Korean leaders Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-Un hold surprise second summit

Politics

Der Weg zur Einigung mit Kim Jong-un

Jun 8, 2018 Yoon Young-kwan

SEOUL – Hat der nordkoreanische Machthaber Kim Jong-un eine strategische Entscheidung getroffen, sein Atomprogramm zugunsten der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung einzustellen, oder handelt es sich um ein weiteres diplomatisches Täuschungsmanöver, in dem er lediglich vorgibt das Atomprogramm seines verarmten Landes im Gegenzug für materielle Vorteile beenden zu wollen?

Das dürfte die zentrale Frage im Vorfeld des Gipfeltreffens zwischen Kim und US-Präsident Donald Trump in Singapur am 12. Juni sein. Bis dahin kennt niemand die die Antwort, vielleicht nicht einmal Kim selbst.

Optimisten neigen zu der Ansicht, dass Kims erklärte Absicht zu denuklearisieren aufrichtig ist. Sie heben die Tatsache hervor, dass sich Nordkoreas Wirtschaft grundlegend verändert hat seit er 2011 die Nachfolge seines Vaters Kim Jong-il angetreten hat. Sie ist heute offener und der Außenhandel macht fast die Hälfte des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) aus, was die Folge eines allmählichen marktwirtschaftlichen Wandlungsprozesses ist, der Mitte der 1990er-Jahre begonnen hat. Doch diese Offenheit geht mit Verwundbarkeit einher, was Kims aktive diplomatische Bemühungen erklärt, schwerwiegende Störungen des Wirtschaftsgeschehens durch die bestehenden internationalen Sanktionen zu vermeiden.

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0 Comments on this paragraph, 13 Comments on this article

M Henri Day Jun 10, 2018

This article - hardly surprisingly - is vitiated by the fact that the author, deliberately or inadvertently, as the the case may be, misstates the goal of any negotiations on the future of the Korean peninsula. The author seems to feel that the goal is the «complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program», which, however pleasing the notion may to strategists in the United States, is false. Rather, the «common goal», as enunciated in the Panmunjom Declaration of Messrs Kim and Moon is that «of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula», i e, the removal of all nuclear-weapons systems from and a ban on their redeployment to both sides of the DMZ. In addition to the DPRK, another nuclear-weapons state - and one with vastly geater resources and a demonstrated willingness to use such weapons in war and to threaten to use them if its demands are not met - is involved here, viz, the USA. It is this state which regularly flies nuclear-capable aircraft along the borders of the two Koreas and whose nuclear-armed submarines patrol, e g, the Yellow Sea, off the borders of the DPRK. No agreement which does not prohibit such actions on the part of the US is worth the paper it is written on. Surely so experienced an observer as Professor Yoon is not unaware of this fact....

Henri
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j. von Hettlingen Jun 9, 2018

