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沙特阿拉伯的权力的游戏

Jun 24, 2017 Bernard Haykel

普林斯顿—沙特阿拉伯国王萨勒曼刚刚废黜了57岁的王储穆罕默德·本·纳伊夫，替之以自己31岁的儿子穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼，完成了自2015年萨勒曼继承王位以来权力集中的过程。

穆罕默德王子——西方统称为MBS，是萨勒曼国王最钟爱的儿子。81岁的萨勒曼将他立为王储表明他与自开国国王阿卜杜拉齐兹·伊本·沙特以来王位几十年间由其儿子兄终弟及的传统彻底决裂。

从构造角度讲，沙特阿拉伯不再是一个共享权力的老人政治国家。它已经回归了伊本·沙特本人在位时的绝对的君主制。权力被完全集中在国王的手中，然后由国王将大部分权力委托给王储。

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ROHIT CHANDAVARKER Jun 26, 2017

The ascension of MBS was inevitable though earlier than expected. The ouster of MBN might come to haunt the Govt. in future given his adroit handling of interior ministry & counter terrorism successes. MBS is now in charge of every arm of the Govt. & the nickname , Mr. Everything, seems apt.
Vision 2030 is undoubtedly a transformational concept which, if successful, would catapult Saudi Arabia into a non oil dependent economy with drastic changes to its social & cultural ethos. However, one is deeply sceptical of its success, even moderately, given the headwinds it faces from a cross section of Saudis including the powerful clergy. The huge fiscal deficit of $98 billion last year jolted the Govt. into working out structural reforms, unheard of since the country's inception. Divestment of 5% of Saudi Aramco would be a herculean task given its secretive nature of working.
MBS has embarked on reforms styled on the lines of UAE following lead taken by his friend Mohammad bin Nahyan of Abu Dhabi. One doubts if MBS would be able to replicate Dubai's landscape in Saudi, though.
The challenges MBS faces are huge & many, with some of his own making.
First is the involvement in Yemen and its toll on Saudi economy. Having charged into battle with presumably little thinking, MBS is now caught in a Catch 22 situation in Yemen with a stalemate that refuses to break, thereby bleeding his already hurting economy. Antipathy towards Iran is taking the form of robust adventurism with little planning & wisdom. Egged on by the recent bonhomie shown by Trump, MBS has, along with UAE, Egypt & Bahrain, sought to punish Qatar. This standoff within GCC members is unlikely to resolve in a hurry given the ratcheting up of the issue. The 13 demands that Qatar has to abide by seem unreasonable & unimplementable. Qatar, meanwhile, seems certain to tilt towards Iran & Turkey. Ironically, Saudis intended to isolate Iran in the Middle East but is now taking centrestage. The supposed billions of dollars of arms sales by US is mostly earlier commitments by previous US administrations & mean little is real terms. The famed Arab coalition that Saudis initiated is likely to wither away with a split within the Sunni coalition members over the Qatar imbroglio. Pakistan's Raheel Sharif heading the coalition's military is unlikely to take decisive decisions given Pakistan's relations with not only Qatar, but also Iran.
The freeze on Saudi salaries of civil servants had to be lifted under domestic pressure. And the powerful clergy is wary of MBS' moves to reform society especially women's rights.
Hence, MBS has his task cut out with little time to recoup or ponder. Hitting the ground running with little help from peers is bound to create pressure, though one hopes he succeeds, for Saudis' sake.
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Paul Aarts Jun 26, 2017

Why does the author not spend even one word on Mohammad bin Salman's disastrous adventure in Yemen?
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j. von Hettlingen Jun 25, 2017

Bernard Haykel points out the qualities Mohammed bin Salman (MSB) possesses, that allow him to be named as heir to the Saudi throne last week. Despite his young age, the 31 year-old is said to have "wit, guile, and force of personality to consolidate power and assert his authority over key sectors of Saudi society."
The author says, MSB's humility enabled a "smooth" transition from the one crown prince to another, replacing his cousin Mohammed bin Nayif. He fell to his knees to kiss his predecessor's hand, prompting Nayif to "offer his allegiance to MSB." Inviting Trump to Saudi Arabia was another feat that had impressed his father, King Salman. The visit had improved the US-Saudi relationship, which reached a nadir under Obama.
Apart from being the King's favourite son, MSB seems have a plan to bring social and economic change - Vision 2030. It aims "to diversify the Saudi economy, by reducing its heavy dependence on oil revenues." MSB is managing the overhaul of an ailing economy and the reduction of the country's lavish subsidies. He has also proposed the partial privatisation of the state-owned oil company, Aramco and invited foreigners to invest in the Kingdom. Young people support the abolition of the much feared religious police and the opening up of a closed society.
The other goal is to turn Saudi Arabia into "a regional military hegemon that can stand up to external threats, not least Iran. To do this, he will have to make his country far less dependent on US military protection, on which it has relied since 1945." This ambition raises widespread concern not only in the region but also across the globe. While MSB's ascendency gives hopes of reform, he is also known for being a hothead.
In May MSB gave an interview, offering a glimpse into how he viewed Iran, Saudi Arabia's arch enemy. He said there was no space for dialogue with Iran due to its ambitions “to control the Islamic world”. Outlining the tensions in sectarian terms, he said it was Tehran’s goal “to control the Islamic world” and to spread its Shia doctrine in preparation for the arrival of a revered imam named Mohammed al-Mahdi. Shia Muslims believe al-Mahdi, the 12th and last Shia imam, who disappeared in the ninth century, will one day reappear to bring justice to the world. It's doubtful if young Iranians believe in the return of Mahdi.
When asked if he saw a possibility for direct dialogue with Iran, the prince replied: “How can I come to an understanding with someone, or a regime, that has an anchoring belief built on an extremist ideology? What are the interests between us? How can I come to an understanding with this?”
Iran and Saudi Arabia are two key players backing opposite sides in their proxy wars in Syria and Yemen. They also support political adversaries in Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq, escalating the conflicts and deepening the Sunni/Shia schism on both sides.
Ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran have been strained since Iran’s 1979 revolution. The Saudis fear the growing influence of a newly-strident Iran over the Shia population in their oil-rich Eastern Province and the Muslim world. The dispute between the two nations has deep religious, historic and political roots. Iran and Saudi Arabia are on opposing sides of a more than 1,000-year old argument at the heart of Islam. Tensions escalated in recent years when Iran became furious with a deadly stampede during 2015 Hajj pilgrimage and a more assertive Saudi foreign policy since King Salman took charge. Then there was the row over the execution of Sheikh Nimr. The two countries severed diplomatic and trade ties. Now Qatar is being thrown under the bus for its economic cooperation with Iran. This diplomatic row between Qatar and its neigbours may bear MSB's signature. Given his young age and impetuousness, uncertain times lie ahead of the Middle East for years to come.
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Shakir Mumtaz Jun 25, 2017

