Who is to Blame?
Now that the economic crisis looks less threatening (at least for the moment), an ever more encompassing blame game is unfolding. But, because we are not sure quite who and what should be unmasked, the search for culprits has become like the late medieval and early modern search for witches: a way of making sense of a disorderly and hostile universe.
PRINCETON – Now that the economic crisis looks less threatening (at least for the moment), and forecasters are spying “green shoots” of recovery, an ever more encompassing blame game is unfolding. The financial crisis provides an apparently endless opportunity for unmasking deceit, malfeasance, and corruption. But we are not sure quite who and what should be unmasked.
Leading bankers were initially the most obvious culprits. They presided over institutions that made large profits for a substantial period of time by mispricing risk, and then argued for public support on the grounds that they were too big to fail. They appeared arrogant and overpaid, and were easily demonized.
But what about the political process? Why were the banks not more closely controlled and better regulated? It is not that politicians were “bought” in a simple sense; rather, they convinced themselves that financial innovation opened the gate to greater general prosperity, increased home ownership, and, of course, popular support in elections.
PRINCETON – Now that the economic crisis looks less threatening (at least for the moment), and forecasters are spying “green shoots” of recovery, an ever more encompassing blame game is unfolding. The financial crisis provides an apparently endless opportunity for unmasking deceit, malfeasance, and corruption. But we are not sure quite who and what should be unmasked.
Leading bankers were initially the most obvious culprits. They presided over institutions that made large profits for a substantial period of time by mispricing risk, and then argued for public support on the grounds that they were too big to fail. They appeared arrogant and overpaid, and were easily demonized.
But what about the political process? Why were the banks not more closely controlled and better regulated? It is not that politicians were “bought” in a simple sense; rather, they convinced themselves that financial innovation opened the gate to greater general prosperity, increased home ownership, and, of course, popular support in elections.