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Recent months have been very good for Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. His “Democratic Security” policy now seems to have definitively turned the tables in the country’s fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which have seen their leaders killed and their hostages freed. Uribe has also proven to be a strong economic administrator, attracting increasing flows of foreign direct investment to Colombia. But success presents Uribe with a new set of challenges that risk undoing most of his achievements.
The first and most tangible challenge is that Uribe – with popularity ratings of more than 90% following the rescue of 15 high-profile hostages, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, in early July – will be more tempted to run for a third term. This would not be catastrophic per se, but amending the constitution again to favor one of the players would undermine the country’s relatively deep political institutionalization – one of the factors that has helped attract foreign investors. Changing the rules of the game to prop up personal rule would help perpetuate weaknesses such as a lack of accountability, and prevent important government policies from becoming entrenched as state policies.
One can only hope that Uribe has learned the lessons of doomed third-term experiments in the region – Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Argentina’s Carlos Menem spring to mind – and leave the presidency on a high note. If he does, he will probably be remembered as one of Colombia’s most successful and influential presidents, and can look forward to a continuing career as a regional and international statesman.
Perhaps more importantly, were Uribe to step down after his current term, he would still wield considerable proxy power at home, playing an integral role in choosing his successor – whoever he backs stands a very good chance of winning – and boosting his political supporters’ prospects in legislative elections.
If the outcome of the first challenge rests solely on Uribe’s shoulders, two others are tied to the FARC’s reaction to these latest developments – whether it chooses to negotiate or to continue its armed struggle. Under the first scenario, Uribe faces the danger of being pushed into a “weak” or “unconditional” peace process. For more than six years, the government has resisted calls to negotiate with the FARC, rejecting the group’s requests for a demilitarized zone, dismissing overtures, and demanding the release of all hostages and a cease-fire as a precondition for talks.
The problem is that a weakened FARC may expose the government to popular pressure to launch negotiations, even if FARC does not declare a cease-fire. In that case, the FARC might use peace talks – as it has several times in the past – to bid for time, re-arm and regroup. For the last couple of years, the FARC, many of whose leaders believe that they “win” simply by prolonging the conflict, has been seeking ways – for example, a humanitarian exchange and political recognition – to ease the military pressure that it has faced since Uribe came to power. The danger, then, is a failure to deliver the knockout blow at a time when the group appears to be disintegrating.
But continuing the fight also poses a serious threat to Uribe’s main success, which has been to improve perceptions of security, including among investors. The FARC, now wounded and cornered, may decide that its only option is to go on the offensive in order to demonstrate its continuing relevance and remaining strength. Although the FARC’s capabilities have been seriously degraded over the last six years, and its geographical dispersion has shifted away from the main population centers, a series of high-profile attacks against business and civilian targets in the main cities would suffice to shatter the impression of security in the country. Worryingly, this might also happen if the FARC splits, with one part deciding to negotiate while hard-line military commanders fight on.
If Uribe stands down, whoever succeeds him will probably maintain most of his policies and continue to work toward improving security in the country. Investors will know that Colombia is not a one-man show, and that the political system’s vaunted institutionalization and effective checks and balances are real. Strengthening the state and fostering a stable and growing economy would also provide the best rebuke to the FARC and its bid for time.
Daniel Linsker is Head of Desk, Latin America, for Control Risks, an international business risk consultancy.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2008.
www.project-syndicate.org
