{0>Debt, Dictatorship, and Democratization<}0{>债务、独裁和民主化<0}

{0>NEW YORK – After Saddam Hussein’s fall, the United States successfully pressed creditors to write off much of Iraq’s external debt.<}0{>纽约——萨达姆·侯赛因倒台后,美国成功迫使债主免除了伊拉克绝大部分外债。<0} {0>Senior American officials, including Paul Wolfowitz, later President of the World Bank, argued that the Iraqi people should not be saddled with 背负obligations that the dictator contracted in order to enrich himself and oppress his subjects臣民.<}0{>后任世行行长的保罗·沃尔福威茨等美国高官提出伊拉克民众不应负担独裁者为塞满腰包和压迫臣民欠下的债务。<0} {0>Citing a long-standing doctrine in international law, advocates of a write-off claimed that Iraq’s debt was “odious.”可憎的 As a result, the creditors were no longer protected under global legal rules.<}0{>免债鼓吹者们援引长期形成的国际法理论,宣称伊拉克债务是“可憎”的。因此,债主们不再受到国际法律规则的保护。<0}

{0>As political change again sweeps across the Middle East, the issue of odious debt is back.<}0{>随着政治变革的浪潮再次席卷中东,“可憎债务”问题又一次引发人们的关注。<0} {0>But all debt that was contracted by a previous oppressive regime cannot, for that reason alone, be classified as “odious.”<}0{>但仅仅出于以上原因,不能将之前的压迫政权所欠下的所有债务全部划归“可憎债务”范畴。<0} {0>The question is this:<}0{>问题在于:<0} {0>how much of the money went to meritorious值得赞赏的 development projects, and how much went instead to prop up扶持 the regime and line its leaders’ pockets?<}0{>这笔资金有多少用于值得称道的开发项目,又有多少用于扶持独裁政权,流进了独裁领袖的腰包?<0}

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{0>In the case of Egypt, for example, Minister of Economic Cooperation 经济合作部长Faiza Abu al-Naga suggested in January that Mubarak himself was directing the country’s foreign-loan policy and “oversee[ing] the entire process.”<}0{>比如以埃及为例,经济合作部长法伊扎·阿布·娜佳曾在1月表示,制定国内外国贷款政策并“监督整个过程”的工作由穆巴拉克亲自负责。<0} {0>Even if true, there may be nothing legally wrong with such an arrangement.<}0{>就算事实果真如此,这样的安排在法律上也无可指责。<0} {0>After all, lending and aid to Egypt by the US and other Western powers have long been entangled with geopolitics, and using the tools of finance to back a loyal ally in an unstable region is not odious 可恶or illegitimate per se本身.<}0{>归根结底,美国和其他西方大国对埃及的借款和援助一直就和地缘政治搅在一起,利用金融工具支持动荡地区的忠诚盟友本身不能算是可恶或者非法。<0}

{0>But, to the extent that以…为限 the funds contributed to internal repression, or to the personal enrichment of the regime’s leaders, lenders may bear some responsibility, at least for relieving taxpayers of the burden of debt contracted against, or with indifference towards, their interests.<}0{>可是,如果这笔资金用于国内压迫或流入到独裁领袖个人的腰包,那么借款人就需要承担一定的责任,至少应保证纳税人免于偿还损害或无视其自身利益的债务。<0} {0>This responsibility cannot be absolute or unlimited, however, and should be confined to situations where lenders were aware (or should have been aware) that the funds might be used for corrupt or oppressive ends.<}0{>这种责任不是绝对或无限的,只有当借款人了解(或应当了解)自己的资金可能用于腐败或压迫目的的情况下才应承担这种责任。<0}

{0>The bulk of Egypt’s estimated $35-$37 billion in external debt is owed to official (governmental) creditors and multilateral and regional development institutions.<}0{>埃及约合350-370亿美元的外债多数来源于官方(政府)债主和多边及地区发展机构。<0} {0>At the same time that the World Bank publicly described Egypt as one of the region’s most corrupt countries, its own International Finance Corporation国际金融公司 maintained Egypt as a leading customer.<}0{>世界银行公开将埃及称为区域内最腐败的国家,但与此同时,世行下属的国际金融公司仍然把埃及当作最主要的客户。<0}

{0>Likewise, Tunisia’s foreign borrowing increased significantly in recent years, even as perceived corruption腐败程度, as measured by Transparency International透明国际, worsened significantly.<}0{>无独有偶,突尼斯近来在对外借款大幅增长的同时,根据透明国际的测算,其腐败程度也大幅升高。<0} {0>In both countries, a narrow elite managed and manipulated the economy for their own benefit, but found it easy to win praise from the international financial institutions whenever they made gestures toward liberalization.<}0{>两国经济都由一小撮精英负责管理和操纵,他们在为自身牟利的同时,发现只要作出自由化的姿态就可以赢得国际金融机构的赞扬。<0}

{0>Debt relief will doubtless make it easier for new regimes to proceed with much-needed policies to create jobs, improve infrastructure, and develop human capital人才资本.<}0{>债务减免无疑会降低新政府推行急需的创造就业、改善基础设施和开发人力资源政策的难度。<0} {0>But the case事实 for debt cancellation is fundamentally about transitional justice转型正义.<}0{>但免除债务本质上属于过渡司法的内容。<0} {0>The risk of a hasty bargain with creditors for debt forgiveness is that it could preclude 妨碍a process of accountability for the past.<}100{>急急忙忙地和债主讨论债务豁免可能会妨碍对过去负责。<0}

{0>Instead, an independent commission should be established to examine the previous regime’s foreign-borrowing policy, its objectives and effects, and what lenders knew (or could reasonably be assumed to have known) about those objectives and effects.<}0{>相反,应当组建独立的委员会审视前政权的对外借贷政策,核实它们的目标和效果,以及借款人对上述目标和效果了解(或可以合理认定应该了解)些什么。<0}

{0>Such a commission should be composed largely of nationals who have broad public credibility广泛的公众信誉, perhaps with a minority delegation of foreign experts.<}0{>这样的审核委员会应当招募广受公众信任的国内知名人士,或许还要吸纳少量外国专家代表。<0} {0>Its mandate 权限should be not only to allocate responsibility for past decisions, but also to forge recommendations for transparent, accountable borrowing in the future.<}0{>它的权限不应仅局限在对已经作出的决策分清责任,还应对今后透明、负责任的借贷行为提出建议。<0}新政府应该{0>On the basis of such a commission’s findings, the new government should engage in discussions with its official creditors, including the international financial institutions.<}0{>根据上述委员会的审核结果与官方债主,包括国际金融机构进行谈判。<0}

{0>Critics of forgiving odious debt argue that it risks discouraging future lending to some developing countries, given the uncertainty of being repaid.<}0{>批评者认为免除所谓的“可憎债务”可能导致将来债主因为债务偿还的不确定性而不愿向某些发展中国家放债。<0} {0>But, where oppressive regimes are using foreign credit to postpone needed domestic political and economic reforms, that may be a good outcome.<}0{>但是,如果压迫政权利用外国贷款来延缓国内需要的政治和经济改革,不愿放债也许是一种好的结果。<0}

{0>At a minimum, creditors would have to examine more carefully those to whom they are lending, and where the money is really going.<}0{>至少债主们不得不认真审核自己的借款对象,了解这笔资金真正的去处。<0} {0>If creditors turn a blind eye to corruption and oppression, they should have to pay a price.<}0{>如果债主们对腐败和压迫视而不见,那么他们应该为此付出代价。<0}