谁想要金融去监管？

Aug 24, 2017 Howard Davies

伦敦—白宫人事流动频繁，记录美国权力走廊的进出情况也变得困难起来。你写好关于特朗普政府人事和政策的内容，也许在发表之前就变成了废纸。

但是，至少到目前为止，关键的经济政策人物仍然在位。史蒂夫·努钦（Steve Mnuchin）仍然是财政部长，并且在最近的权力斗争的认识转换中独善其身。加里·科恩（Gary Cohn）仍然是国家经济委员会主席，尽管据说他对总统在一些非经济问题上的言论感到不快。当然，珍妮特·耶伦也仍然是美联储主席，至少要当到明年2月。

但这一稳定性未必表明经济和金融政策观点已经大局已定，特别是在未来金融监管的问题上。《金融时报》最近对美联储副主席斯坦利·费舍尔（Stanley Fischer）的采访相当引人注目，因为它揭露了一些重大分歧。

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0 Comments on this paragraph, 8 Comments on this article

Per Kurowski Aug 27, 2017

The pillar of current bank regulations, the risk weighted capital requirements, contains truly monstrous mistakes. That is why regulators do not want to discuss it.

The two most fundamental mistakes were and still are:

1. “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for” John A Shedd

The regulators never defined the purpose of banks before regulating these; and so they were never in the least concerned about that their capital requirements would seriously distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy.

2. “May God defend me from my friends, I can defend myself from my enemies” Voltaire.

The regulators assumed that the ex ante perceived risks were not cleared by bankers in any way shape or form; and so that these risks expressed the real ex post dangers. The clearest example of this is that they assigned a risk weight of only 20% to what is rated AAA, that which because it is perceived as very safe could lead to the build up of very dangerous excessive exposures; and one of 150% to what is below BB-, that which bankers will basically not touch even with a ten feet pole.

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html
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Steve Hurst Aug 25, 2017

I am 100% certain the debt ceiling will be raised
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Paul Daley Aug 25, 2017

Good article. The means and ends of regulation should always be under review. But I would put more emphasis on the ends of regulation than Davies does. Why, in a "six sigma world," do we allow institutions to stumble forward provided they do not completely break down. No production line would allow a unit like that. So why should our standards for institutions be so much less demanding than they are for machines, particularly when the costs of a breakdown are so high. We have learned to control to very high standards in micro-environments. We need to begin to transfer some of that expertise to our largest institutions, rather than waiting for markets to do the dirty work on the truly feeble.
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jean nutson Aug 25, 2017

Financial regulatory mechanisms are certainly necessary in the global financial system to ensure the creation and sustenance of healthy financial institutions ie, banks and other investment companies. A typical example is the raising of capital requirements for banks as well as the stipulation of strict and rigorous procedures for licensing and operational activities of banks globally to eliminate fraudulent and unprofessional elements in the global banking systems, to enhance maximum protection and security of assets and to promote competition which is very necessary for efficient customer services. Another very essential point should be the adoption of the paperwork reduction act (1996) to obviously facilitate efficiency and to eliminate human errors as well as fraud and also to promote maximum transparency within the banking and financial system globally.
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jean nutson Aug 25, 2017

Financial regulatory mechanisms are certainly necessary in the global financial system to ensure the creation and sustenance of healthy financial institutions ie, banks and other investment companies. A typical example is the raising of capital requirements for banks as well as the stipulation of strict and rigorous procedures for licensing and operational activities of banks globally to eliminate fraudulent and unprofessional elements in the global banking systems, to enhance maximum protection and security of assets and to promote competition which is very necessary for efficient customer services. Another very essential point should be the adoption of the paperwork reduction act (1996) to obviously facilitate efficiency and to eliminate human errors as well as fraud and also to promote maximum transparency within the banking and financial system globally.
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jagjeet sinha Aug 25, 2017

A SECOND GOVERNOR - FOR FISCAL POLICY
Democracy produces mandates that require reductions in Inequalities.
The Banks are centrally directed to expand The Debt levels, to align with Democracy.
The liquidity that results drives the Wealth Indices - the unregulated Institutions usually positioned for maximum gains.
The Debt levels however remain confined within The Banks - prevented from positioning to reap the gains.
The evolution of Capital Markets has brought Asset Prices to Bank balance sheets.
The Banks essentially have to innovate to behave like The Clearing Houses - that always have sufficient Capital.
The added complications for Banks in Risk management flowing from volatile Asset Prices - is the OTC products.
Unlike The Clearinghouse Risk management of standardized instruments - Banks need to understand OTC Risks.
Banks are required to innovate to meet client needs, while simultaneously manage the enhanced risks.
By limiting the Banks from gains that the Unregulated Institutions are positioned for, Banks hands are tied.
They end up with enhanced risks, without the positioning for higher gains - then are blamed for the conundrum.
Isolation of bank balance sheets from Asset Prices volatility is no longer possible - yet the risk/reward strictures are a handicap.

Democracy moreover allows Government intervention - like President Clinton did in 1992 - to innovate to remove Inequalities.
No wonder the Debt balloon has only One way forward - the capacity for heavy lifting now nearly Zero in a ZIRP regime.
The fiscal departures that needed simultaneous with heavy lifting by Banks - have not been forthcoming.
The fiscal architecture is too delicate to allow Central Bank Governors domain - and Government just can't cope.
Trump perhaps The first President that has unequivocally promised a raft of fiscal departures.
Fiscal Policy prescriptions perhaps need a Governor professionally responsible with Democracy.
Because Central Bank Governors so far are not permitted a fiscal domain.

The author rightly points out that increasing complexity is a reality.
But the prescriptions pointing towards deregulation may not serve the Inequality Agenda that Democracy requires.
Time perhaps opportune for Fiscal Architecture to be governed professionally rather than politically.
Yet accountable to Democracy and the democratic process.
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G. A. Pakela Aug 24, 2017

The securitization of risky credit card debt, auto loans and loans to businesses and consumers would remove the risk of bank runs. Individuals and institutions that are willing to trade off a higher return in exchange for default and liquidity risk would be left holding the bag during an economic downturn. Banks could invest their deposits in a low risk combination of bank loans and government securities. Its capital would be the bulwark against the risk of its bank loans.
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M M Aug 24, 2017

The concluding statement of this article is very sound. The current financial system, models and forecasting methodologies are out of date. Excessive regulations introduced during the previous US administration have crippled the system and many businesses. Unless leading Academics and Economists can come up and propose a viable and sustainable alternative financial system and regulatory framework, they just need to stay out of it.
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