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Politics

Última llamada para el transatlanticismo

Oct 26, 2020 Joschka Fischer

BERLÍN – Muchos norteamericanos ya han votado, y muchos más pronto irán a las urnas en lo que será el acontecimiento político más importante del mundo este año. La elección presidencial de Estados Unidos en 2020 es un momento decisivo en todos los sentidos de la palabra, no sólo para la democracia norteamericana sino también para el transatlanticismo y el futuro de Occidente.

Si Donald Trump es reelecto, hay buenas razones para dudar de que el transatlanticismo sobreviva los próximos cuatro años, o de que Occidente se mantenga unido de manera significativa. Sería un verdadero desastre en un año ya desastroso.

Afortunadamente, el contendiente demócrata de Trump, Joe Biden, ha liderado de manera consistente en las encuestas de opinión, lo que significa que pronto podría haber una oportunidad de que Occidente resurja como un actor geopolítico. La pregunta es cómo debería ser una relación transatlántica post-Trump. Regresar simplemente a la era pre-Trump no es una opción. Demasiado ha cambiado a ambos lados del Atlántico en los últimos años, incluidos los propios actores políticos clave.

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0 Comments on this paragraph, 5 Comments on this article

Peter Chase Nov 4, 2020

"The EU’s digital market is largely dominated by big US tech firms, which means that if the EU wants to achieve data sovereignty, it must build its own platforms, clouds, and so forth...." These firms have invested billions in Europe and Germany, and their European operations and research are all done by European citizens. Is the location of their headquarters really a problem?
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j. von Hettlingen Oct 29, 2020

Joschka Fischer urges European leaders to stand by and be ready to grab “the opportunity” that a Joe Biden presidency would present. Most of all they must pray for the Democratic candidate, because a Trump win would be a “veritable” disaster for global stability, ushering in the end of “transatlanticism” and the demise of the current liberal world order, that Europe has helped uphold. The world is already grappling with enough challenges - a global pandemic, geopolitical tensions and the impact of climate change etc. The future will be even more uncertain if Trump gets another term.
The author says a new administration under Biden instils hope that the transatlantic relations will be improved, but this would hardly mean a return to the “status quo ante,” given the damage Trump had inflicted. Calling Europeans “freeloaders,” Trump's transactional foreign policy has served as a wakeup call, that Europe can no longer rely on the US for security, and will have to think about how to better defend itself and contain the conflicts in its backyard, even without the US.
The author sees the potential of reviving the West as “a geopolitical actor” after Trump. But the US and its European allies need to reinvent the transatlantic relationship, because a return to business as usual is not an option. The US under Biden could still be protectionist on trade, sympathetic to the American public’s supposed isolationist instincts, and equally unenthusiastic about defending Europe unconditionally. “So much has changed on both sides of the Atlantic these last few years, including the key political players themselves.” China and Russia pose enormous challenges to global stability.
Over the last ten years, the geopolitical dynamics had shifted towards Asia. Obama put his “pivot” to Asia on top of the US foreign policy agenda. It “was driven not by ideology but by the US’ objective interests as a global and Pacific power. In fact, the intensifying focus on Asia has been happening ever since the end of the Cold War, and even more so since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization and economic, technological, and military ascendency.”
While the US had shifted its “geopolitical center of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific,” Europe itself, has also “undergone a tacit pivot to Asia, as it has increasingly come to rely on China as a trading partner. But because the European Union has not been a global political player, this shift didn’t attract much attention, let alone a broader strategy debate.” Although Europe is “no Pacific power,” China has made substantial inroads into the Continent as part of its Belt-and-Road Initiative.
Beijing’s aggressive rise has alienated many countries in Asia, which are seeking to counter China’s growing belligerence. Trump has taken a “sledgehammer” approach to the US-China relations. There are talks of an economic “decoupling” between the world’s two largest economies. “Even under Biden, China will be the central strategic issue confronting the transatlantic West.” Would Europe join the US to confront China? Would it rather prefer “trade and cooperation, or some complicated mix of both?”
According to the author, the US and Europe need to revamp their cooperation in dealing with “countless regional conflicts” across the globe. India has accused China of border incursion in the Himalayas; Beijing has threatened to retake Taiwan by force; It has tightened its control over Hong Kong, violating international law, because the former colony under the Sino-British Joint Declaration should be guaranteed rights and freedoms under the “two systems” formula until 2047.
Much hope is placed on Germany to “strengthen the transatlantic security partnership and halt the US drift toward a more isolationist foreign policy.” Not only does the author urge Europe to “become a capable global player in its own right, by building up the necessary political and military capacities and integrating these into the NATO framework,” he also insists on the EU pursuing its “technological sovereignty and self-determination.” Economic competitiveness and security are crucial. “European militaries cannot be expected to rely on cloud-based computing facilities located outside of the EU.”
Momentarily, the EU’s digital market is “largely dominated by big US tech firms, which means that if the EU wants to achieve data sovereignty, it must build its own platforms, clouds, and so forth, as well as subject all providers in Europe to a domestic regulatory regime.” This requires the EU “to set its own rules and standards to ensure that all data belonging to European citizens and companies remains in Europe; and it needs to minimize its dependency on others when it comes to the core hardware underpinning today’s digital technologies.”
Even if the above issue would be a thorny one, at least Europeans will hear a different tone from the Biden administration. It would treat allies more decently, “and multilateralism would no longer be held in contempt by its erstwhile champion. The US would rejoin the rest of the world in international climate agreements and global-governance institutions such as the World Health Organization, and these developments would offer some hope for the future.”
The author may be too eager to salvage the transatlantic relationship, urging the EU to “muster the strength and vision to become a global player” in security and geopolitics. Trump had showed Europe what his alternative to the current world order would be like. “The global geopolitical landscape will be directly affected by what happens in the transatlantic relationship.” Either we let the rest of the twenty-first century be consumed by “dueling superpowers and deepening instability,” or we look for “a balance of powers, with Europe making its weight felt within a broader geopolitical triangle.”
Much of what the author demands may be a tall order. Given the current division within the EU, it remains to be seen whether Europe will be able to reach these goals in the foreseeable future.
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Annette Kralendijk Oct 28, 2020

Agreed it will not be possible for Europe to return to freeloader status, regardless of who wins in the US. If it’s Biden, he will have a difficult time convincing Americans that the US should maintain thousands of troops at great cost to the US in wealthy countries like Germany even in the face of German inactivity to meet its NATO obligations. Europe must have more capacity to provide its own defense. The US must bring its troops home from all over the world. We can no longer operate as though WWII just ended.
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Ted Heavy Oct 27, 2020

The polls favored Clinton last go round. How'd that work out for you?
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John Sinclair Oct 26, 2020

Covid -19 for sure carries with it much pain , but the shock that is representing to often very conservative goverments and their supporters around our world could become the starting point for bolder steps to a more inclusive approach to world government and the rights of vulnerable populations: John Sinclair . Canada
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