In 2001, George W. Bush claimed that he had looked into Vladimir Putin’s eyes and found a soulmate for the West. Today, Western leaders may well be about to repeat the same mistake with Dmitry Medvedev.
LONDON – In 2001, George W. Bush claimed that he had looked into Vladimir Putin’s eyes and found a soulmate for the West. Putin then proceeded to restore authoritarian rule in Russia. Today, Western leaders may well be about to repeat the same mistake with Dmitry Medvedev.
Sunday’s election was a coronation rather than a competition. Medvedev’s only opponents were has-beens from the 1990’s like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who long ago converted himself from proto-fascist into a Kremlin loyalist, and Andrey Bogdanov, an ersatz “democrat” permitted to run by the Kremlin in order to dupe the West into thinking that a real contest was taking place.
It is therefore surprising that Medvedev should be hailed by so many in the West as a “liberal.” Is this just because we have been maneuvered into fearing someone worse, a sabre-rattling silovik (past or present member of the security services), like former Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov? Or does Medvedev represent a genuine opportunity to unfreeze the current mini-Cold War between Russia and the West?
Medvedev is indeed personable. Putin’s background was in the KGB, while Medvedev is a lawyer who has attacked Russia’s “legal nihilism” and denounced the fashionable concept of “sovereign democracy.” Medvedev is familiar to the business world after seven years as Chairman of the Board of Gazprom. He can talk the talk at Davos. He wears nice suits. He does not look like an archetypal post-Soviet bureaucrat or KGB agent. He is a big fan of 1970’s rockers Deep Purple.
But we need to understand the system that made Medvedev before rushing to embrace a new face that may turn out to be only a cosmetic improvement.
Russia’s problem is not that it is an imperfect democracy, but that its governance is corrupted by so-called “political technology.” This involves more than just stuffing the ballot box. Political technology means secretly sponsoring fake politicians like Bogdanov, setting up fake NGO’s and “patriotic” youth movements like Nashi (Ours) to prevent a Russian version of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, and mobilizing voters against a carefully scripted “enemy.”
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In 1996, the enemy was the Communists; in 1999-2000, the Chechens; in 2003-04, the “oligarchs.” Now it is us – the supposedly hostile West and the threat posed by “color revolutions” to Russia’s hard-won stability.
Medvedev himself may find some or all of this distasteful, but Russia now has an entire industry of political manipulation that is hardly likely to disappear overnight.
We also need to understand the mechanics of Russian succession politics. In the Russian context, “liberal” does not mean little more than opposing the siloviki . It means being in a different clan, at a different part of the feeding trough. The uncertainties of the succession have created a covert war for property and influence between a handful of different clans, but the system cannot afford an outright winner.
In recent months, the most powerful clan, led by Deputy Head of Kremlin Administration Igor Sechin, whose company, Rosneft, received the biggest chunk of Yukos in 2004, has threatened to engulf the others. Another company, Russneft, worth an estimated $8-9 billion, seems to be heading its way, after its owner, Mikhail Gutseriyev, was evicted by the same recipe of legal threats and tax liens that was used against Yukos, and after the mysterious death of his son in a car crash. There are rumors that Sechin’s clan has designs on Russia’s Stabilization Fund, which soaring energy prices have pumped up to over $140 billion.
In other words, rebalancing the system, not any sudden desire to reverse the increasingly illiberal course Russia has taken since 2003, was the key reason for choosing Medvedev. Putin’s ambition to stay in power as prime minister is also rooted in this rebalancing act. He needs to stay on as Medvedev’s “minder” to keep any one clan from dominating the others. Medvedev and the siloviki heartily dislike each other. Sechin and Ivanov will be watching him closely for any signs of weakness. Medvedev will not become his own man until he can cut free.
Putin himself honored his succession deal with Boris Yeltsin for about three years. It is often forgotten that Yeltsin loyalists like Alexander Voloshin and former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov survived in office until the Yukos affair of 2003-04. Medvedev may one day have his own Yukos moment, but we should not assume that he is an independent player until he does.
European governments can therefore welcome Medvedev’s election, but their response should be carefully calibrated to the real changes he will be able to make. Europe should avoid repeating the over-reaction of many leaders when Putin succeeded the ailing Yeltsin in 2000. There should be no race to be Medvedev’s new best friend, and no staring into his eyes and speculating about his soul.
We should concentrate on what Medvedev does, not on what he says, because there can be no real transition in Russia unless and until he begins to define the system rather than being defined by it.
