Latin America's democracies face a myriad of hazards, but one crucial challenge could be solved relatively easily: the gross under-representation of women their legislative bodies. Quotas should be adopted that require that no more than half of parties’ legislative candidates in each district be of the same sex.
Latin America’s democracies range from those that are models for the world – Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay – to those like Guatemala, Haiti, and Venezuela that are so weak that calling them democracies is dubious. The democracies in this region face a myriad of hazards, but one crucial challenge could be solved relatively easily: the gross under-representation of women in their legislative bodies.
Despite some prominent women at the top of Latin American politics, the general absence of women from the region’s political life causes a serious democratic deficit. The low representation of women in legislatures is not only a symbol of flaws in the functioning of Latin American democracies; it also means that women legislators are unable to bring their intrinsically different approaches to policy into play.
Only the Argentine Senate has a composition that is more than 40% female, while the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly and Argentine Chamber of Deputies are the only legislatures above the 30% bar. In nine legislative bodies in the region, women account for 10% or less of the members.
Between 1991 and 2000, twelve Latin American countries adopted legislation requiring minimum percentages of women on the party lists used for the election of national legislators. But, despite this legislation, the percentage of women legislators in many of these countries remains very low.
To address the dismal under-representation of women in Latin America’s legislatures, a series of reforms must be adopted, reforms that depend in part on a country’s existing electoral legislation. All countries, for example, should adopt quotas requiring that no more than half of parties’ legislative candidates in each district be of the same sex.
Research demonstrates that gender quota legislation is more effective in ensuring the election of women when a closed party list voting system is used. Under this system, voters can only vote for political parties as a whole, and thus have no influence on the order in which candidates are elected. When combined with adequate enforcement of the quota legislation, closed lists guarantee a minimum level of women’s representation across all parties and districts.
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For example, in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Mexico (where a closed list, placement mandates, and strict compliance are in force), there is an assurance that if a party wins three seats in a district, a women will occupy at least one of the seats. Open-list systems, where voters have influence on the order in which a party’s candidates are elected, provide no such guarantee.
In closed-list systems, the candidate lists should be zippered: male, female, male, female (or vice versa). In open-list systems, a 50% quota should be adopted.
It is not possible to predict with any accuracy the impact of an increase in the quota percentages in the open-list systems that currently have effective quota legislation. But if these countries replace their open lists with closed lists, the percentage of women elected should, all else remaining equal, increase by around 10%. The impact would be greatest (resulting in an approximately 20% jump in the percentage of women elected) in systems that currently do not have effective quota legislation.
Such legislation must also have rigid compliance standards that are reviewed and enforced by the state’s electoral authorities and courts. One way to enforce the rules may be to say that parties that do not comply with the legislation in a district should not be able to run candidates there.
But lists alone won’t do the trick. Indeed, another necessary component of such reforms is the adoption of medium-sized to large-sized districts for the election of national legislators. Women have the most difficultly reaching office in single-seat districts. As nearly 40% of Latin American legislators are the only legislator from their party elected in a district, this poses a real barrier to women.
The benefits from these reforms are two-fold. First, and most importantly, they will immediately increase the number of women in Latin America’s legislative bodies, which in turn will enhance the legitimacy of these countries’ democracies.
Second, by increasing the presence of women in positions of power, the reforms will aid in the creation of an autonomous and powerful cadre of female political leaders. This will allow for a greater degree of substantive representation of issues and policies that are important to women, whose interests are often inadequately represented by overwhelmingly male legislatures.
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Latin America’s democracies range from those that are models for the world – Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay – to those like Guatemala, Haiti, and Venezuela that are so weak that calling them democracies is dubious. The democracies in this region face a myriad of hazards, but one crucial challenge could be solved relatively easily: the gross under-representation of women in their legislative bodies.
Despite some prominent women at the top of Latin American politics, the general absence of women from the region’s political life causes a serious democratic deficit. The low representation of women in legislatures is not only a symbol of flaws in the functioning of Latin American democracies; it also means that women legislators are unable to bring their intrinsically different approaches to policy into play.
Only the Argentine Senate has a composition that is more than 40% female, while the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly and Argentine Chamber of Deputies are the only legislatures above the 30% bar. In nine legislative bodies in the region, women account for 10% or less of the members.
Between 1991 and 2000, twelve Latin American countries adopted legislation requiring minimum percentages of women on the party lists used for the election of national legislators. But, despite this legislation, the percentage of women legislators in many of these countries remains very low.
To address the dismal under-representation of women in Latin America’s legislatures, a series of reforms must be adopted, reforms that depend in part on a country’s existing electoral legislation. All countries, for example, should adopt quotas requiring that no more than half of parties’ legislative candidates in each district be of the same sex.
Research demonstrates that gender quota legislation is more effective in ensuring the election of women when a closed party list voting system is used. Under this system, voters can only vote for political parties as a whole, and thus have no influence on the order in which candidates are elected. When combined with adequate enforcement of the quota legislation, closed lists guarantee a minimum level of women’s representation across all parties and districts.
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For example, in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Mexico (where a closed list, placement mandates, and strict compliance are in force), there is an assurance that if a party wins three seats in a district, a women will occupy at least one of the seats. Open-list systems, where voters have influence on the order in which a party’s candidates are elected, provide no such guarantee.
In closed-list systems, the candidate lists should be zippered: male, female, male, female (or vice versa). In open-list systems, a 50% quota should be adopted.
It is not possible to predict with any accuracy the impact of an increase in the quota percentages in the open-list systems that currently have effective quota legislation. But if these countries replace their open lists with closed lists, the percentage of women elected should, all else remaining equal, increase by around 10%. The impact would be greatest (resulting in an approximately 20% jump in the percentage of women elected) in systems that currently do not have effective quota legislation.
Such legislation must also have rigid compliance standards that are reviewed and enforced by the state’s electoral authorities and courts. One way to enforce the rules may be to say that parties that do not comply with the legislation in a district should not be able to run candidates there.
But lists alone won’t do the trick. Indeed, another necessary component of such reforms is the adoption of medium-sized to large-sized districts for the election of national legislators. Women have the most difficultly reaching office in single-seat districts. As nearly 40% of Latin American legislators are the only legislator from their party elected in a district, this poses a real barrier to women.
The benefits from these reforms are two-fold. First, and most importantly, they will immediately increase the number of women in Latin America’s legislative bodies, which in turn will enhance the legitimacy of these countries’ democracies.
Second, by increasing the presence of women in positions of power, the reforms will aid in the creation of an autonomous and powerful cadre of female political leaders. This will allow for a greater degree of substantive representation of issues and policies that are important to women, whose interests are often inadequately represented by overwhelmingly male legislatures.