Georgia’s recent instability has dealt a blow to its international reputation as a new democracy, and poses a challenge to the European Union as well. Faced with street protests in November, President Mikheil Saakashvili claimed that Russian-Georgian tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili was conspiring to bring down the government. So he closed the opposition-leaning private Imedi TV station (owned by Patarkatsishvili) and introduced a state of emergency for nine days, before calling an early presidential election for January 5.

Ever since Saakashvili’s inauguration in January 2004, following the 2003 “Rose Revolution,” Georgia’s government has displayed EU flags on official occasions. Georgians share that enthusiasm. A poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in September 2007 indicated that 81% of Georgians support joining the EU.

But, regardless of the election’s outcome, the recent crisis exposes a lack of commitment by the EU to security and democracy in Georgia. Despite Georgia’s strategic location on the Black Sea, bordering Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey – and on a key trade route linking the EU, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia – Europe has dragged its feet on the country’s most enduring political problems.

On the Georgian side, It is well understood – at least by the political elite – that EU membership is a distant prospect at best. This weakens the political importance of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), an initiative developed in 2004 to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors. An EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan was signed in November 2006, but it is unlikely to meet expectations.

Indeed, the ENP comes second to co-operation with NATO as a priority for Georgia, in part because Georgians, feeling threatened by Russia, crave security above all. Moreover, while the recent state of emergency was a serious setback, NATO membership, unlike EU accession, is still within reach. This makes all the difference.

The security interests of Georgia and the EU coincide least when it comes to the so-called “frozen conflicts” in the Kremlin-backed breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – it is no accident that “Promoting Peaceful Resolution of Internal Conflicts” ranks only sixth among the ENP Action Plan’s priorities. Georgia wants a reluctant EU to be more engaged, but each side understands engagement differently.

The EU supports politically uncontroversial confidence-building measures that can reap results only in the long term, if ever. The Georgian government views the Abkhazian and Ossetian conflicts as the country’s principal security threat and impediment to development. It expects bolder moves from the EU, such as explicit endorsement of the Georgian-Ossetian working group, which includes the alternative, pro-autonomy South Ossetian government of Dmitri Sanakoyev, but is boycotted by the pro-Russian separatist government in Tskhinvali. The EU has avoided any such gesture, seeking to avoid further tension with Russia.

On the other hand, there are better prospects for strengthening the EU’s role in democracy development. “Strengthening the Rule of Law, Building State Institutions, Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” occupies first place in the ENP Action Plan. Though judicial independence and protection of human rights remain conspicuously weak, Saakashvili’s government has increased the civil service’s efficiency, improved public infrastructure, fought corruption, reduced crime, and created an attractive investment environment.

However, the opposition’s shortcomings pose a further obstacle to democratic development. The government’s opponents can mobilize public protests, as they did in November, but they are much less capable of formulating alternative policy agendas and attracting support for them. With no internal system of checks and balances in Georgia – the only way to sustain democratic institutions – the international community becomes a compensating actor, with the EU well placed to take the lead.

In fact, while the Saakashvili government’s clampdown showed the structural weaknesses of Georgia’s democracy, the aftermath has also shown that Georgia’s Western ambition remains intact, because the government understands that it cannot afford any long-term deviation from democratic norms.

The EU’s special representative in the South Caucasus, Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby, played a crucial role in bringing back Imedi TV in time to restore media balance ahead of the presidential election – possibly the first time that the EU took a leading role in seminal political events in Georgia. This was not part of any prefigured Action Plan, but it shows that, given the political will, the EU can play an active role in promoting democracy and stability.