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巴黎—在金融危机的早期阶段,一个流行的观点是美国监管系统需要从根本上进行结构修正。证券交易委员会(SEC)和商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)态度的不同阻碍了对投资银行和衍生品交易的有效监督(只有美国相信分开监管证券和衍生品是有意义的)。
事实上,银行监管过于细分给寻找放纵使用资本的银行造就了制度套利的机会。类似地,联邦保险监管者的缺位使AIG归储蓄管理局(Office of Thrift Supervision,OTS)和纽约州保险局(New York State Insurance Department)监管,这一安排显然是不到位的。
这些观点并没有起到什么效果。多德-弗兰克法案确实成功地解除了OTS的忧虑,但眼红的各个国会监督委员会成功阻止了SEC和CFTC的合并,银行监督合理化也没有任何进展。因此,美国的制度与对21世纪初造成致命危局的集体视而不见并没有什么区别。
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