Comments 9

Слеза для Аргентины

Aug 1, 2014 Kenneth Rogoff

Последний дефолт Аргентины представляет тревожные вопросы для политиков. Правда, периодические кризисы задолженности в стране часто являются результатом деструктивной макроэкономической политики. Но, на этот раз, дефолт был вызван значительным сдвигом в международном режиме суверенного долга.

Сдвиг предпочитает твердых кредиторов в эмиссии облигаций, регулируемых законодательством США. С замедлением роста развивающихся рынков и растущим внешним долгом, новые правовые интерпретации, которые делают долговое будущее списание и переоформление задолженности труднее, не предвещают ничего хорошего для глобальной финансовой стабильности.

В этой истории нет героев - их не найдешь особенно в депутатах Аргентины, которые десять лет назад пытались в одностороннем порядке заставить массивное обобщенное списание на иностранных держателей облигаций. Экономисты, которые трубили «консенсус Буэнос-Айреса» в качестве нового способа для запуска экономики также выглядят глупо в ретроспективе. Международный валютный фонд уже давно признал, что он выдал слишком много долгов, чтобы попытаться спасти неустойчивую привязку Аргентины к доллару когда она рухнула в 2001 году.

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Kenneth Rogoff

Writing for PS since 2002
174 Commentaries

Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Harvard University and recipient of the 2011 Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics, was the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund from 2001 to 2003. The co-author of This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, his new book, The Curse of Cash, was released in August 2016.

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Felipe Manteiga Aug 17, 2014

Balanced analysis. Ukraine was, is and will be thoroughly corrupt. And so is Argentina. Unfortunately, many senior executives in leading "global" banks , who are keenly aware of these faults in the soverign persona, eagerly lend resources not only for the benefit of the official interest rate charged, but also for the informal (or rent seeking) fees collected.

Af fat as the U.S. policies are concerned, many worry about by the vice copacetic interests in FED, Treasury, and Wall St. are tightening on all financial markets. This structured scarcity should reward generously rent seeking fees by bank executives.

The young will go jobless, but bankers will sing their way to ....the bank.
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Emilio Perez Aug 10, 2014

with emerging powerful markets coming up, the US should stop imposing these usurious practices and create fair lending practices.
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Jose Oyola Aug 10, 2014

The Rogoff piece describes a sound policy that should be pursued by IMF and other multilateral lending institutions, namely, outright grants to countries in two circumstances:
(a) Humanitarian aid in response to a significant destruction of the productive capacity due to acts of nature (e.g., Haiti)
(b) Geopolitical purposes (e.g., Ukraine).
Why Ukraine, who is an insolvent country with chronic budget deficits and is facing the imminent danger of an invasion by Russia, given a "loan" instead of a grant?
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Roger Lerner Aug 10, 2014

There needs to be a recognized forum for restructuring debt of sovereign debtors, which applies a uniform body of law/standards. Sovereign nations cannot be forced to pay, short of war, or cut off from credit markets, neither of which is happens
Those who buy US corporate debt know what can be done via. the US Bankruptcy Code. We need a similar set of standards, uniformly enforced by compact among sovereign borrowers and lenders, adjudicated in a neutral forum. This allows predictability, better pricing and some level of insulation from local political demands for abrogation. In the end, it certainly will not be perfect as governments seem to have a limitless thirst for borrowing and lenders and unrelenting willingness to satisfy that thirst. Present greed seems almost always to trump experience.
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John Gavin Aug 10, 2014

Isn't it a mistake to allow nations that have demonstrated repeatedly their incompetent management of their own money supplies?
Why should we be lending to these countries at all before they demonstrate political changes that address the corrupt use of the borrowed funds by these regimes? The IMF and nations who continue to lend while ignoring the corrupt theft of loans intended to benefit the people in these nations must understand that such circumstances only exacerbate the problem and strengthen the corruption by making it profitable. Why do we give handouts first and whine about their misuse by government after the funds have been stolen?
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Christopher Goodwin Aug 10, 2014

"A great opportunity for re-engineering the law.. governing sovereign debts." (Pitikaris) "Unsettling questions for policymakers" (Rogoff)
"another approach to debt rescheduling" (the IMF) So now "reprofiling."
ARE YOU NOT ALL MAD? These are alternative ways of saying, "We want to be able to borrow money, and not pay it back, that would be just cute." The only workable solution is to say, "We cannot pay" with the obvious "We will not lend you any more." EOTWAWKI. And a good job, too. The World as we know it is run on systematic crime. Stop now.
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Terrence Moloney Aug 9, 2014

Reprofiling only works if it's negotiated for in accordance with the terms of the notes. It's not really a function of whether the US is reluctant or enthusiastic. It's up to the market under what terms it is willing to lend: will it lend if the notes provide for a subsequent reprofiling with majority consent of note holders or not? I can't see how the IMF refusing to lend money to a sovereign in trouble unless third party creditors agree to profiling is going to accomplish much unless the third party creditors are offered something in return. In essence this means the IMF would be negotiating a restructuring with the creditors and there could still be holdouts, depending on terms of the notes.

It also doesn't seem likely the markets would accept borrower courts. Very risky since so many of the courts have weaker judicial independence. The premium would increase considerably. Nor is it obvious that the results of such adjudication would be any less controversial; someone's going to lose.

Lastly, which governing law countries and their investors agree to doesn't have much to do with what currency you borrow in. You can agree to borrow Yen but have a NY-law governed contract.

I think on the whole Professor Rogoff overestimates policymakers borrow here: how would they steer international debt flows through the borrower's courts, for example? These are private contracts. Mess around and you'll just make rates higher or borrowing impossible.

T
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Sam Iam Aug 7, 2014

What happens in emerging markets which don't have well established bankruptcy laws and lots of cronyism? Why are debtor countries bankruptcy laws most apt to adjudicate bankruptcy? Is there a risk to the international financial system?
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Theodoros Pitikaris Aug 3, 2014

The question is whether or not Argentina was able to pay in full one or some creditors due to Rights Upon Future Offers (RUFO) clause
If the Argentina was in European Union the holders would never get paid since CACs are in place.

One the other hand Argentina had deposit on time the money to the Bank of New York Mellon, on interest rate coupon repayment due to 31st of July. But the Judge following the law gave a specific and clear order to Argentina to pay the two funds in full before any other creditor.

A tear for Argentina, a tear for the western civilization or a a great opportunity for re-engineering the law that governing the sovereign debts. An great opportunity for rebooting the whole market.
- Siegfried Eschen Aug 3, 2014
  
  The deposit has no value since the contract says, that the money has to be available for the creditors. In this case the judge had prohibited the payment, because no payments had been ordered to the holdouts. If the bank had transferred the money to the 92% of creditors only, it could have lost its license. Argentina knew this, but transferred the money to the bank nevertheless. This shows the problem in a nutshell: if the sovereign operates as if it stands above the law, creditors have a hard time. In the good old days, these kinds of sovereigns just decapitated those nasty creditors! So no tears at all for Argentina! The people get the government they deserve. Hard times are coming for the next generations of Argentines due to these populist governments. Of course, the Kirchners themselves became very rich during their stay in public functions, whereas 30-40% of the Argentine people are poor now (if the scientific data are correct and less cooked up, than the official ones).
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Слеза для Аргентины

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