WEEKLY SERIES

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

STRATEGIC SPOTLIGHT

GLOBAL FINANCE

ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT

ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY POLICY

ECONOMIC HISTORY

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS

GLOBAL OUTLOOK

REGIONAL EYE

SPECIAL SERIES

PROJECT SYNDICATE

Finance in the 21st Century

A People’s Economics

English Spanish Russian French German Italian Czech Chinese Arabic

2011-01-20

NEW HAVEN – We are in the midst of a boom in popular economics: books, articles, blogs, public lectures, all followed closely by the general public.

I recently participated in a panel discussion of this phenomenon at the American Economic Association annual meeting in Denver. An apparent paradox emerged from the discussion: the boom in popular economics comes at a time when the general public seems to have lost faith in professional economists, because almost all of us failed to predict, or even warn of, the current economic crisis, the biggest since the Great Depression.

So, why is the public buying more books by professional economists?

The most interesting explanation I heard was that economics has become more interesting, because it no longer seems to be a finished and closed discipline. It is no fun to read a book or article that says that economic forecasting is best left to computer models that you, the general reader, would need a Ph.D. to understand.

And, in truth, the public is right: while there is a somewhat scientific basis for these models, they can go spectacularly wrong. Sometimes we need to turn off autopilot and think for ourselves, and when a crisis occurs, use our best human intellect.

The panelists all said, in one way or another, that popular economics facilitates an exchange between specialized economists and the broader public – a dialogue that has never been more important. After all, most economists did not see this crisis coming in part because they had removed themselves from what real-world people were doing and thinking.

Successful popular economics involves the reader or listener, in some sense, as a collaborator. That, of course, means that economists must be willing to include new and original theories that are not yet received doctrine among professional specialists.

Until recently, many professional economists would be reluctant to write a popular book. Certainly, it would not be viewed favorably in considering a candidate for tenure or a promotion. Since it does not include equations or statistical tables, they would argue, it is not serious work that is worthy of scholarly attention.

Worse than that, at least until recently, a committee evaluating an economist would likely think that writing a popular economics book that does not repeat the received wisdom of the discipline might even be professionally unethical.

Imagine how the medical profession would view one of its members who recommended to the general public some therapy that had not yet passed scrutiny from the appropriate authorities. Medical professionals know how often seemingly promising new therapies turn out, after careful study, not to work, or even to be harmful. There is a rigorous process of scholarly review of proposed new therapies, associated with professional journals that uphold high research standards. Circumventing that process and promoting new, untested ideas to the general public is unprofessional.

In the decades prior to the current financial crisis, economists gradually came to view themselves and their profession in the same way, encouraged by research trends. For example, after 1960, when the University of Chicago started creating a Univac computer tape that contained systematic information about millions of stock prices, a great deal of scientific research on the properties of stock prices was taken as confirming the “efficient markets hypothesis.” The competitive forces that underlie stock exchanges were seen to force all securities prices to their true fundamental values. All trading schemes not based on this hypothesis were labeled as either misguided or outright frauds. Science had triumphed over stock-market punditry – or so it seemed.

The financial crisis delivered a fatal blow to that overconfidence in scientific economics. It is not just that the profession didn’t forecast the crisis. Their models, taken literally, sometimes suggested that a crisis of this magnitude couldn’t happen.

One way to interpret this is that the economics profession was not fully accounting for the economy’s human element, an element that can’t be reduced to mathematical analysis.

The relatively few professional economists who warned of the current crisis were people, it seems, who not only read the scholarly economics literature, but also brought into play more personal judgment: intuitive comparisons with past historical episodes; conclusions about speculative trading, price bubbles, and the stability of confidence; evaluations of the moral purposes of economic actors; and impressions that complacency had set in, lulling watchdogs to sleep.

These were judgments made by economists who were familiar with our business leadership – their inspirations, beliefs, subterfuges, and rationalizations. Their views could never be submitted to a scholarly journal and evaluated the way a new medical procedure is. There is no established scientific procedure that could prove their validity.

Of course, economics is in many ways a science, and the work of our scholars and their computer models really does matter. But, as the economist Edwin R. A. Seligman put it in 1889, “Economics is a social science, i.e., it is an ethical and therefore an historical science….It is not a natural science, and therefore not an exact or purely abstract science.”

