Economics

Le mythe de la croissance autoritaire

Aug 9, 2010 Dani Rodrik

CAMBRIDGE – Il y a peu, quelques centaines d’activistes pro-démocratie se sont réunis sur une place de Moscou un samedi matin pour protester contre les restrictions du gouvernement sur la liberté de rassemblement. Ils brandissaient des pancartes sur lesquelles était inscrit « 31 », en référence à l’Article 31 de la Constitution russe qui garantit la liberté de rassemblement. Ils furent rapidement encerclés par la police qui tentât d’interrompre la manifestation. Un critique réputé du Kremlin et quelques autres furent alors précipitamment trainés dans un véhicule de police et emmenés.

Des évènements comme celui-ci sont presque quotidiens en Russie où le Premier ministre Vladimir Poutine dirige le pays d’une main ferme, et où la persécution d’opposants au gouvernement, les violations des droits de l’homme et les abus judiciaires sont devenus la routine. A une époque où la démocratie et les droits de l’homme sont devenus la norme mondiale, de telles transgressions ne contribuent en rien à améliorer l’image de la Russie. Les dirigeants autoritaires comme Poutine le comprennent bien, mais ils considèrent que cela représente un prix acceptable à payer pour exercer un pouvoir débridé sur leur pays.

Ce que des dirigeants comme Poutine comprennent moins est que leurs politiques compromettent aussi l’avenir économique de leur pays et leur statut économique global.

To continue reading, register now.

Subscribe now for unlimited access to everything PS has to offer.

As a registered user, you can enjoy more PS content every month – for free.

Already have an account? Log in

Subscribe to PS Digital

Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.

Subscribe Now

new comment has been posted. new comments have been posted.

0 Comments on this paragraph, 3 Comments on this article

Scott Wolfel Sep 23, 2013

Good article, but it is more of an assertion, with highly selective examples, than a causal theory or scientific explanation .

The wealthiest countries in the world, particularly the U.S. which provides the template, are democratic and capitalist, because these two innovations developed together as Europe emerged from the Middle Ages with a new set of values and secular institutions. That said, until after WWII there were various mixes of authoritarianism and democracy throughout this long process of development, with the U.S. being the only major "pure" case (Platonic ideal?) because it imported the liberal Enlightenment principles of economic and political liberty onto an institutional tabula rasa.

While there are clearly flaws in the authoritarian capitalist model as Oligarchs and Princelings capture the King's Ransom and increased economic liberty leads to calls for increased political liberty, the democratic capitalist model is looking increasingly frayed at the edges. In democratic capitalist societies, there are elites who capture a disproportionate share of the economic spoils, often through their direct and indirect connection with the political elites. In addition, the surest way for politicians to get elected and re-elected is to transfer increasing amounts of a country's economic resources to various individuals and interest groups in exchange for votes. On the left, this manifests in increasing amounts of social programs and the modern welfare state, while on the right this is represented by tax breaks and other incentives that disportionately benefit the wealthy and corporations.

While neither of these is per se "wrong," and both can provide economic and social benefits under certain circumstances, excesses over the last 3 decades are at the root of the current global sovereign debt crisis across the entire developed world. While peripheral Europe currently represents the worst case scenario, Japan and a second tier of European powers, including Italy and France, also have inescapable fiscal traps which are hobbling their economies and may well lead to future collapse.

While the U.S. has thus far avoided the worst of the financial crisis, it's growth has been anemic at best and the future debt overhang from unfunded liabilities that are estimated at $65 trillion (more than 4 times GDP) in current dollars are truly daunting.

The unfunded liability problem, which exists across the developed world, is indicative of the political failure of democracies in providing the foundation for long-term economic health. People work about 45 years give or take and are retired for about 25 years give or take with increasing lifespans. Logically, this means that you have to save enough during your working life in aggregate during the 45 years of working to provide adequate resources during the 25 years of retirement as well as all of the other social benefits that government's provide. Going back to Bismark, these social benefits were paid for current retirees by current workers, but the worm is now turning as the number of retirees will swamp the ability of the workforce to pay, let alone pay for the rest of the government.

