Sweden's thumbs down to the Euro strips bare the fundamental choice now facing Europe. Slowly, very slowly, the European Union is approaching the moment of truth when its members must decide what kind of a Union they want. Do they want a politically integrated Union, perhaps developing eventually into a true federation? Or do they want a loose economic club, based essentially on a single economic market, with a few optional add-ons of a political nature?
This question has faced the EU from its beginning, and until now member governments answered it by proceeding at the pace of the most reluctant. But that may be changing. This year, or next year, it may at last become clear that the gulf between federalists and nationalists is too deep to be bridged. At that point, the federalists will see whether they can find a way to go ahead on their own. If they do, there will be a two-speed Europe, with a politically integrated inner core and others more loosely associated on the outside.
The idea of a two-speed or variable-geometry Union, has long been debated, mainly as a way of finessing the Euro-skeptical foot-dragging of successive British governments. Mostly, these debates tended to reach the morose conclusion that a two-speed Europe would be hopelessly difficult to negotiate. Then, thank goodness, the idea of a variable-geometry Union seemed to lose urgency when Tony Blair came to power.
What is now reviving the idea of variable geometry is the prospect of the EU's massive enlargement with the admission of ten new members from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, multiplied by the political crisis within Europe over the American war against Iraq. Everyone knows that a much larger EU must be more integrated politically if it is not to grind to a halt through sheer weight of numbers. This is a question of simple arithmetic, not ideology.
To deal with this problem, a draft EU constitution was submitted to member governments earlier this year, which would (among other things) expand the role of majority voting. Formal negotiations on that draft start next month. Unfortunately, it is increasingly clear that some peripheral EU members and many of the new members intend to revise the draft treaty, which they fear goes too far toward political integration.
Some small countries do not like the idea of a permanent President of the Council of Ministers, which they fear will strengthen the influence of big countries at their expense. Some middle-sized countries, like Spain and Poland, do not like the proposed majority voting rules, which would operate according to population weights. Some small countries do not like streamlining the Commission, and the proposed cutback in the number of Commissioners from member states. Neutrals, like Finland and Austria, are opposed to plans for closer defense cooperation. And so on.
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These concerns are understandable; and it is particularly understandable that the new member states from Eastern Europe, who have no experience of voluntary integration--and far too much experience of involuntary integration--are apprehensive about some aspects of the draft constitution. The problem is that if governments start to amend the draft constitution, the whole thing is liable to unravel.
It is hard to guess in advance the consequences of such a failure. This will depend on how failure plays out in the conference room. But if the negotiations break down because new members, or small countries, or middle-sized countries, or the neutrals, resist the reforms necessary to make the enlarged EU viable, it is a certainty that those member states in favor of closer integration, essentially the six original founding members (France, Germany, the three Benelux countries, and perhaps Italy) will start to work seriously on ways of building an alternative structure.
This is the real significance of last Sunday's ballot, when the Swedish people voted, by a surprisingly large margin, against joining the Euro. They were not voting against the Euro, they were voting against more Europe.
Sweden's government wanted the country to join, because it was afraid of the consequences of staying outside. But the government balked at arguing for it on political grounds. The Swedes have always been half-hearted about the political aspects of EU membership. But they could hardly be expected to vote for Euro membership on purely economic grounds at a time when the Swedish economy was doing better than the Euro economy.
The same is true of Britain. Tony Blair wants Britain to join the Euro, because he does not want to be excluded from the European core. But he pretends that this is an economic question, because he dare not argue, and does not believe in, the case for more political integration.
Some observers argue that Britain's prospects for joining the Euro have been damaged by the Swedish No vote or by the domestic fall-out after the war against Iraq. But this is simplistic and wrong. Tony Blair will not take Britain into the Euro because he cannot articulate the only real case for membership, which is political. Even if he did articulate this case, he would not persuade the British people, who have been conditioned by 50 years of Euro-skepticism from their political leaders.
If the negotiation of a new EU Constitution is to have any chance of success, it may be decided on Saturday, at a meeting between Tony Blair of Britain, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany, and President Jacques Chirac of France. Britain's relations with the other two states were seriously damaged by Blair's unconditional support for America's illegal war against Iraq. One point of Saturday's meeting will be to mend fences on the next steps in Iraq. But Blair's deeper purpose will be to try to ensure that if negotiations on the EU Constitution break down, Britain is not stranded permanently in the outer ring of a two-speed Europe.