Yoon Young-kwan argues that Kim Jong-un can only be taken seriously if he commits to a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of his nuclear weapons programme, while allowing “intrusive nuclear inspects, which is a critical component of CVID.” Moreover he must not make “the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and an end to the bilateral alliance” as a precondition to his denuclearisation, whose terms are yet to be clarified.
Indeed, the coming months will show whether Kim will make the “strategic decision to trade away” his nuclear programme which has cost his country several billion dollars to develop over the years. While he has the power to make “bold political decisions” and the “realistic prudence” to oversee “a successful denuclearization,” it is unclear whether Trump can be trusted. His withdrawal from the Iran deal shows that he is capable of engaging in “deceptive diplomacy” and turning the tables on his counterpart after achieving his goal.
The author points out Kim’s eagerness to have sanctions lifted, hoping to bring prosperity to his country and people. Since he succeeded his father in 2011, North Korea’s economy “has changed fundamentally” as a result of “a gradual marketization process” since the mid 1990s that has seen the rise of a merchant class. Pyongyang, the capital is now known as “Pyonghattan” where its nouveaux riches are enjoying unprecedented access to luxury goods and fancy restaurants. However the official salary – even in Pyongyang – remains less than $10 a month.
There are signs that Kim might “emulate Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s reforms in the late 1970s.” This week he has sacked three senior old-guard military officials, which “may hint that he is ready to offer some important concessions to prepare a favorable diplomatic environment for concentrating on economic development.” The whole world is watching “whether Trump is now ready to embrace Kim’s North Korea as President Richard Nixon did with Deng’s China.” But Mike Pompeo is no Henry Kissenger and does not have the skills and acumen of Nixon’s top diplomat.
Although the outcome of the June 12 summit is unknown, the author sees a way “to achieve denuclearization that satisfies both optimists and pessimists.” The folly is that this summit should not be held at all in the absence of confidence-building measures, which require years to build. It is like putting the cart before the horse. The stake is high because if the personality of Kim and Trump clashes, it will be difficult to “step back” and reconsider “the most fundamental reason for the diplomatic failures of the last three decades: the high level of mutual distrust.”
Trump should not expect to succeed where his predecessors had failed. Kim Jong-il’s father reached out to George HW Bush after the fall of the Soviet Union, only to find himself humiliated. Bill Clinton sought to approach the “small and weak” North Korea which was “paranoid about its own security.” But it was “too little too late.” The author thinks Trump is addressing “the fundamental cause” and not the “symptoms” of North Korea’s problem – “to bolster Kim’s confidence that he and his regime will be safe without nuclear weapons and the international community will help him to focus on economic growth.”
So Trump’s “impromptu decision” to meet Kim could be “meaningful and productive,” even it may not achieve much. Trump still believes that his “maximum pressure” on North Korea through economic sanctions had subdued Kim. But his younger counterpart is a “smart cookie” and has also sought support from China and Russia, should the summit fail. Trump is a narcissist and relies on gut feelings to make decisions. Harbouring an aversion towards technocrats and experts, he does not surround himself with competent advisers or diplomats to help him prepare for the summit, because he thinks he knows best.
Indeed, much depends on Trump’s mood and whims on June 12, before the world can see what will happen to the Korean Peninsula. Yet it should come as no surprise that Kim would emerge as the winner, because he will negotiate from the position of strength for his and his country’s future. Trump, obsessed with writing history does not care much about his country, other than gratifying his own ego.
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B Wilds Jun 9, 2018

As the summit grows near it is important to remember that North Korea claims a long list of grievances against America dating back to right after World War II. Sadly the validity of such claims are supported by detailed reports from two well-respected groups.

To be quite frank I was appalled at the allegations levied against America but knowing how facts are twisted and propaganda is used by governments I should not have been.

If any validity at all exists to the claims made in the 1952 IADL and the 2001 Korea International War Crimes Tribunal reports some of North Korea's fear and distrust of America becomes more understandable. More about these claims in the article below.

http://brucewilds.blogspot.com/2018/06/north-koreas-view-and-something-we.html
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Yoshimichi Moriyama Jun 8, 2018

"Trum may be preparing for the wrong game: a two-player round of checkers when Kim is steeling for a multiplayer two-board chess match. On one board will be the future of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, what Trum came to negotiate. On the other will be what Kim and the other participants know is also crucially at stake: the future of geopolitics in North East Asia. How can the President ensure a favorable outcome in this complicated chess match?" (from Michael Green, Deciphering Kim Jong Un's Motives, Foreign Affairs, online.)f
https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-05-16/deciphering-kim-jong-uns-motives.

President Trum has a few very powerful cards but does not know how to play them; worse, he does not know it.
Kim does not have any powerful cards but he is not a moron; he knows how to play. China has already allowed ships to carry food, etc. from Chinese ports to North Korea. Russia may be starting to do the same. Kim is cruel but he is not an idiot.

Deception is not simply a North Korean national patent. It is the national character shared by both the South and the North.
- P. Kamath Jun 8, 2018
  
  Yoshi: You say, ". Deception is not simply a North Korean national patent. It is the national character shared by both the South and the North." ....,!
  
