Despite dire predictions about Colombia's future, the peace process with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has recently been strengthened, primarily through the work of President Andrés Pastrana, but the guerrillas have contributed too. It is now possible to speak of moving from a dishonest peace process tainted by violent ambushes and stalling tactics toward real peace. Indeed, agreement on a bilateral cease-fire is expected before April.
After twenty years of peace talks that achieved next to nothing, in 1998, Colombia's public, sickened by assassinations, massacres, and kidnappings, required the then newly-elected President Pastrana to re-energize the search for peace. To do so, the government took a big risk and conceded to the FARC a territory the size of Switzerland to control.
The three years of desultory talks that resulted, however, achieved little. So President Pastrana abandoned the politics of concession in favor of a firm hand. The government told the guerillas either to negotiate seriously or see the Colombian military move into the FARC's territory.
The FARC leaders were stunned by the president's resolve. Despite Pastrana's vigorous pronouncements, the guerillas believed that the President would back down as he had so frequently in the past. Instead, to the FARC's astonishment, the government's plan to retake control of the region was serious. Given the Pastrana government's new resolve, the FARC had no option but to yield.
But more than a stern line in the peace talks spurred this promising outcome. Another contributing factor is the fact that Colombia's armed forces have been thoroughly reorganized and restructured in recent years. This modernization was due not only to a series of defense ministers committed to reform, but to the nation's improving financial circumstances and American military assistance provided under the rubric of the ``Plan Colombia.''
Due to these improvements, the superior tactical position that the FARC had achieved during the administration of Pastrana's predecessor, Ernesto Samper, which had resulted in serious military setbacks and the abduction of hundreds of soldiers and officials, was reversed. The FARC, which had begun to transform itself from a guerilla force into a regular army, was forced to return to guerilla warfare. Renewal of Colombia's Air Force and Marine Corps, an increase in the number of professional soldiers, and improvement in communication and mobilization systems all put the FARC increasingly on the defensive.
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In tandem with these domestic initiatives was a change in the international climate, for the events of September 11
th
had produced a completely new situation that opposed using violence as a political tool. This matters here because Colombia contains the second largest number of terrorist organizations on the US State Department's blacklist. (The Palestinians are first, hosting six such groups.) The Colombian groups include not only the FARC but the smaller ELN (National Army of Liberation) and the extreme right wing AUC (United Colombian Self-Defense).
The changed international environment saw the European Union strip guerilla organizations of their visas and blocked their entry into EU countries of those who continued to carry out abductions. Mexico, which provides an overseas home to the largest overseas FARC delegation, threatened to expel the FARC if the group failed to advance the peace process.
As frustration grew among ordinary Colombians about the use of violence, the FARC became ever more wary of completely antagonizing the country's civilians. Most Colombians now view the guerillas' armed actions not as a way to advance social change, but as the cause of recession and unemployment. In fact, less than 2% of Colombians approve of the guerillas.
In the last month, Colombia witnessed a startling change in civic protests against violence: civilians, long the victims of guerillas acts, poured into the streets in protest, filling them with flags, musical groups, and songs calling for an end to the war. Men and women, young and old, defied the guerillas' bullets. Some prevented villages from being taken over by the FARC; some forced the guerillas to abandon urban areas. Here was a telling sign: the people confronting the very guerillas who purported to represent them.
Change also took place within the FARC. Within the confines of its demilitarized zone FARC members were becoming ``sedentary guerillas'' who could not easily return to the jungles. The FARC had acquired a hospital system, an arms factory, airplane landing strips, helicopters and small airplanes, and a communications system - resources that did not want to abandon. Realizing the increasingly sedentary nature of the guerrillas gave the government confidence that its threat to overrun the demilitarized zone would bring the FARC back to serious negotiations.
But the failed peace talks of the past decades had depleted the faculty of both parties (guerillas and government) to agree on a major accord. So a ``third'' party, as in the wars in El Salvador or Guatemala of the 1980s, became indispensable as a conduit to mediate between the two. That ``third'' party is composed of three actors: a UN delegate; the ambassadors of the ten countries that make up a group of friendly nations backing the peace process, and the Catholic Church.
All of these factors contributed to bringing the FARC back to the negotiating table for the first serious discussions in twenty years. With presidential elections approaching, both sides will likely feel heavy pressure to make progress now.