In general, politicians in democracies get elected through a combination of providing the most transfer payments with the least taxes. While the balance is different and shifts from election to election, for decades democratic governments have supplemented these two strategies with deficits (and ignoring the long-term liabilities), which offers short-term gain at the expense of long-term pain (ie: increasing amounts of debt), although the current "big lie" is that the debt 't is "free" and doesn't have long-term economic costs.

The cracks in the foundation of this model were unmasked by the global financial crisis 5 years ago (24 years ago in Japan) and yet the "solution" is supposedly more of the same.

Professor Rodrik is correct to point out the fundamental flaws in the authoritarian capitalist model. China in particular has fundamental structural weaknesses in its model that are beginning to be uncovered and will play out in coming decades. That said, comparing it to India, South Africa and Brazil, the latter 2 which have benefitted greatly from the China-fueled commodity boom, is premature and a mistake. Democratic and authoritarian countries in the developed and developing world all face fundamental structural problems domestically and are inextricably tied together in a global market. The fundamental drivers of long-term economic growth, namely investment in the productive capacity of a society including human capital, remain broken in the democratic capitalist "core" and this is flowing through to the entire system putting all regimes under pressure.

The question is not necessarily one of authoritarian or democratic growth, but what is the fundamental driver of long-term growth and how do various political and social systems either facilitate or hinder this? In reality, both systems have strengths and weaknesses in this regard and both systems currently have structural imbalances and inefficiencies that will be made clear in the next crisis.

The fundamental difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes in this regard is that democratic regimes have mechanisms for peaceful regime change when the economic engine breaks down as it periodically does. Ideally, this leads to a resetting of the social contract without killing the golden capitalist goose, but this isn't necessarily the case and will be the fundamental question for democratic capitalist societies in coming decades.

On the other hand, authoritarian regimes only have a blunt instrument when economic discontent morphs into political dissent and social unrest. While the French Revolution is the classic example, and the Russian and CHinese Revolutions provide more modern counterparts, the Arab Spring is currently playing out in real-time. While none of these was capitalist per se, they provide the template for authoritarian regimes reactions to economic crises.

The primary question for authoritarian capitalism is can regimes continue to provide the benefits of increasing economic liberalization, while suppressing demands for political liberalization and social unrest?

The need is to go back to the fundamental drivers of long-term economic growth and to examine how authoritarian and democratic regimes hinder this process. Ceteris paribus, optimal economic growth is a social good, but all things are never equal. The distribution of that growth and externalities, like polution, are also important as is the character of a regime in promoting human rights and justice. These latter questions are the provence of political economy, which has become subsumed under other disciplines.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Y. Isabel Gordillo Sep 23, 2013

Excelente artículo, pero por qué no aparece el nombre del traductor?
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Leo Arouet Feb 15, 2013

Rusia y su dictadura... Cuando Pedro el grande siempre quiso alcanzar a los occidentales. Cuando visitó Francia seguro que tuvo ganas de llorar como aquel congresista Indonesio que visitó Singapur y se echó a llorar al ver tan atrasada que estaba su nación. Luego de regresar se Europa Pedro el grande realizo reformas en todos los espacios de la vestidura, textos, cultura, la armada y edificaciones... Lo mismo sucedió cuando los rusos se apropiaron del marxismo alemán pensaron que con ello iban a estar en la vanguardia, pero sucedió que el costo fue millones de vidas perdidas (de los propios rusos que se negaron a apoyar la dictadura de Stalin)... Y hoy, otro dictador.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.

https://prosyn.org/6xzSdEzfr

Le mythe de la croissance autoritaire

Subscribe to PS Digital

New Comment

Contact us

Log in/Register

Le mythe de la croissance autoritaire

Subscribe to PS Digital

Edit Newsletter Preferences

Set up Notification