There is very strong possibility of a coup due to the ongoing power struggle. MBS's Youth in a gerontocratic set up may prove to be a cause of intense resentment among those vying for power.

Given the opportunity, MBS might be able to redirect the economic orientation but may not be able to make KSA an area military hegemon as it does not have the army personnel capable of carrying out such a role.
shakir2.wordpress.com
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Hamed Nikhalat Jahromi Jun 24, 2017

Very good points are raised here.

But I have several disagreements:

1. I do not think the “… MBS’s power base is … secure”. About six months ago several high-ranking princes wrote a letter to King Salam telling him about their concern that Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) is consolidating power. I hear that Mohammed bin Nayif is under house arrest after bayʿah which means the bayʿah has been under pressure – presence of an armed bodyguard in the bayʿah, a very uncommon thing, strengthens this suspicion. I think, out of respect for the king, princes have stayed quite so far but there is a very good chance they are going to make a move against MbS after the king dies.

2. I disagree that “… MBS managed all of this while still formally adhering to the Saudi royal family’s strict protocols and elaborate codes of hierarchy”. This is why there has developed an allegiance of high-ranking princes against him.

3. I do not think Vision 2030 intends to or can create “… good jobs …”. The Vision wants to create usual jobs in health care, tourism, etc. to be filled by Saudi subjects. But the problem is Saudis are used to high-paying, easy public-sector jobs with fancy titles – these are good jobs in their view. A major challenge to Vision 2030 is therefore getting Saudis to work in Burger King – many commentators, and I agree with them, consider such a shift in the behaviour of Saudis unrealistic.

In conclusion:

a. MbS’s power most likely will be challenged after King Salman. If he really wants to secure his power base he must get King Salman to abdicate the throne. This way MbS can establish himself as the king while his father is still alive.

b. Failure in delivering Vision 2030 goals, something that increasingly seems likely – he recently had to roll back on some key National Transformational Plan goals, will substantially weaken MbS’s place in the Royal Family and among Saudis in the years to come. He has to quickly think of ways to contain the situation when this happens, a problem that does not seem easy to tackle.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Hamed Nikhalat Jahromi Jun 24, 2017

Very good points are raised here.

But I have several disagreements:

1. I do not think the “… MBS’s power base is … secure”. About six months ago several high-ranking princes wrote a letter to King Salam telling him about their concern that Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) is consolidating power. I hear that Mohammed bin Nayif is under house arrest after bayʿah which means the bayʿah has been under pressure – presence of an armed bodyguard in the bayʿah, a very uncommon thing, strengthens this suspicion. I think, out of respect for the king, princes have stayed quite so far but there is a very good chance they are going to make a move against MbS after the king dies.
2. I disagree that “… MBS managed all of this while still formally adhering to the Saudi royal family’s strict protocols and elaborate codes of hierarchy”. This is why there has developed an allegiance of high-ranking princes against him.
3. I do not think Vision 2030 intends to or can create “… good jobs …”. The Vision wants to create usual jobs in health care, tourism, etc. to be filled by Saudi subjects. But the problem is Saudis are used to high-paying, easy public-sector jobs with fancy titles – these are good jobs in their view. A major challenge to Vision 2030 is therefore getting Saudis to work in Burger King – many commentators, and I agree with them, consider such a shift in the behaviour of Saudis unrealistic.

In conclusion: (i) MbS’s power most likely will be challenged after King Salman. If he really wants to secure his power base he must get King Salman to abdicate the power. This way MbS can establish himself as the king and systematically destroy his opposition while his father is still alive. (ii) Failure in delivering Vision 2030 goals, something that increasingly seems likely – he recently had to roll back on some key National Transformational Plan goals, will substantially weaken MbS’s place in the Royal Family and among Saudis in the years to come. He has to quickly think of ways to contain the situation.
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沙特阿拉伯的权力的游戏

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