthodoxy prefer to keep going after each other's throats? The current crisis has actually been burning underground for some time, and has broken to the surface now because the Moscow Patriarchate fears that there is a real possibility that John Paul II will be invited by President Putin to visit Russia on governmental matters. The Pope will be invited as a head of state (the Vatican) not in his spiritual capacity.

A stick with which to beat back any instinct in the Kremlin to issue such an invitation was needed by the Patriarch, and so the Vatican's decision to reorganize its dioceses in Russia must have seemed a godsend. The leadership of the Orthodox Church does not want to see the current Roman pontiff ever invited to Russia, and appear to be awaiting his replacement as the head of the Holy See.

Why is this? First, because the next pope will almost certainly not be Polish - indeed, is unlikely to be any sort of Slav. Second, the next Pope will not be endowed initially with such enormous moral authority as John Paul II has acquired across the world, and so the Patriarch will be able to speak publicly with him, and be measured against him, on something more like equal terms.

The sharp reactions of the Orthodox Patriarchate to the actions of the Holy See reflect an ongoing crisis of leadership and legitimacy within the Russian Orthodox church, where a battle is clearly underway for the succession of Aleksey II. After almost a century of oppression, the Orthodox Church is still struggling to define its role in Russia's postcommunist society, and finds it difficult to compete with more nimble (and self-assured) churches. Moreover, although younger than John Paul II, Patriarch Aleksey II has entered his own ``autumn of the patriarch.'' Sad to say, reconciliation between the two churches is thus unlikely to gain momentum until two new leaders begin to command their believers.