Workers at the Iranian Khodro car manufacturing plant make Iranian car models

Politics

Jak Írán zareaguje na nové sankce

May 2, 2018 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani

PRINCETON – Íránský rial ztratil od prosince 2017 třetinu své hodnoty. A prudké znehodnocení směnného kurzu 10. dubna přimělo tamní vládu k tomu, aby zastavila domácí transakce v zahraniční měně a zakázala držení zahraničních měn v hodnotě přesahující 10 000 eur (12 000 dolarů).

Tento krok vlády představuje radikální změnu kurzu po třech desetiletích relativně liberální hospodářské politiky, kdy úřady povolovaly devizové transakce v soukromém sektoru, a dokonce i odliv kapitálu. Nejde o pouhý projev íránských obav z opětovného zavedení sankcí ze strany USA po 12. květnu, kdy se očekává, že americký prezident Donald Trump dostojí svému slibu z předvolební kampaně a odstoupí od jaderné dohody s Íránem z roku 2015. Spíše se už Írán adaptuje na nový svět, v němž vyhlídka sblížení se Západem slábne.

V situaci, kdy hrozba obnovení amerických sankcí už dnes zapříčinila krizi rialu, využívá Trumpova administrativa jaderné dohody, dříve známé pod názvem Společný komplexní akční plán (JCPOA), k tomu, aby se pokusila donutit Írán k přijetí dalších omezení jeho jaderného programu a také programu balistických raket. Vzhledem k tomu, že v případě JCPOA usedl Írán k jednacímu stolu necelý rok po předchozím zhroucení směnného kurzu – v říjnu 2012 o 200% –, není zcela od věci domněnka, že vláda Trumpovým požadavkům ustoupí.

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0 Comments on this paragraph, 2 Comments on this article

Per Kurowski May 6, 2018

Does that mean they will flagellate themselves voluntarily, imposing additional sanctions on themselves?
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j. von Hettlingen May 5, 2018

Djavad Salehi-Isfahani explains what will happen to Iran’s economy if the Trump administration withdraws from the 2015 nuclear deal. Ordinary Iranians do not feel that the deal has brought any relief from their grievances, blaming President Hassan Rouhani’s government for failing to deliver prosperity after years of hardship. In the absence of an economic upturn “the country is already adapting to a new world in which the prospect of rapprochement with the West is fading.”
The author says crippling sanctions and the financial crisis like the “exchange-rate collapse” in 2012 had forced Tehran to negotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although “it is not entirely unreasonable to believe that the government will bow to Trump’s demands,” it is doubtful that the leadership can “justify further concessions.” Back in 2012 Iranians were more “optimistic” about reaching out to the West, especially to the US. Given Trump’s intenton to “renege on its commitments under the JCPOA,” their mood today is sombre.
It suits the hardliners that Trump scuttles the nuclear deal, because it would allow them to focus on their “resistance economy” proposed by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2012. They see Rouhani’s “pro-market, pro-globalization reforms” as a thorn in their side. The new economic system will “reduce Iran’s reliance on Westren economies” and boost domestic investment and production. This would strengthen the country’s “resilience against international sanctions.” Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps benefits from Westrn sanctions, as it has a monopoly on large sectors of the economy, employing nearly 1.5 million people.
The author says Rouhani “may be forced to change course, by adopting the Khamenei’s “preference for the East over the West,” now that his “hopes for market reforms and closer integration with the West dashed.” Iranians were bullish when the economy “rebounded strongly in 2016, as international sanctions were lifted.” But the “negative growth” in 2017 has also to do with Iran’s chronic structural problems, like its failure “to improve the country’s environment for private investment.”
Apart from sanctions, the author says Rouhani’s team is to „blame for Iran’s lackluster performance.” Although hundreds of thousands of jobs had been created since 2016, they were unable to absorb the “massive youth bulge.” Around 60% of the population is under 30, and “unemployment is now at an all-time high, especially for young, college-educated Iranians.”
The rising discontent – especially over the cost of living – was the main cause for the biggest anti-government protests in December 2017 and January 2018 for nearly a decade. Sluggish growth, inflation, unemployment, declining living standard were painful to bear once hope for economic improvement dissipated. Protesters called for more focus on their grievances rather than on military adventures abroad, like supporting militant groups like the Hezbollah in Lebanon or propping up the Assad regime in Syria.
The problem is that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have operated with impunity, well beyond the reach of civilian authorities, driving Iran’s sanctions-crippled economy, financing its military forays in the region and enriching the hard-line commanders and clerics. With sanctions lifted after the nuclear deal, and the country opened to competition and foreign investment, the group’s economic dominance was increasingly seen as a liability.
It explains why hardliners seek to undermine Rouhani’s government, which has tried to crack down on corruption. Their aggression and destabilising activities in the region are one of the reasons why the Trump administration wants to change Iran’s behaviour by amending the 2015 nuclear deal. Should Trump do pro-Israeli donors’ bidding and withdraw from the JCPOA, it will deal a blow to the moderate, reform-minded president, Hassan Rouhani, while empowering the hardliners in Iran. This will not bode well for stability in the Middle East, encouraging Tehran’s arch enemies – Israel and Saudi Arabia – to defy Tehran, knowing the US would be on their side.
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