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The escalating war in the Middle East must be understood in a broader context. The fact that the Iranian regime felt emboldened to risk a direct strike on Israel attests to a changing world order in which Western power is increasingly open to challenge.
considers the implications of Iran’s unprecedented decision to launch a direct strike on Israeli territory.
LONDON – In 2001, George W. Bush claimed that he had looked into Vladimir Putin’s eyes and found a soulmate for the West. Putin then proceeded to restore authoritarian rule in Russia. Today, Western leaders may well be about to repeat the same mistake with Dmitry Medvedev.
Sunday’s election was a coronation rather than a competition. Medvedev’s only opponents were has-beens from the 1990’s like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who long ago converted himself from proto-fascist into a Kremlin loyalist, and Andrey Bogdanov, an ersatz “democrat” permitted to run by the Kremlin in order to dupe the West into thinking that a real contest was taking place.
It is therefore surprising that Medvedev should be hailed by so many in the West as a “liberal.” Is this just because we have been maneuvered into fearing someone worse, a sabre-rattling silovik (past or present member of the security services), like former Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov? Or does Medvedev represent a genuine opportunity to unfreeze the current mini-Cold War between Russia and the West?
Medvedev is indeed personable. Putin’s background was in the KGB, while Medvedev is a lawyer who has attacked Russia’s “legal nihilism” and denounced the fashionable concept of “sovereign democracy.” Medvedev is familiar to the business world after seven years as Chairman of the Board of Gazprom. He can talk the talk at Davos. He wears nice suits. He does not look like an archetypal post-Soviet bureaucrat or KGB agent. He is a big fan of 1970’s rockers Deep Purple.
But we need to understand the system that made Medvedev before rushing to embrace a new face that may turn out to be only a cosmetic improvement.
Russia’s problem is not that it is an imperfect democracy, but that its governance is corrupted by so-called “political technology.” This involves more than just stuffing the ballot box. Political technology means secretly sponsoring fake politicians like Bogdanov, setting up fake NGO’s and “patriotic” youth movements like Nashi (Ours) to prevent a Russian version of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, and mobilizing voters against a carefully scripted “enemy.”
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Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.
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In 1996, the enemy was the Communists; in 1999-2000, the Chechens; in 2003-04, the “oligarchs.” Now it is us – the supposedly hostile West and the threat posed by “color revolutions” to Russia’s hard-won stability.
Medvedev himself may find some or all of this distasteful, but Russia now has an entire industry of political manipulation that is hardly likely to disappear overnight.
We also need to understand the mechanics of Russian succession politics. In the Russian context, “liberal” does not mean little more than opposing the siloviki . It means being in a different clan, at a different part of the feeding trough. The uncertainties of the succession have created a covert war for property and influence between a handful of different clans, but the system cannot afford an outright winner.
In recent months, the most powerful clan, led by Deputy Head of Kremlin Administration Igor Sechin, whose company, Rosneft, received the biggest chunk of Yukos in 2004, has threatened to engulf the others. Another company, Russneft, worth an estimated $8-9 billion, seems to be heading its way, after its owner, Mikhail Gutseriyev, was evicted by the same recipe of legal threats and tax liens that was used against Yukos, and after the mysterious death of his son in a car crash. There are rumors that Sechin’s clan has designs on Russia’s Stabilization Fund, which soaring energy prices have pumped up to over $140 billion.
In other words, rebalancing the system, not any sudden desire to reverse the increasingly illiberal course Russia has taken since 2003, was the key reason for choosing Medvedev. Putin’s ambition to stay in power as prime minister is also rooted in this rebalancing act. He needs to stay on as Medvedev’s “minder” to keep any one clan from dominating the others. Medvedev and the siloviki heartily dislike each other. Sechin and Ivanov will be watching him closely for any signs of weakness. Medvedev will not become his own man until he can cut free.
Putin himself honored his succession deal with Boris Yeltsin for about three years. It is often forgotten that Yeltsin loyalists like Alexander Voloshin and former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov survived in office until the Yukos affair of 2003-04. Medvedev may one day have his own Yukos moment, but we should not assume that he is an independent player until he does.
European governments can therefore welcome Medvedev’s election, but their response should be carefully calibrated to the real changes he will be able to make. Europe should avoid repeating the over-reaction of many leaders when Putin succeeded the ailing Yeltsin in 2000. There should be no race to be Medvedev’s new best friend, and no staring into his eyes and speculating about his soul.
We should concentrate on what Medvedev does, not on what he says, because there can be no real transition in Russia unless and until he begins to define the system rather than being defined by it.