Politics

Искушение популизмом в Саудовской Аравии

Nov 15, 2017 Ishac Diwan

НЬЮ-ЙОРК – Пытаясь понять динамику начавшегося в Саудовской Аравии политического землетрясения, многие занялись анализом психологии молодого наследного принца – Мухаммеда ибн Салмана. Но есть и структурные причины популизма в версии принца Мухаммеда. Понимание этих факторов необходимо для того, чтобы определить наилучший путь вперёд.

В прошлом политическая стабильность в Саудовской Аравии опиралась на три отдельных соглашения – внутри королевской семьи; между королевской семьёй и традиционной элитой королевства; между государством и населением.

Соглашение внутри семьи аль-Саудов основано на принципе «асабийя» – это способность амбициозного клана держаться вместе ради монополизации власти. Однако королевская семья стала слишком большой и слишком разобщённой, чтобы издержки поддержания её единства оказались оправданными. По приближённым оценкам, примерно пять тысяч принцев третьего поколения со своей свитой тратят $30-50 млрд в год.

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0 Comments on this paragraph, 3 Comments on this article

Steve Hurst Nov 16, 2017

'...a medium-term goal could be to reduce Saudi workers’ pay by a third, increase their productivity by a third,...' How likely is that? A 44% cost outcome down from 100%
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j. von Hettlingen Nov 16, 2017

Ishac Diwan says what is happening in Saudi Arabia today requires the understanding of the psychology of the 32-year-old crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and his brand of populism.
Since King Salman named his son crown prince in June, after removing his nephew, Mohmamed bin Nayef, the Saudi kingdom has been seeing a break from its tradition of political stability, which rested on consensus reached "within the royal family; between the royal family and the Kingdom’s traditional elites; and between the state and the population."
But this tradition is no longer sustainable. Due to the growing number of the royal family - some 5.000 princes - rivalry is pervasive. Their apanage is said to "consume $30-50 billion" annually. The "notable" families in the kingdom contribute to over "50%" of GDP and accumulate substantial wealth in private sector, thanks to "privileged access to government contracts, subsidies, capital, protection from competition."
This powerful elite has been accused of corruption, importing cheap labour and creating few jobs for local Saudis, who rely on the state for "economic security in exchange for loyalty." This rentier social contract is marked by "a patronage network of high-paying public-sector jobs and a broad array of generous welfare benefits and consumer subsidies." Over 75% of Saudi citizens work for the state, which pays three times more than the private sector. And "much of the rest of the public budget is spent on cradle-to-grave social support." But with dwindling oil revenues, MBS realises that the kingdom can no longer afford this largesse.
In April 2016, MBS introduced his Vision 2030, aimed at making the kingdom the heart of the Islamic world, an investment powerhouse. He seeks to diversify and privatise the economy, making it less reliant on oil, and planning to sell about 5 percent of the Aramco, Saudi's national oil company, raising as much as $100bn. As half of the kingdom's population is young, MBS plans to create jobs, focusing on renewable energy and water, biotechnology, food, advanced manufacturing and entertainment etc.
The author points out that autocratic regimes in Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, and Syria have larger populations but less oil, and they followed a “republican strategy” that "appeased the poor with various forms of patronage, and repressed economic elites." This helped rein in "credible opposition," and create "an anemic, largely informal, and consumption-based economy."
It looks as though MBS could fall for the Venezuela model, placating ordinary people, while purging the elites and eliminating possible opposition. Unlike Nicolas Maduro, MBS could allow foreign and state-controlled firms to replace the private sector run by the elites. "And the balance of payments could be stabilized with lower consumption and imports, particularly that of the royals and the rich." The author says Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Putin had sacrificed the "private sector on the altar of regime survival."
No doubt "lower levels of consumption" and "higher levels of repression" would hardly go down well with ordinary Saudis. If they were forced to share economic pain, they would certainly demand more say. A "youthful" society that makes up of men and women would urge for "social emancipation," participation and inclusion in the labour market.
It remains to be seen how reform-minded MBS is and whether he has the stamina to implement the reforms he advocates, without the process of democratisation, which is long and tortuous. As the custodian of the two holy mosques, Saudi Arabia is a highly conservative country. It is unclear how much support MBS receives for the social changes he seeks to push ahead with. As volatile the Middle East is, Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to instability, and the future of MBS is far from certain, even if he rules with an iron fist.
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Искушение популизмом в Саудовской Аравии

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