Constitutions express a political community's history, culture, values, and political convictions. The Constitution for Europe now being written is no different. It cannot create the common bonds that define Europe and hold it together. It can only reflect and be animated by them.
Today, however, the cohesive forces that held Europe together for two generations have lost some (if not all) of their strength. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, peace and liberty are more or less taken for granted. Economic integration has advanced so far that a return to the national rivalries that twice led the continent into suicidal warfare is unthinkable.
The postwar search for affluence, too, has lost much of its allure. In Germany and other member states, economic growth no longer seems certain. Citizens are increasingly wary of the idea of economic and social progress. Public debate instead highlights the need for restricting government activities and reducing social transfers.
Enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 members will mean that for decades Europeans will need to live with greater material inequalities. To be sure, lower standards of living having always existed between Europe's east and west. During Europe's Cold War division, that gap widened considerably. With enlargement, those differences can no longer be hidden.
German reunification provides a sobering example in dealing with this problem. If the enlarged EU were to attempt on a Europe-wide scale what Germany did for its eastern lands, current EU members would need to transfer roughly 4% of their combined GDP to the new member states for at least a decade. Politics will make such transfers impossible, but even if that were not the case, the new members lack the political, economic, social, and administrative infrastructure to absorb them. Thus, the time needed to narrow the gap between Europe's east and west will be measured in generations, not years.
If the ties that have bound Europe together for two generations are fraying, what alternative bonds can be found? Late in his life Jean Monnet said that, were he to begin European integration again, he would start with culture. But secularization, rationalization, and atomization of civil and social life, and the steady expansion of government into every social sphere, have lead to a privatization of culture and religion, reducing their potential to stimulate feelings of community, identity, and solidarity.
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If the EU is to be durable, it must place greater emphasis on its cultural heritage. Because of Europe's multiplicity of languages, no one language can serve as a strong element of identity. Of course, English is developing into a lingua franca. But as a lingua franca it is limited to serving as a technical or professional language, not the language of a community.
When it comes to real cultural identity, Europe's true "common language" is composed of its musical, literary, artistic, and architectural traditions-the cultural substance perceived by all as European. The cultivation, constant renewal, development, and protection of this cultural identity must be a key common European task.
This common cultural substance is the foundation on which European nations and states are built. Yet it is not produced by state action. The state can support its development, preservation, and renewal, but cannot compel its existence. People primarily determine the extent to which culture flourishes. So cultural cohesion in Europe will have to grow from the bottom up.
But European individuals and civil societies find it hard to assert their autonomy in the face of the state. The great European experiment will succeed only if Europe's citizens limit the scope of the state's claims on society and its resources, thus redefining those areas of self-government and autonomy where responsible community life and cultural activities flourish. It is in these areas, however, that the constitutional drafts emerging in Brussels are wanting.
Consider the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights. Rather than limiting itself to basic human rights, the Charter dilutes them by engaging in detailed regulation of labor standards, social laws, and pronouncements that reflect industrial-age experience rather than address the future. To promote such "rights" as fundamental will more likely perpetuate the status quo than help shape Europe's future.
In this sense, the Charter is reactionary: if it is included in the constitution, it will impede the development of rights and responsibilities appropriate to the future.
Europe's new constitution will be accepted as a guarantee of freedom and lawful government only if it results from a broad public dialogue reflecting the common cultural and moral assumptions that bind Europeans together. If it is to last, it will not be enough for it to be conceived in the light only of today's experience. If the Constitution is to guide Europeans through periods of change and yet unknown threats, its roots must reach the foundations of European history and identity as they are embodied in the shared culture that Europe's citizens freely acknowledge as their own.
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Constitutions express a political community's history, culture, values, and political convictions. The Constitution for Europe now being written is no different. It cannot create the common bonds that define Europe and hold it together. It can only reflect and be animated by them.
Today, however, the cohesive forces that held Europe together for two generations have lost some (if not all) of their strength. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, peace and liberty are more or less taken for granted. Economic integration has advanced so far that a return to the national rivalries that twice led the continent into suicidal warfare is unthinkable.
The postwar search for affluence, too, has lost much of its allure. In Germany and other member states, economic growth no longer seems certain. Citizens are increasingly wary of the idea of economic and social progress. Public debate instead highlights the need for restricting government activities and reducing social transfers.
Enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 members will mean that for decades Europeans will need to live with greater material inequalities. To be sure, lower standards of living having always existed between Europe's east and west. During Europe's Cold War division, that gap widened considerably. With enlargement, those differences can no longer be hidden.
German reunification provides a sobering example in dealing with this problem. If the enlarged EU were to attempt on a Europe-wide scale what Germany did for its eastern lands, current EU members would need to transfer roughly 4% of their combined GDP to the new member states for at least a decade. Politics will make such transfers impossible, but even if that were not the case, the new members lack the political, economic, social, and administrative infrastructure to absorb them. Thus, the time needed to narrow the gap between Europe's east and west will be measured in generations, not years.
If the ties that have bound Europe together for two generations are fraying, what alternative bonds can be found? Late in his life Jean Monnet said that, were he to begin European integration again, he would start with culture. But secularization, rationalization, and atomization of civil and social life, and the steady expansion of government into every social sphere, have lead to a privatization of culture and religion, reducing their potential to stimulate feelings of community, identity, and solidarity.
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If the EU is to be durable, it must place greater emphasis on its cultural heritage. Because of Europe's multiplicity of languages, no one language can serve as a strong element of identity. Of course, English is developing into a lingua franca. But as a lingua franca it is limited to serving as a technical or professional language, not the language of a community.
When it comes to real cultural identity, Europe's true "common language" is composed of its musical, literary, artistic, and architectural traditions-the cultural substance perceived by all as European. The cultivation, constant renewal, development, and protection of this cultural identity must be a key common European task.
This common cultural substance is the foundation on which European nations and states are built. Yet it is not produced by state action. The state can support its development, preservation, and renewal, but cannot compel its existence. People primarily determine the extent to which culture flourishes. So cultural cohesion in Europe will have to grow from the bottom up.
But European individuals and civil societies find it hard to assert their autonomy in the face of the state. The great European experiment will succeed only if Europe's citizens limit the scope of the state's claims on society and its resources, thus redefining those areas of self-government and autonomy where responsible community life and cultural activities flourish. It is in these areas, however, that the constitutional drafts emerging in Brussels are wanting.
Consider the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights. Rather than limiting itself to basic human rights, the Charter dilutes them by engaging in detailed regulation of labor standards, social laws, and pronouncements that reflect industrial-age experience rather than address the future. To promote such "rights" as fundamental will more likely perpetuate the status quo than help shape Europe's future.
In this sense, the Charter is reactionary: if it is included in the constitution, it will impede the development of rights and responsibilities appropriate to the future.
Europe's new constitution will be accepted as a guarantee of freedom and lawful government only if it results from a broad public dialogue reflecting the common cultural and moral assumptions that bind Europeans together. If it is to last, it will not be enough for it to be conceived in the light only of today's experience. If the Constitution is to guide Europeans through periods of change and yet unknown threats, its roots must reach the foundations of European history and identity as they are embodied in the shared culture that Europe's citizens freely acknowledge as their own.