  The North and South Koreas no doubt share and exhibit some common traits because of common cultural and Civilizational evolution. It is normal! But don't you think you are painting two sides with the same tarred brush? Do you have any other strong evidence to prove your point? It is terribly unfair!
  - Yoshimichi Moriyama Jun 9, 2018
    
    "The North and South Koreas no doubt share and exhibit some common traits..." No doubt you have finished the kindergarten course of Korean history, but I am afraid you have not finished the elementary school course yet to say that I painted the two sides with the same tarred brush. Well..., but..., yes, I must say I had prepared only one brush to paint the picture.
    
    A South Korean passenger boat sank on April 16, 2014, and about three hundred lives were lost. The Chosun Ilbo, one of the biggest South Korean newspapers, reported that President Park's whereabouts for the next seven hours was not known and that she might have been having an affair with a man. The chief correspondant of a Japanese newspaper, stationed in Seoul, put it into Japanese and reported it; the report was appeared on the website of the Japanese newspaper.
    The correspondant was indicted by the South Korean prosecution for the offense of defamation of President Park. The Chosun Ilbo was not prosecuted.
    The Japanese would have been declared guilty if the Foreign Press Club in Seoul had not made strong protests. The Japanese was kept standing for three hours in the court while the chief judge read a non-guilty verdict adomonishing him for his immoral conduct. It was as if he had commited a grave crime and were guilty.
    
    Several years ago a South Korean said on the Internet that Japan was right and that Korea was wrong. He was arrested by the police. He was only thirteen years old. It was very fortunate that he did not live in North Korea.
    South Korea has often said that Japanese have never repented, like Germans, of its wicked past. Even the 1930s' Japan was not a totalitarian country. It is a myth, propagated by Koreans and Chinese that (West) Germans were remorseful and contrite, as I said in my three comments on Pro-Syn/Emily Chen/The Surrender of Japan's Peace Constitution.
    No Korean women or girls were abducted for prostitution as Koreans say. "We are still in the dark about what kind of (South Korean) people became comfort women for the (South) Korean military or why the (South) Korean government has never discussed the subject of the (South) Korean comfort stations, (Sonfa Oh, What makes Korea insult Japan.)" There were cases of women kidnapped from the North or suspected of linkes with communists being made to work in prostitution during the Korean War.
    The American and Japanese academics specializing in the comfort women issue have the consensus that no forceful prostitution of Korean women with the Japanese army took place.
    
    I (Michi) quoted in my twelve comments on On Line Opinion, Australia/Felix Imonti/Kim Jong-Un's survival strategy, "Japan has been the best colonial master of all time (David S. Landes)," and "Japan's rule over Korea was very different from Western Powers' control over their colonies (Sonfa Oh)."
    http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/views.asp?article=19745.
    I will appreciate very much if you read them all; then you will have passed the first year course of elementary school.
    The Korean population almost doubled during 1910~1945; the annual average growth rate was 3.1%, some scholars say 3.7%; per capita GDP more than doubled.
    Korea had always been ruled, until very recently, by a king or a dictator and modernization has not taken hold.
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Paul Daley Jun 8, 2018

Good article. There isn't any narrow solution available that will only eliminate North Korea's nuclear. Negotiators are going to have increase the scope of the negotiations and change the focus from denuclearization to Korean peace and reunification on the model used in Germany in the 1990s. That means irreversible steps towards unification and democracy in return for military commitments from the US not to exploit these political changes for military advantage vis-a-vis China. Unfortunately, the US and the EU were not able to resist the temptation to exploit the new political situation in Europe. Neither was the US willing to hold to the nuclear agreement with Iran. That will all complicate the negotiations regarding Korea. But the German model is applicable. With a little more good faith than the West has shown thus far, it may be possible to create a political situation in Korea and a military situation in East Asia that will allow the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
- Yoshimichi Moriyama Jun 9, 2018
  
  China on its part does not want two Koreas to be unified unless the South is absorbed by the North, I think. I think the main reason for two Germanies' unification was that the Cold War mentality had been melted and that the Soviet Union was economically so weakened that Moscow had not the capacity to keep East Germany in its fold any longer.
  There may be other reasons for the impossibility of the Korean unification at least for now.
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https://prosyn.org/ZUUoFZxde

Der Weg zur Einigung mit Kim Jong-un

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