Unconventional Economic Wisdom
Cómo no recuperarse
Joseph E. Stiglitz
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NUEVA YORK – Algunos pensaban que la elección de Barack Obama revertiría las cosas para Estados Unidos. Como no fue así, incluso después de la sanción de un gigantesco paquete de estímulo, la presentación de un nuevo programa para hacer frente al subyacente problema inmobiliario y varios planes para estabilizar el sistema financiero, algunos ya empiezan a culpar a Obama y a su equipo.
Obama, sin embargo, heredó una economía en caída libre, y difícilmente hubiera podido revertir las cosas en el corto tiempo que transcurrió desde que asumió la presidencia. El presidente Bush parecía un ciervo encandilado por los faros -paralizado, incapaz de hacer prácticamente nada- durante los meses anteriores a abandonar el cargo. Es un alivio que Estados Unidos finalmente tenga un presidente que puede actuar, y lo que ha estado haciendo marcará una gran diferencia.
Desafortunadamente, lo que está haciendo no es suficiente. El paquete de estímulo parece grande -más del 2% del PBI por año-, pero una tercera parte está destinada a recortes impositivos. Y, en un momento en que los norteamericanos enfrentan un excedente de deuda, un desempleo que crece rápidamente (y el peor sistema de compensación por desempleo entre los principales países industriales) y una caída de los precios de los activos, probablemente ahorren gran parte del recorte impositivo.
Casi la mitad del estímulo no hace más que compensar el efecto contraccionario de la reducción de personal a nivel estatal. Los 50 estados de Estados Unidos deben mantener presupuestos equilibrados. Los déficits totales se calculaban en 150.000 millones de dólares hace unos meses; hoy la cifra debe ser mucho mayor -de hecho, sólo California enfrenta un déficit de 40.000 millones de dólares.
Los ahorros de los hogares finalmente están empezando a aumentar, lo cual es bueno para la salud a largo plazo de las finanzas hogareñas, pero desastroso para el crecimiento económico. Mientras tanto, la inversión y las exportaciones también se están derrumbando. Los estabilizadores automáticos de Estados Unidos -la progresividad de nuestros sistemas tributarios, la fortaleza de nuestro sistema de asistencia pública- se han visto seriamente debilitados, pero ofrecerán cierto estímulo, a medida que el déficit fiscal esperado trepe al 10% del PBI.
En resumen, el estímulo fortalecerá la economía de Estados Unidos, pero probablemente no sea suficiente para restablecer un crecimiento robusto. Esas son malas noticias para el resto del mundo, también, ya que una recuperación global fuerte requiere de una economía norteamericana fuerte.
Las verdaderas deficiencias en el programa de recuperación de Obama, sin embargo, no residen en el paquete de estímulo sino en sus esfuerzos por reanimar los mercados financieros. Las anomalías de Estados Unidos les ofrecen importantes lecciones a los países en todo el mundo, que enfrentan o enfrentarán mayores problemas con sus bancos:
- La demora en la reestructuración bancaria es costosa, tanto en términos de los eventuales costos del rescate como del daño a la economía general en el ínterin.
- A los gobiernos no les gusta admitir los costos totales del problema, de modo que le dan al sistema bancario apenas lo suficiente para sobrevivir, pero no lo suficiente como para devolverle la salud.
- La confianza es importante, pero debe descansar en fundamentos sólidos. Las políticas no deben basarse en la ficción de que se otorgaron buenos créditos, y que la perspicacia empresaria de los líderes y reguladores del mercado financiero se validará una vez que se restablezca la confianza.
- Se puede esperar que los banqueros actúen en interés propio en base a incentivos. Los incentivos perversos alimentaron la excesiva toma de riesgos, y los bancos que están al borde de la quiebra pero son demasiado grandes como para quebrar volverán a actuar de la misma manera. Sabiendo que el gobierno recogerá los pedazos si fuera necesario, pospondrán la resolución de las hipotecas y pagarán miles de millones en bonos y dividendos.
- Socializar las pérdidas al mismo tiempo que se privatizan las ganancias es más preocupante que las consecuencias de la nacionalización de los bancos. Los contribuyentes norteamericanos están recibiendo un trato cada vez peor. En la primera ronda de las infusiones de efectivo, obtuvieron alrededor de 0,67 dólar en activos por cada dólar que entregaron (aunque los activos estaban casi con certeza sobrevaluados y su valor cayó rápidamente). Pero en las últimas infusiones de efectivo, se calcula que los norteamericanos están recibiendo 0,25 dólar, o menos, por cada dólar. Los malos términos implican una gran deuda nacional en el futuro. Una razón por la que estamos recibiendo malos términos es que si obtuviéramos un valor justo por nuestro dinero, a esta altura seríamos el accionista dominante de por lo menos uno de los principales bancos.
- A no confundir salvar a banqueros y accionistas con salvar bancos. Estados Unidos podría haber salvado a sus bancos, y dejar a los accionistas librados a su suerte, por mucho menos de lo que invirtió.
- El efecto derrame en la economía casi nunca funciona. Inyectar dinero en los bancos no ayudó a los propietarios de casas: los remates siguen aumentando. Dejar que AIG quebrara podría haber afectado a algunas instituciones sistémicamente importantes, pero hacer eso habría sido mejor que arriesgar más de 150.000 millones de dólares y esperar que parte de esa cifra recayera donde fuera importante.
- La falta de transparencia metió al sistema financiero norteamericano en este problema. La falta de transparencia no lo sacará de esta situación. La administración Obama está prometiendo asumir las pérdidas para persuadir a los fondos de cobertura y a otros inversores privados de comprar activos intangibles de los bancos. Pero esto no establecerá "precios de mercado", como sostiene la administración. Si el gobierno asume las pérdidas, estos son precios distorsionados. Las pérdidas bancarias ya ocurrieron y sus ganancias ahora deben producirse a expensas de los contribuyentes. Incorporar a los fondos de cobertura como terceras partes no hará más que aumentar el costo.
- Mejor proyectar hacia adelante que mirar hacia atrás, concentrándose en reducir el riesgo de los nuevos créditos y asegurando que los fondos creen nueva capacidad de préstamo. El pasado, pisado. Como punto de referencia, los 700.000 millones de dólares otorgados a un nuevo banco, apalancados 10 a 1, podrían haber financiado 7 billones de dólares en nuevos préstamos.
La era de pensar que se puede crear algo de la nada debería terminar. Las respuestas miopes de los políticos -que esperan arreglárselas con un acuerdo que es demasiado pequeño como para complacer a los contribuyentes y lo suficientemente grande como para complacer a los bancos- sólo prolongará el problema. Se está vislumbrando un callejón sin salida. Se necesitará más dinero, pero los norteamericanos no están de ánimo para ofrecerlo -ciertamente, no en los términos que se han visto hasta ahora-. El pozo de dinero tal vez se esté secando y con él, también, el optimismo y la esperanza legendarios de Estados Unidos.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, profesor de Economía en la Universidad de Columbia, fue ganador del Premio Nobel de Economía en 2001 y es co-autor, junto con Linda Bilmes, de The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Costs of the Iraq Conflict.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009.
www.project-syndicate.org
Traducción de Claudia Martínez
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tvselvakumaran 08:24 16 Mar 09
Professor Joseph Stiglitz discusses two issues in this article -- (i) the stimulus package, and (ii) the crisis in the financial markets. I have some points to make on these two issues:
(i) Misconception: if the stimulus bill is not large enough, it would not deliver a recovery.
By the end of Summer 2008, political support for a new stimulus bill began to gather in earnest. At that time, it was not known for certain whether the American economy was in a recession. Now, in recent decades, a large number of research papers have been written combining insights from Keynesian theory with business cycle theory towards the aim of smoothening the fluctuations in the business cycle. In fact, the boom in East Asian economies that extended to more than 25 years before 1997, and the 63-year long recession-less growth in the world economy since the end of the second world war, lent credence to the view among academic economists that a recession could be made short and shallow, if not altogether bypassed. As a result, throughout Fall 2008, many economists repeatedly stated that if the stimulus bill is not large enough, it would not lead to a recovery.
Sometime during the winter of 2008, NBER announced that the American economy had actually been in recession since December 2007. It was after this announcement that there was a realization that the current economic recession is a really serious one, and cannot be wished away by a massive one-time stimulus bill. Till then, economists had been pre-occupied with preventing the crisis in the financial system from spreading to the real economy. However, the realization of a serious economic crisis came too late. The political momentum for a massive one-time stimulus bill had already been set in motion. Moreover, since it was now getting very difficult to justify a huge one-time stimulus bill on a theoretical basis, some political compromises had to be made to get bi-partisan support. As a result, a large part of the $800-billion stimulus bill was marked for tax cuts.
However, there were some sensible last-minute adjustments. With the economy already mired in a serious recession, a massive stimulus spending would be like flogging a dead-tired horse. So, the sensible approach was to change the focus of the bill towards structural re-adjustment rather than a stimulus, and backload much of the spending to 2010. Keynesian theory requires continuous monitoring of the markets to enable the central bank or the government to step in and take corrective measures whenever it is obvious that the resource allocations made by the markets would not be optimal in the long run. There is no provision in Keynesian theory to spend several trillion dollars at one time, so that a recession can be postponed by a decade, say. Hence, it would have been better to enact a series of small spending bills to come into effect every three months or so. With the flexibility of tuning the spending according to how the economy reacts to the current recession during each three month interval, it would have provided a much better support for the economy to fight its way out of the recession.
(ii) Financial markets: Recently, Professor Nouriel Roubini has argued that the US financial system is effectively insolvent (Ref: his March 5, 2009 article on Forbes.com). By his calculations, the total losses in the financial system is about $3.6 trillion, of which about half ($1.8 trillion) would have to be absorbed by US financial institutions and the other half by foreign institutions. But the total capital in the US financial institutions is only about $1.4 trillion. Hence the financial system is insolvent, and it needs to be nationalized quickly, in his opinion. Here, I would like to point out that it has always been the case that the estimates for losses in any crisis keep changing dynamically. For example, during the 1989 - 91 S & L crisis, initial estimates for the bank losses ran up as high as 500 billion dollars during 1988 - 90. However when the American economy grew robustly after 1992, the Resolution Trust Council (RTC) was able to sell off the foreclosed assets at reasonably good prices, and reduce the total losses to as low as 100 billion dollars.
Secondly, Professor Roubini's solution to the insolvency of the financial system is that the banks should be nationalized quickly. This solution is fraught with grave danger. Nationalizing banks would lead to the problem of 'socializing losses and privatizing gains', which Professor Joseph Stiglitz points out above. Just today (March 16, 2009), a Wall Street Journal article disclosed that more than two-thirds of the $173 billion of Federal aid given to bailout AIG so far has gone to counter-parties to cover their damages in their CDS and insurance contracts with AIG. These counterparties include (i) municipalities within the US, (ii) foreign institutions, and (iii) well-known US financial institutions like Citigroup, Barclays, UBS, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, etc. The fundamental truth is that the financial system benefits some people more than others. No matter how quickly Professor Roubini is able to get the government to nationalize insolvent banks, he would find that well-connected financiers have already returned the institutions under their charge to profitability, mostly by using public money, all done through perfectly legal means.
An alternative solution proposed by Professor Kenneth Rogoff is for the Federal Reserve to print a lot of money and invest it to the financial institutions. This would re-capitalize the financial institutions and save them from bankruptcy. Moreover, in a few months, there would be widespread inflation. This would help the home-owners because inflation would reduce the relative severity of their mortgage debts. Since most of the households in America are also immersed in credit card debt, inflation would help them there as well. In addition, the government could spend massively by way of fiscal deficits to ensure that deflationary forces are surely defeated. This solution has the additional feature of fitting in nicely with the Rogoff doctrine, which recommends that Western economies go through a period of sub-optimal growth in order to avoid a global price war for commodities. (The Rogoff doctrine was published in the Financial Times on July 29, 2008).
China was quick to wake up to Professor Rogoff's solution for the financial crisis. Inflation would benefit everybody inside the United States in their current predicament of debt obligations that are disproportionate to their incomes. However, it would severely affect those countries, like China and Japan, which are holding trillions of dollars as foreign currency reserves. To preserve the relative value of its dollar reserves, China has announced its own two-year fiscal spending program of 4 trillion yuan to ensure that its annual GDP grows at a rate of 8%+. The biggest losers in this inflation game would be the poor countries who could not possibly finance their deficits. Even if they did, many of the poor countries do not have a democratic framework in order to hold their rulers to account for the deficit spending.
In October 2008, I proposed a simple low-cost solution for the financial crisis (Ref: Q5 in my "FAQ on the Financial Crisis"). I would like to make one point here that I have not made elsewhere: my solution has the unique feature that it is sustainable. To make this point clear, consider the phenomenon of consumer spending. The global supply chain connects to factories where goods are produced. These factories, in turn, connect to the distribution channels that apply just-in-time technology to stock their retail outlets. The consumer then goes through the shopping experience at the shopping malls or online stores. Consumer shopping trends are cyclical, with each annual cycle having several seasonal cycles as well. In case, there is an over-production of goods during one particular shopping season or a dullness in consumer demand, the stores immediately announce discounts and price cuts.
These price reductions benefit the consumer directly, and they work all the way back through the distribution channels and the supply chain. In this way, a sustainable feedback loop helps to implement an 'informal contract' between the consumer at one end, and all the other participants of the supply network at the other end. And this unwritten contract, in effect, extends over many years. In fact, this mechanism for price adjustments has become an integral part of the consumer culture of the 20th century. My solution for the mortgage crisis aims to provide an analogous feedback loop that connects the security-owners on Wall Street with the home-owners on Main Street.
skydancer 01:35 25 Jul 09
greetings Dr. S....if it's good to have a government offered health insurance program....why not a government offered bank.....create the National Federal Reserve Credit Union.....loan money to citizens at the current Fed rate of 0.25....issue credit cards and make loans at the same rate....have checking and savings accounts.....fully nationalize Freddie and Fannie, lower interest rates and do away with compound interest.....pay the employees a decent living, not less than $50K nor more than $200K/year....well you get the idea, the question is how to make it a reality......?
alexferro 05:02 15 Mar 09
Perhaps we could avoid further messes by adopting financial markets rules inspired on Canadian ones. Their banks dont seem to be suffering from what ails ours.