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普京和卢卡申科的探戈

Sep 4, 2020 Dmitry Oreshkin

莫斯科—俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京所公开发表的有关白俄罗斯大规模抗议活动的讲话既有力又模糊。例如，他表示已经组建了一支“执法后备部队，”可能随时参与到白俄罗斯局势当中。但普京所指可能涉及多种不同人员，从交警和镇压示威运动的警察到联邦安全局（苏联时代克格勃的主要继任者FSB）以及像俄罗斯卫队（Rosgvardia）这样全副武装的军事机构。

究竟什么情况会实际促使俄罗斯干预白俄罗斯局势？普京表示“除非局势失控，”否则不会动用“后备部队。”但由谁来决定局势是否失控？如果决定者是白俄罗斯四面楚歌的独裁者亚历山大·卢卡申科，普京完全可以说克里姆林宫只会应“共和国合法当选总统的要求”采取行动。毕竟，1956年苏联军事干预匈牙利和1968年干预捷克斯洛伐克都是本着这样的原则。

但普京没有做出这样的承诺。事实上，普京的公开声明表明，他认为他本人而不是卢卡申科应当对白俄罗斯的政治进程负责。这导致卢卡申科陷入到两难境地：冒着被推翻的风险好过要求普京提供军事援助。

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j. von Hettlingen Sep 7, 2020

Dmitry Oreshkin suggests Putin and Alexander Lukashenko are doing a tango, which is a partner dance that involves leading and following roles. Although gender roles used to play a big part in the dance’s mechanics, women in recent times want to be more independent from their dominant male partners. The dance further developed allowing same sex pairs to adopt two equally leading roles. This makes the Putin/Lukashenko tango all the more awkward.
Following mass protests in Belarus, its embattled president has turned to Putin for help, after EU leaders refused to recognise the election result. From Putin Lukashenko received the assurance of sending “law enforcement reserve” force, which would “not be used until the situation starts getting out of control.” The ambiguity of this statement leaves much room for interpretation. Lukashenko is in a bind – he might as well “risk being overthrown than to turn to Putin for military support.”
Belarus is heavily reliant on Russia, and the two allies share the same ethnicity and culture, tied to a multitude of economic and strategic treaties. But unresolved questions about national identity had strained their cooperation in recent times. The early years of Lukashenko's rule were marked by warm ties with Russia – first under Boris Jelzin, then Putin. Last year Lukashenko was worried that the Treaty of a Union State he signed with Jelzin in 1999 was beginning to look like a takeover.
Lukashenko has recently sought to spread his options by strengthening ties with China and the US. A meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last year was seen as a potential new opening for Belarus. Ahead of last month’s presidential election, Belarusian authorities said a “mercenary” group of 33 Russians, linked to activists planning mass protests against Lukashenko, had been detained. But Russia denied such allegations. No doubt these moves had not gone unnoticed in Moscow.
The author says, “Putin is doubtless seeking payback after Lukashenko’s public refusal last year to consider deeper integration with Russia. At the time, Putin was worried about his 2024 term limit and hoping to reset the clock by uniting Belarus and Russia” in a “new” country” with him as leader. But Lukashenko was unwilling to sacrifice his own political future.
In July Putin oversaw a referendum to amend the Russian constitution and “ensure his continued rule at least until 2036. And, because the plebiscite turned out to be more arduous, expensive, and controversial than expected, the Kremlin is now eager to humiliate and punish Lukashenko, even if it means writing off his debt.”
Putin must be outraged that Lukashenko dared to seek a competitive advantage over the protests. “The Kremlin has announced its readiness to restructure Lukashenko’s longstanding oil and gas debt. But writing off old debts does not mean new funds, which is what Lukashenko needs. Hence, he is probably hoping to stabilize the domestic situation somewhat so that he can then blackmail the Kremlin. Rather than demanding repayment, he would argue, the Kremlin should really be sending him more funds to support Belarus’s role as a strategic buffer against NATO.”
Lukashenko has blamed the US and Western spies for fomenting unrest, accusing NATO of aggressively positioning forces along his country’s borders with Poland and Lithuania. “The protesters in the streets of Minsk and other Belarusian cities face the risk of weakening one dictator only to have him replaced by a stronger, more remote one. And if events take a serious turn for the worse, Belarusians could even end up with a military conflict raging within their borders.”
The author says a “Russian intervention in Belarus will remain strictly verbal for now.” For the time being, a Crimean-style invasion seems not imminent, and “Belarusian security forces will continue trying to suppress the demonstrations, and Lukashenko will resist Putin’s overtures to send in ‘little green men,’ to occupy and then annex Crimea in 2014.
Although Putin would not negotiate with Lukashenko “unless he has a stick in the hand and a carrot in the pocket,” knowing it may “have a few more economic trump cards up its sleeve,” it is difficult to predict the vagaries of mass protests and the desperation of a cornered wolf. Lukashenko could resort to brutal crackdowns on protesters, escalating tensions. It remains to be seen whether the poisoning of Alexei Navalny would trigger Western sanctions that could take a big bite out of Russia’s economy.
During his two decades in office , Putin “has enjoyed three bursts of popularity, each following small, seemingly victorious military campaigns – in Chechnya in 2000, in Georgia in 2008, and in Ukraine in 2014. Given this track record, it is no surprise that he would try to play the same game in Belarus, offering Russians yet another shiny object signifying Russia’s greatness.”
Much like Trump’s approach to the Covid-19 pandemic, Putin almost certainly hopes the protests in Belarus will die down. If they do not and the standoff persists, Putin may face a hard choice. At present, he appears inclined to use force, with potentially costly implications for Russia. He should learn a lesson from Ukraine. Over the past six years, Kremlin policies of intervention have pushed Ukraine away from Russia and toward the West. Putin should avoid reapeating this mistake with Belarus.
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