A Opção de Nixon para o Irão?

May 22, 2012 William H. Luers , Thomas R. Pickering

WASHINGTON, DC - A reorganização das cadeiras do convés não teria salvado o Titanic. Nem os intermináveis debates sobre a forma da mesa nas negociações Vietname favoreceram o esforço para acabar com aquele infame conflito. No entanto, muitos presidentes norte-americanos foram bem-sucedidos na reformulação de conversações com adversários, através de novas formas ousadas para reforçar a segurança nacional, sem guerra. Tal ousadia torna-se agora necessária nas negociações do programa nuclear iraniano.

Em 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt negociou pessoalmente com o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros soviético, Maxim Litvinov, para estabelecer relações diplomáticas entre os dois países. Dwight D. Eisenhower convidou Nikita Khrushchev para visitar os Estados Unidos em 1959, com o objectivo de abrir os olhos do primeiro líder soviético a visitar a América. As conversações bilaterais entre os EUA e a China, que decorreram em Varsóvia em 1960, foram infrutíferas até que Richard M. Nixon e o Conselheiro de Segurança Nacional Henry Kissinger encetaram uma discussão diferente, mais directa sob os auspícios do Paquistão.

As negociações internacionais com o Irão sobre o seu programa nuclear também necessitam de um novo conceito e de uma agenda mais ampla. A reunião realizada em Istambul no mês passado encerrou com saldo positivo. Ambos os lados decidiram encontrar uma forma de evitar o padrão de recriminação mútua e de intercâmbios estéreis. A porta está agora aberta para um acordo inicial com objectivos modestos.

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William H. Luers

Writing for PS since 2012
1 Commentary

William H. Luers served as US Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Venezuela, and President of the United Nations Association from 1999 to 2009.

Thomas R. Pickering

Writing for PS since 2012
3 Commentaries

Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Clinton administration, served as US Ambassador to Russia, Israel, India, Jordan, and the United Nations. He is the Vice Chair of Hills & Company.

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Ivan Azymov May 23, 2012

'..progress would become easier.'

Progress in what, exactly? And for whom?

Iranians are NOT interested in conquest disguised as 'Democracy'. They are not interested in occupation disguised as 'help'. And they are not interested in becoming a colony disguised as yet another addition to an 'alliance'.

The IAEA has not found n iota of weapons-grade material despite numerous inspections to every location deemed suspect. Yet, the U.S. insists Iran is lacking in cooperation.

Logic dictates the conflict is not about the thinly veiled argument of non-cooperation, but instead, it is about control.

Iran understands this, and clearly sees past the subterfuge purported by the U.S., and thus maintains itself on guard (and rightly so). Regardless of attempts at reconciliation, if the philosophies on both sides remain the same (a likely possibility), the end solution will also amount to the same: confrontation.

It is surprising to see the same errors repeated time and again to this day--should the U.S. keep pressing for control in the Middle East, despite the existing differences amongst the arab-speaking countries, said push for dominance may have the opposite effect: unification in order to prevent conquest by a foreign power.

In the 1960s, an initiative to permanently limit nuclear armament to a few 'select' countries was launched. The initiative was flawed from the beginning, given that Russia was included as a matter of consequence.

I recall being astonished at the arrogance of such an initiative. Knowledge cannot be systematically and indefinitely supressed--humanity simply does not function in that manner.

Numerous present (and past) 'world leaders' subscribe to the fallacy of absolute control. They refuse to accept the fact that provided time, discoveries and accomplishments are duplicated--even in isolation. They also purport to respect sovereignty, though their actions speak volumes to the contrary. Unless the U.S. and allied countries accept these facts (and subsequently conduct themselves in a manner which accommodates the actuality and right of sovereign states), the end result will always be conflict. Regrettably, in light of the unchanging pattern, the inevitable escalation may prove to be catastrophic--for all involved.
- Kevin Lim May 24, 2012
  
  You suggest the real issue is control. Arguable. But you then suggest that we should not aim for total control.
  
  If ever there was an area of knowledge for which total control is required, it is the technology behind building a nuclear weapon.
  
  Your objections are both philisophical (we must respect state sovereignty) and practical (they are gonna figure it out sooner or later). Your philosophical argument assumes that state sovereignty is inviolate. But international law has never recognised state sovereignty as something so absolute e.g. A state can not hide behind state sovereignty to perpetuate genocide. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the stakes are so large that state sovereignty should not, cannot be a defence. You object to the hypocrisy that some states are permitted such weapons. Granted, but that is a practical concession not a philosophical one. Once a state develops a significant nuclear arsenal, in the ultimate analysis who has the leverage to compel it to relinquish it? So is it hypocritical? Yes, but you are just gonna have to get over it because every new state that possesses such weapons results in creating more flash points and more global instability as power relationships try to reach a new equilibrium.
  
  As for your practical argument, that is simply countered. The development of nuclear weapons is not something that governments accidentally stumble upon. It is a deliberate choice. And like all deliberate choices it can be influenced. Iran is seeking such weapons because it fears (rightly) that the US is seeking regime change. It is of course not entirely innocent in that affair but thats an argument for another time. With the right incentives e.g. assurances of non-interference, ending of sanctions, and the right disincentives e.g. further sanctions, perhaps it can be convinced that it can reach an accomodation with the West that does not involve having the Bomb. We may already be seeing the beginnings of that accomodation - Khamanei has recently declared possession of such weapons as a "grave sin" a position that it will be hard to back track from, and in Israel policy makers are openly saying that Iran is not seeking the Bomb. A face-saving accomodation can be reached which would allow Iran to have nuclear energy with the assurances that the world needs that it cannot easily turn that technology to warlike ends.
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