BUENOS AIRES – Colombia’s presidential election at the end of May will be unique in many ways. Álvaro Uribe’s plans for a third term were dashed in March by the Constitutional Court, which, despite massive pressure, upheld the constitutional prohibition on serving more than two consecutive terms. Uribe’s absence has opened the election in unforeseen ways.

Although Uribe is now technically a “lame duck” president, he does retain considerable influence, and is trying hard to keep the issue of internal security – the central focus of his presidency – at the heart of the electoral battle. He has also sought to benefit from ratcheting up tensions with neighboring Venezuela, and counts on his dauphin, former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, to unite the country’s right-wing forces in order to ensure continuity with his policies.

But Colombia does not seem to want continuity at any price; instead it now appears to favor moderate revision of what Uribe has built over the past decade. This renovation comes in a form that is unusual in contemporary Colombian history. The alliance between presidential candidate Antanas Mockus and vice-presidential candidate Sergio Fajardo offers the possibility of a real break, because neither man comes from the currently weakened traditional liberal-conservative political milieu. Instead, each comes from the world of academia (both hold doctorates in mathematics).

Their principal – and successful – experience is in local politics. Mockus was mayor of Bogota and Fajardo mayor of Medellin, and both want to shift the government’s main priority from internal security to strengthening the rule of law, education, science and technology, productivity, and SOUND public finances. Neither is backed by urban political machines or shady armed organizations in rural areas, but by independent groups, non-ideologically inclined citizens, and new voters keen to cast their ballots for unconventional candidates. Both have ingeniously mobilized young people and made innovative use of online social networks.

The Mockus-Fajardo ticket proudly portrays the two men as political outsiders, with all the attendant risks and benefits. Their electoral platform – which also promotes a sense of generational change – is centered on their rejection of illegality and corruption, two issues that galvanize broad popular support. Indeed, this yearning for change is why Mockus, the son of Lithuanian immigrants, may reach the presidency in a country that experienced only a scant influx of foreigners in the twentieth century.

The Mockus phenomenon is in many ways the Colombian analog of the rise of “alternative” presidents across Latin America in recent years: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, José Mujica in Uruguay, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.

But Mockus is different. In contrast to men like Funes, Ortega, Mujica, and Chávez, whose careers began in guerrilla movements or failed coups, Mockus’s past is irreproachable. He has never been co-opted by private interests, be they political, economic, or criminal. He trusts his instincts and likes imaginative public policies, though this worries those who fear another messianic leader at the head of the government.

Moreover, Mockus’s sensitivity towards human-rights concerns distinguishes him from Uribe, who leaves behind a deplorable legacy in this regard. Obviously the FARC guerrillas – much diminished by Uribe, but still violently opposed to Colombian democracy – remain a source of concern for many Colombians. But, because the Mockus-Fajardo ticket is truly centrist, the risk of serious missteps in this area seems minimal.

Moreover, the shadow over the election campaign does not come from the FARC, but from the right – the Uribist candidate Santos and the conservative Noemí Sanin. The Liberal Party, a coalition comprising a cross-section of the center-left, and the leftist Polo Democrático have no chance of victory, although their support for a Mockus government would be important in forging a stable parliamentary majority. Conversely, legislative elections in March gave the Mockus-Fajardo ticket only minimal representation in the two chambers of Congress, implying that any government that they form would need all the legislative allies that it can find in order to enact its agenda.

If, as appears increasingly likely, Mockus becomes president, his agenda promises to be prudent – neither a leap into the void nor immobilized by the need for profound changes. Three issues will hold his attention initially: the potent mafia subculture that has arisen over the last decade, the need to redirect a development model marked by extensive inequality, and avoidance of isolation and overreaction in the country’s foreign relations.

Colombia may be on the cusp of achieving a long-cherished but oft-postponed dream: domestic peace and diminishing tension with its neighbors. Antanas Mockus looks like the figure best suited to realizing these possibilities.