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Who Lost Europe?

Dani Rodrik

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2010-06-09

CAMBRIDGE – Financial meltdown has been averted in Europe – for now. But the future of the European Union and the fate of the eurozone still hang in the balance. If Europe doesn’t find a way to reactivate the continent’s economy soon, it will be doomed to years of gloom and endless mutual recrimination about “who sabotaged the European project.”

Having suffered a deeper economic collapse in 2009 than the United States did, Europe’s economy is poised for a much more sluggish recovery – if one can call it that. The International Monetary Fund expects the eurozone to expand by only 1% this year and 1.5% in 2011, compared to 3.1 and 2.6% for the US. Even Japan, in a deep slump since the 1990’s, is expected to grow faster than Europe.

European growth is constrained by debt problems and continued concerns about the solvency of Greece and other highly indebted EU members. As the private sector deleverages and attempts to rebuild its balance sheets, consumption and investment demand have collapsed, bringing output down with them. European leaders have so far offered no solution to the growth conundrum other than belt tightening.

The reasoning seems to be that growth requires market confidence, which in turn requires fiscal retrenchment. As Angela Merkel puts it, “growth can’t come at the price of high state budget deficits.” 

But trying to redress budget deficits in the midst of a collapse in domestic demand makes problems worse, not better. A shrinking economy makes private and public debt look less sustainable, which does nothing for market confidence.

In fact, it sets in motion a vicious cycle. The poorer an economy’s growth prospects, the larger the fiscal correction and deleveraging needed to convince markets of underlying solvency. But the greater the fiscal correction and private-sector deleveraging, the worse growth prospects become. The best way to get rid of debt (short of default) is to grow out of it.

So Europe needs a short-term growth strategy to supplement its financial-support package and its plans for fiscal consolidation. The greatest obstacle to implementing such a strategy is the EU’s largest economy and its putative leader: Germany.

Even though its fiscal and external accounts are strong, Germany has resisted calls for boosting its domestic demand further. Its fiscal policy has been expansionary, but nowhere near the level of the US. Germany’s structural fiscal deficit has increased by 3.8 percentage points of GDP since 2007, compared to 6.1 percentage points in the US. 

What makes this perverse is that Germany runs a huge current-account surplus. Projected to amount to 5.5% of GDP in 2010, this surplus is not far behind China’s 6.2%. So Germany has to thank deficit countries like the US, or Spain and Greece in Europe, for propping up its industries and preventing its unemployment rate from rising further. For a wealthy economy that is supposed to contribute to global economic stability, Germany is not only failing to do its fair share, but is free-riding on other countries’ economies.

It is Germany’s partners in the eurozone, especially badly hit countries like Greece and Spain, that bear the brunt of the costs. These countries’ combined current-account deficit matches Germany’s surplus almost exactly.  (The eurozone’s aggregate current account with the rest of the world is balanced.)

The traditional remedy for countries caught in the kind of crisis that Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland find themselves in is to combine fiscal retrenchment with currency depreciation. The latter gives the economy a quick shot of competitiveness, improves the external balance, and reduces the output loss and unemployment that accompany fiscal cutbacks. But eurozone membership deprives these countries of this powerful tool, and depreciation of the euro itself is of limited benefit since so much of their trade (around 50%) is with Germany and other eurozone members.

There are few other tools at hand. There is the usual call from international organizations and some economists for “structural reforms,” which in this context largely means increasing firms’ ability to fire workers. Whatever long-term benefits such reforms might bring, it is difficult to see how they would provide immediate benefits. Reducing the cost of firing workers will not increase demand for labor much when no one wants to hire new workers.

Short of dropping out of the eurozone, the only real option available to Greece, Spain, and the others to boost competitiveness is to engineer a one-time across-the-board reduction in nominal wages and prices for utilities and services. This is a difficult task under the most favorable circumstances. The European Central Bank’s low inflation target (2%) renders it virtually impossible, as it implies requisite downward adjustment in wages and prices of 10% or more.

So Germany’s refusal to boost domestic demand and reduce its external surplus, along with its insistence on conservative inflation targets for the ECB, severely undercuts prospects for European prosperity and unity. It virtually guarantees that Greece, Spain, and others with large private and public debts will be condemned to years of economic decline and high unemployment. At some point, these countries may well choose to default on their external obligations rather than endure the pain.

