The reality about China and the US is that for cooperation to exist, fundamental changes to deal with flaws in the global economy.
China and the US have two different economic approaches and the only way is to reconcile them to create a new global economy that will create global wealth.
Understanding the economic differences between China and the US is clearly noted in what former editor of the Financial Times Mr Geoffrey Crowther wrote in his book "An Out Line of Money" in that "if a purchaser is someone who wants D-marks in order to pay for German exports, the fact that he can get his D-marks cheap is equivalent to a reduction in the price of exports; it will stimulate sales in exactly the same way as an ordinary depreciation of the exchange rate" (Crowther (1951) p.260).
US economic policy as epitomised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been "an ordinary exchange depreciation" to stimulate US dollar inflows. The Chinese economic policy has been a "reduction in the price of exports" as epitomised by cheap Chinese products exported globally.
It is against this that China's wealth is US dollar based and measured in US dollars.
However the key factor in China's economic success is in what Mr Geoffrey Crowther implies being D-marks buying German goods. This is the corner stone of a market system and expressed the underlyinging axioms of the Supply and Demand Doctrine as propounded by Adam Smith. Adam Smith's Supply and Demand Doctrine is based on British goods being bought by the British Sterling pounds whose supply and demand of both sets a price. If a German wanted British goods they would first have to use their D-marks to buy the British Sterling pounds and use these pounds to buy British goods. This is the process China has followed. Although Chinese firms quote in US dollars the final payment settlement for Chinese firms is in Chinese Renminbi because their foreign currency regulations.
Therefore it is Chinese Renminbi buying Chinese goods much like Mr Geoffrey Crowther wrote German D-marks buying German goods.
This Chinese economic policy is not new but was once used by mining companies.
As noted as late as April 1966 Roan Selection Trust (RST) and Anglo American Corporation (AAC) sold Zambian copper at £336 per ton under a producer price system, while the LME price was at £753 per ton.
Then the 1966 economic growth rate was robust, well above seven per cent and a strong Kwacha parity existed, US$2.80 per Kwacha. Zambian copper was sold in its local currency at a "reduction in the price of exports" as compared to the London Metal Exchange price quoted in US dollars. Naturally the Zambian government believed the LME British Sterling pounds value was far superior and opted to directly sell their copper to the LME that bans the use of the Kwacha, the local currency of Zambia, but only allows the US dollar, Sterling pound, Euro, Japanese Yen and recently the Chinese Renminbi as the only accepted currencies. In effect the underlyinging axioms of the supply and demand doctrine were ignored.
This now brings in the issue of the US dollar's "exorbitant privilege" of directly buying exports of other countries without the participation of the national currencies to determine the supply and demand and hence the exchange rate.
The supply and demand of the US dollar in national money markets has thus been driven to inhibit the flow of US dollars back to the US through trade to alleviate the Triffin Dilemma, which in turn China through its economic policy of price reduction has captured.
The US dollar has been chained by the IMF fixed cross rates which in turn has sacrificed the US productivity and its global market.
Evidence of this is clearly noted in the IMF fixed cross rates. For example the IMF fixed cross rates on the 28th of May 2020 gave the exchange rate between the two trans-Atlantic nations as US$1 equal to £1.2284. When looking at the Euro the value of the US dollar and Sterling pound in Euro respectively is €0.91027 and €1.11826 giving a IMF fixed cross rate of 1.2284 which mimics the exchange rate of the two trans-Atlantic nations of the UK and USA.
The South African Rand shows a similar picture being ZAR17.4053 per US dollar, and ZAR21.3813 per British Sterling pound giving a cross rate when the two figures are divided of 1.2284. Similarly the North Korea Won with KPW165.848 per Sterling pound against KPW135 per US dollar gives a cross rate of 1.2284. South Korea gives a similar picture. KRW1,517.51 per Sterling pound against KRW1,235.32 per US dollar when divided together gives a cross rate of 1.2284. The Japanese Yen shows the same picture with JYP132.25 per Sterling pound and JYP107.65 per US dollar when divided together gives 1.2284. The Canadian dollar also shows the same image being CAD1.69181 per Sterling pound and CAD1.37721 per US dollar that gives a cross rate of 1.2284. The Indian Rupee at INR92.4590 per Sterling pound and INR75.2657 when divided gives 1.2284 which is the exchange rate between the US and UK.
Even the Chinese Renminbi at CNY8.9449 per Sterling pound against CNY7.15910 per US dollars gives a cross rate of 1.2284. Zambia with ZMK22.1715 per Sterling pound against ZMK17.925 per US dollar gives the same picture.
The question that arises from this is does North Korea have exactly in its money markets the same US dollar and Sterling liquidity to equal the cross rates as determined by the IMF? Does Zambia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, China, India to name a few countries have everyday day in and day out the same liquidity of Sterling pounds and US dollars in their money markets to justify the value given to the IMF fixed cross rates.
To create value free floating cross rates are needed whose value is actually based on existing currency liquidities within each country's money as a function of trade.
Such a condition existed as recounted by the IMF managing director Mr. M. Gutt at Harvard University on the 13th February 1948, when he presented a paper entitled The Practical Problem of Exchange Rates.
Then as Tew records, the official direct Sterling-US dollar rate ruling in Britain and the United States is one Sterling pound to US$4, but the Lira-Sterling and Lira-US dollar direct rates are such that the Sterling pound-US dollar cross-rate in Italy is one Sterling pound to US$2.6. (Tew Brain (1967) p.79)
Americans found it cheaper to purchase goods from the UK via Italy until the IMF stepped in and imposed the IMF fixed cross-rate system in favour of the UK and not Italy nor the US.
It is here a CHEAP US DOLLAR in certain markets would equally compete with cheap Chinese goods and stimulate US dollar inflows into the US and thus enhance US productivity. The picture that emerges, for example, may see Zambia having trade surplus with Japan . This creates an exchange rate of ¥1,000 per K1 as Japan uses her Yen to purchase Kwachas, Zambia ’s national currency.
To this, Japan uses the purchased Kwachas to buy copper, against which Zambia accumulates Yen in its market.
Although the exchange rate in Zambia for the US dollar, based on Zambia' s market liquidity may be K8 per US dollar, in Japan it may well be ¥200 per US dollar as Japan trades more with United States of America than Zambia .
If a citizen in Zambia wanted to import an iphone X from the United States of America pegged at US$500, it would be cheaper to buy the iphone X via Japan , but this would in turn affect market liquidities in both the Zambia and Japan money markets and hence exchange rates as exchange arbitrage operations occur.
As the iphone X is valued at US$500 in Zambia in Kwacha terms based on its K8 per US dollar rate it would cost K4,000, but through Japan the cost of the iphone X would be ¥100,000 at ¥200 per US dollar, being through Zambia ’s Kwacha/Yen exchange rate at ¥1,000 per K1 be worth K100, which is equal in US dollars based on Zambia's US dollar/Kwacha exchange rate at US$12.50.
At US$12.50 for an iphone X, the United States of America would be on an equal footing to deal with another country called China with its cheap exports unless China’s cross-rates are lower in the countries China/ United States of America /Zambia exchange rate configurations.
It would then be a question of quality and finding the best value in currency arbitrage operations. The United States of America would still get its US$500 irrespective of the value step up or step down and the problem of external disequilibrium is addressed provided each country settled its exports in its national currencies. It is here that the US deals with its Triffin Dilemma and gets back the cash from the stimulus packages that found its way out of the US back to the US to build the US dollar's value and economy.