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Despite dire predictions about Colombia's future, the peace process with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has recently been strengthened, primarily through the work of President Andrés Pastrana, but the guerrillas have contributed too. It is now possible to speak of moving from a dishonest peace process tainted by violent ambushes and stalling tactics toward real peace. Indeed, agreement on a bilateral cease-fire is expected before April.
After twenty years of peace talks that achieved next to nothing, in 1998, Colombia's public, sickened by assassinations, massacres, and kidnappings, required the then newly-elected President Pastrana to re-energize the search for peace. To do so, the government took a big risk and conceded to the FARC a territory the size of Switzerland to control.
The three years of desultory talks that resulted, however, achieved little. So President Pastrana abandoned the politics of concession in favor of a firm hand. The government told the guerillas either to negotiate seriously or see the Colombian military move into the FARC's territory.
The FARC leaders were stunned by the president's resolve. Despite Pastrana's vigorous pronouncements, the guerillas believed that the President would back down as he had so frequently in the past. Instead, to the FARC's astonishment, the government's plan to retake control of the region was serious. Given the Pastrana government's new resolve, the FARC had no option but to yield.
But more than a stern line in the peace talks spurred this promising outcome. Another contributing factor is the fact that Colombia's armed forces have been thoroughly reorganized and restructured in recent years. This modernization was due not only to a series of defense ministers committed to reform, but to the nation's improving financial circumstances and American military assistance provided under the rubric of the ``Plan Colombia.''
Due to these improvements, the superior tactical position that the FARC had achieved during the administration of Pastrana's predecessor, Ernesto Samper, which had resulted in serious military setbacks and the abduction of hundreds of soldiers and officials, was reversed. The FARC, which had begun to transform itself from a guerilla force into a regular army, was forced to return to guerilla warfare. Renewal of Colombia's Air Force and Marine Corps, an increase in the number of professional soldiers, and improvement in communication and mobilization systems all put the FARC increasingly on the defensive.
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Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.
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In tandem with these domestic initiatives was a change in the international climate, for the events of September 11 th had produced a completely new situation that opposed using violence as a political tool. This matters here because Colombia contains the second largest number of terrorist organizations on the US State Department's blacklist. (The Palestinians are first, hosting six such groups.) The Colombian groups include not only the FARC but the smaller ELN (National Army of Liberation) and the extreme right wing AUC (United Colombian Self-Defense).
The changed international environment saw the European Union strip guerilla organizations of their visas and blocked their entry into EU countries of those who continued to carry out abductions. Mexico, which provides an overseas home to the largest overseas FARC delegation, threatened to expel the FARC if the group failed to advance the peace process.
As frustration grew among ordinary Colombians about the use of violence, the FARC became ever more wary of completely antagonizing the country's civilians. Most Colombians now view the guerillas' armed actions not as a way to advance social change, but as the cause of recession and unemployment. In fact, less than 2% of Colombians approve of the guerillas.
In the last month, Colombia witnessed a startling change in civic protests against violence: civilians, long the victims of guerillas acts, poured into the streets in protest, filling them with flags, musical groups, and songs calling for an end to the war. Men and women, young and old, defied the guerillas' bullets. Some prevented villages from being taken over by the FARC; some forced the guerillas to abandon urban areas. Here was a telling sign: the people confronting the very guerillas who purported to represent them.
Change also took place within the FARC. Within the confines of its demilitarized zone FARC members were becoming ``sedentary guerillas'' who could not easily return to the jungles. The FARC had acquired a hospital system, an arms factory, airplane landing strips, helicopters and small airplanes, and a communications system - resources that did not want to abandon. Realizing the increasingly sedentary nature of the guerrillas gave the government confidence that its threat to overrun the demilitarized zone would bring the FARC back to serious negotiations.
But the failed peace talks of the past decades had depleted the faculty of both parties (guerillas and government) to agree on a major accord. So a ``third'' party, as in the wars in El Salvador or Guatemala of the 1980s, became indispensable as a conduit to mediate between the two. That ``third'' party is composed of three actors: a UN delegate; the ambassadors of the ten countries that make up a group of friendly nations backing the peace process, and the Catholic Church.
All of these factors contributed to bringing the FARC back to the negotiating table for the first serious discussions in twenty years. With presidential elections approaching, both sides will likely feel heavy pressure to make progress now.