To me, and no doubt to the other panelists, part of the process of pursuing the inexact aspects of economics is speaking honestly to the broader public, looking them in the eye, learning from them, reading the emails they send, and then searching one’s soul to decide whether one’s favored theory is really close to the truth.

Robert Shiller, Professor of Economics at Yale University and Chief Economist at MacroMarkets LLC, is co-author, with George Akerlof, of Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism.

You might also like to read more from or return to our home page.

Reprinting material from this website without written consent from Project Syndicate is a violation of international copyright law. To secure permission, please contact distribution@project-syndicate.org.
English Spanish Russian French German Italian Czech Chinese Arabic

You must be logged in to post or reply to a comment.
Please log in or sign up for a free account.


LittleGary 11:04 20 Jan 11

Hoo boy. Try telling that to Paul Krugman. He acts like he's the pope of economics. 


dhlii 03:34 24 Jan 11

Economics is about human behavior.


DidierDufau 07:20 26 Jan 11

It's quite clear that more people than usual want to understand what is going on. They are deeply feeling that the crisis is so deep that some of the assumptions on which our global system is grounded are wrong or obsolete. 

The problem is that the official economists (those accepted in the media or allowed to publish books) , are not providing any clue on what happened and what should be done.Most of them are just taking side in ideological quarrels or trying to make money shaking the souls with inflamatory litterature.

Truth and real analysis on what is going on is more and more within special groups and individual thinkers that publishes ont the net. 

When you say that the crisis what not anticipated by economists, it is true if you look to official economics. It is perfectly wrong when you chack what has be written  on some blogs.  The "cercle des economiste e-toile", a french think tank produced a very precise forecast of the crisis (date, intensity, nature, scenario)  a soon as december 2006.

The important thing here is not the forecast but the method used, the facts selected and the mechanisms described.

The official economists are not providing what the people is looking for. Most books are mere descriptions or a posteriori rationalizations.

The real challenge for the media is to let fresh ideas coming from experts groups that are fully independant and not hiding behind their diplomas or positions  get some exposure. Ideas or theories should be taken into account according to their "pertinence"  not the official status of the source.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


AHodge 10:02 09 May 11

Dear Prof Shiller

I am a big fan of your work. And the Minsky followers, and the capex cycle folks. and Burns mitchell or anyone who sheds light on the business cycle

  the big prob with big models this time was no postwar data experience with a massive credit withdrawl.  The big prob with all economists except Minskyites--including perhaps you-- was they did know "anything" about credit markets.  So when three really big bad developments

1 complex derivative and other products and really bad accounting of them. (you" dont know doodly about accounting. could you model a market where the two sides of THE SAME derivative deal are carrying it at massively fifferent prices?(

2 the rise of "fake" insurance of all kinds. CDS fannie freddie on and on

3 the downsides of securitization as the new form of credit supply, including the investors running away and a magnitude increase in fraud possibilities,

so"you" had no clue initially. honestly neither did i at first. but folks knowlegeable in banking (incl Krugman for example) could tell that we had the resulting (still somewhat concealed to most) bank panic starting Aug 8 2007 on our hands.


AHodge 05:07 11 May 11

big models were more helpful (potentially) in forecasting parts of the stage 2 move to maxi recession by summer 2008

the withdrawl of "muni" and state finance in Feb could be easily modeled in state and local spending and jobs/income. just fully put through the data and assume the downtrend continues.

the first mini stimulus announced Jan 2008 actually worked, contrary to theologians reigning in our profession. it "masked" unfavorable trends in early 2008 then was withdrawn in summer just as we otherwise went over the falls

the outright jobs loss starting january was draining away incomes

the oil shock through july deflated real incomes

as a former full time modeler for 7 years, i would defy you to figure those without a model.

 we all know model weaknesses, turning points etc but there is no forecast substitute for a complete consistent scenario

all you had to do was add effects of banking  securitization and trade finance collapsing,

some were observed already like car sales down 10% by july. and the commodity collapse starting end july. "Soul searching" for the 95% who totally missed or later blamed Lehman? They need a world view do-over or another line of work.

 



AUTHOR INFO

Robert Shiller, Professor of Economics at Yale University, is co-author, with George Akerlof, of Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism.
Take a link for this article:
<a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/shiller75/English">A People’s Economics</a>