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Sweden's thumbs down to the Euro strips bare the fundamental choice now facing Europe. Slowly, very slowly, the European Union is approaching the moment of truth when its members must decide what kind of a Union they want. Do they want a politically integrated Union, perhaps developing eventually into a true federation? Or do they want a loose economic club, based essentially on a single economic market, with a few optional add-ons of a political nature?
This question has faced the EU from its beginning, and until now member governments answered it by proceeding at the pace of the most reluctant. But that may be changing. This year, or next year, it may at last become clear that the gulf between federalists and nationalists is too deep to be bridged. At that point, the federalists will see whether they can find a way to go ahead on their own. If they do, there will be a two-speed Europe, with a politically integrated inner core and others more loosely associated on the outside.
The idea of a two-speed or variable-geometry Union, has long been debated, mainly as a way of finessing the Euro-skeptical foot-dragging of successive British governments. Mostly, these debates tended to reach the morose conclusion that a two-speed Europe would be hopelessly difficult to negotiate. Then, thank goodness, the idea of a variable-geometry Union seemed to lose urgency when Tony Blair came to power.
What is now reviving the idea of variable geometry is the prospect of the EU's massive enlargement with the admission of ten new members from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, multiplied by the political crisis within Europe over the American war against Iraq. Everyone knows that a much larger EU must be more integrated politically if it is not to grind to a halt through sheer weight of numbers. This is a question of simple arithmetic, not ideology.
To deal with this problem, a draft EU constitution was submitted to member governments earlier this year, which would (among other things) expand the role of majority voting. Formal negotiations on that draft start next month. Unfortunately, it is increasingly clear that some peripheral EU members and many of the new members intend to revise the draft treaty, which they fear goes too far toward political integration.
Some small countries do not like the idea of a permanent President of the Council of Ministers, which they fear will strengthen the influence of big countries at their expense. Some middle-sized countries, like Spain and Poland, do not like the proposed majority voting rules, which would operate according to population weights. Some small countries do not like streamlining the Commission, and the proposed cutback in the number of Commissioners from member states. Neutrals, like Finland and Austria, are opposed to plans for closer defense cooperation. And so on.
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Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.
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These concerns are understandable; and it is particularly understandable that the new member states from Eastern Europe, who have no experience of voluntary integration--and far too much experience of involuntary integration--are apprehensive about some aspects of the draft constitution. The problem is that if governments start to amend the draft constitution, the whole thing is liable to unravel.
It is hard to guess in advance the consequences of such a failure. This will depend on how failure plays out in the conference room. But if the negotiations break down because new members, or small countries, or middle-sized countries, or the neutrals, resist the reforms necessary to make the enlarged EU viable, it is a certainty that those member states in favor of closer integration, essentially the six original founding members (France, Germany, the three Benelux countries, and perhaps Italy) will start to work seriously on ways of building an alternative structure.
This is the real significance of last Sunday's ballot, when the Swedish people voted, by a surprisingly large margin, against joining the Euro. They were not voting against the Euro, they were voting against more Europe.
Sweden's government wanted the country to join, because it was afraid of the consequences of staying outside. But the government balked at arguing for it on political grounds. The Swedes have always been half-hearted about the political aspects of EU membership. But they could hardly be expected to vote for Euro membership on purely economic grounds at a time when the Swedish economy was doing better than the Euro economy.
The same is true of Britain. Tony Blair wants Britain to join the Euro, because he does not want to be excluded from the European core. But he pretends that this is an economic question, because he dare not argue, and does not believe in, the case for more political integration.
Some observers argue that Britain's prospects for joining the Euro have been damaged by the Swedish No vote or by the domestic fall-out after the war against Iraq. But this is simplistic and wrong. Tony Blair will not take Britain into the Euro because he cannot articulate the only real case for membership, which is political. Even if he did articulate this case, he would not persuade the British people, who have been conditioned by 50 years of Euro-skepticism from their political leaders.
If the negotiation of a new EU Constitution is to have any chance of success, it may be decided on Saturday, at a meeting between Tony Blair of Britain, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany, and President Jacques Chirac of France. Britain's relations with the other two states were seriously damaged by Blair's unconditional support for America's illegal war against Iraq. One point of Saturday's meeting will be to mend fences on the next steps in Iraq. But Blair's deeper purpose will be to try to ensure that if negotiations on the EU Constitution break down, Britain is not stranded permanently in the outer ring of a two-speed Europe.