Germany’s leaders may take comfort in lecturing other governments about their profligacy. And it is true that some, like the Greek government, ran too-high deficits during the good times and endangered their future. But what about Spain or Ireland, where the borrowers were not the government but the private sector? If others borrowed too much, doesn’t it follow that Germans lent excessively?

If Germany wants the rest of Europe to swallow the bitter pill of fiscal retrenchment, it will eventually have to recognize the implicit quid pro quo. It must pledge to boost domestic expenditures, reduce its external surplus, and accept an increase in the ECB’s inflation target. The sooner Germany fulfills its side of the bargain, the better it will be for everyone. 

Dani Rodrik, Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, is the first recipient of the Social Science Research Council’s Albert O. Hirschman Prize. His latest book is One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth.

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Nico 04:52 10 Jun 10

I

agree with Rodrik, who, channeling Keynes, notes that these forms of crisis are just as much, if not more, to be blamed on those running large surpluses for sapping demand and causing the deficit country into a balance of payments crisis. The 'technocratic' solution is to follow the recommendations that Rodrik lays out: inflation, boosting domestic demand in Germany, etc., within the EU, to adjust the relative prices in the region to allow for the debtors to grow and inflate their way out of the crisis. However, the fundamental problem is that surplus countries, creditors, always have the upper-hand, as long as the debtors do not seriously consider default. I do not see Germany wiling to give up on its model anytime soon, woefully so, because their model depends on the "co-operation" of other European states. I think the lesson from Argentina was unequivocal: when faced with such a bind of total social collapse, it is better to default and leave the new 'cross of gold', because at then some economic and policy independence is regained and the costs are then placed on those who lent badly, as it should be.

www.perspectivos.blogspot.com


maruxo40 01:22 10 Jun 10

I also agree with the author. Europe is in the wrond direction.

 

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JohnBishop 04:02 10 Jun 10

A Win-Win approach to Rebalancing North and South Europe

 Credit markets are demanding that Spain, Portugal and Greece reduce their external borrowing and current account deficits.    Devaluation is not an option for Euro Zone members, so many economists are recommending that Spain, Portugal and Greece help local manufacturers become more competitive by forcing the private sector to cut nominal wage rates.   But despite 20 percent unemployment, Spain’s private sector wages are not falling.   Spanish manufacturing workers are already paid 40 percent less than German workers.   Even cheaper workers are available in Eastern  Europe (where wages are less than half the Spanish level) and in China where wage rates are about one euro per hour after recent strike settlements.   Even if a 10 percent reduction in Spain’s private sector nominal wage rates were politically feasible, can we have any confidence this will fix the problem?  I think not.   

There is a Win-Win strategy that takes advantage of Spain, Greece and Portugal greatest assets—lots of sun, beaches and a significantly warmer climate (particularly during fall, winter and spring).  According to the BBC climate web site, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Edinburgh and Berlin have only 1 or 2 hours of sun a day in November, December and January.   Almeria, Barcelona and Palma Spain and Brindisi Italy, by contrast, have over four hours of sun and day-time temperatures that make outdoor living attractive.    Instead of piling all of their vacation time into one long vacation in the summer, Northern European workers should be encouraged to  schedule more vacation time in the winter. 

 Governments can induce such a shift by offering discounts on airfares and rentals for vacationing in southern Europe in the fall, winter and spring (outside of high season).   School vacations could also be restructured.   


aspray 05:26 10 Jun 10

Is the lender/borrower relationship in government accounts characterized by the same incentives to bubble as are financial markets? To me the past few years have made obvious the need for enforced moderation. If policy makers were to focus on moderating growth periods through the buildup of security funds  for corrections, perhaps we could lessen the impact of financial and fiscal volatility. (or even simply the restriction of credit to some degree, after all it is all too obvious that during a boom over-leveraging is inevitable)

Moving forward I like the idea of lenders feeling pain for "excessive lending", but really there is an immense amount of capital flowing through global markets, where should it end up? My core question might be whether there is too much liquidity in the global market? As we saw with the Credit Crisis, investment assets are valued at hundreds or thousands of times the value of goods and governments are pumping more currency into them at prodigious rates. Is it possible that massive expansions in the monetary base could create asset bubbles without inflation in the price of goods? And is this what we've been doing for the past 20 if not 30 years?



AUTHOR INFO

Dani Rodrik, Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, is the first recipient of the Social Science Research Council’s Albert O. Hirschman Prize. His latest book is One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth.