Twenty-First Century Populism

Roberto Laserna

In Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador a new left is said to being born, which their presidents call “twenty-first century socialism.” But, despite the supposed novelty of their vision, their actions seem only to be replicating the self-destructive policies that have brought such agony to Cuba.

Unlike the old leftist movements, which relied on armed struggle, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, Bolivian President Evo Morales, and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa came to power through the ballot box. Once in power, they have appealed to the masses and called for constitutional reforms to enlarge their power.

In Venezuela, Chávez has strengthened his political position through a Constituent Assembly that changed the constitution. Bolivia’s Morales also has managed to impose a similar Assembly, though with uncertain results, and Correa is wielding the threat of constitutional change against “the traditional parties, the native oligarchies, and the empire” – the common enemies of all three presidents.

The Constituent Assembly approach has, so far, proven to be very effective in helping these new caudillos to consolidate their power. Because it is a process that calls for total reform, it helps them avoid debates about specific changes.

Instead, social change is mingled with institutional reform in ways that may seem incomprehensible to voters. For example, Chávez’s and Morales’ Constituent Assemblies are attractive not only to all of Venezuela’s or Bolivia’s radical groups who are seeking to re-found their Republics and reinvent history, but also to those who want to create a forum for democratic deliberation. As they deliberate, however, more and more power is concentrated in the new caudillos.

The experiences of Venezuela and Bolivia suggest that the process only frustrates both radical and democratic forces. The radicals soon discover that changing norms is not enough to change reality, while the democrats find that heightened social mobilization makes dialogue impossible. Moreover, most find that when the Assembly gets to deal with specific proposals, which is rare, the proposals are disagreeable.

In the end, the establishment of a Constituent Assembly merely weakens all other institutions. Since its focus is the “law of laws,” the Assembly implicitly questions the status of all public norms and bodies, thus eroding the political system. When this happens, the presidency is strengthened, enabling the incumbent’s transformation into a caudillo.

As is always the case, those who promote the concentration of power find justification for their acts in the revolutionary need to change structures, liberate the nation, and overcome poverty. But when this concentrated power actually begins to take action, all the old confusions of the left come back to life, as is now the case in Venezuela and Bolivia.

The most flagrant confusion is that which conflates state and nation. As a result, transferring resources to the state is seen as putting them into the hands of the nation. Misled by this confusion, Venezuelans and Bolivians enthusiastically support the rebirth of state companies, without realizing that this only wastes resources that could have been spent better and more efficiently elsewhere, since few state companies ever succeed in ridding themselves of bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption.

Another confusion, and perhaps a more dangerous one, similarly conflates “the people” with the so-called “masses” going out into the streets. The logic of this type of mobilization is that resources are directed to the group that shouts the loudest and is able to trigger social conflict. This means that attention is diverted from the weakest and those most in need to those who already are well enough off to be organized. Indeed, often it is the state itself, now controlled by a powerful president, that mobilizes chosen groups, aided by the concentration of enormous resources in the government’s hands which has arisen due to greater state intervention in the economy.

The fight to control oil and gas revenues is paramount in this regard. More than 90% of Venezuela’s export earnings come from the oil and gas sectors, which provide about half of the government’s income. In Ecuador and Bolivia, income from oil and gas is more modest, but in both cases hydrocarbon exports account for the largest share of total exports, and provide about one-third of government revenue.

This concentration of revenues radically changes the relationship between society and the state. In all three countries, the government’s financial situation does not depend on the economic fate of companies or workers. On the contrary, companies and workers depend on public services and the subsidies that the government provides with revenues derived from oil and gas.

When social organizations are limited and weak, as in Venezuela, this concentration of resources means that concentrated political power can perpetuate itself by reducing huge parts of the economy to dependent clients. When social organizations are strong, conflict arises to control public resources. In both cases, independent institutions begin to be perceived as enemies, which the caudillos and their client corporate groups seek to destroy.

Latin American populism has always nurtured itself on this dynamic. Looking beyond the rhetoric of the new left in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, it is already clear that today’s “twenty-first century socialism” is no different from its twentieth-century antecedents.

The main lesson seems to be that natural abundance may support democracy and development only when they are not in the hands of bureaucrats or caudillos.