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欧洲央行的独立假象

发自雅典——对中央银行独立性的坚守是人们希望“靠谱”政策制定者所能秉承信条的重要组成部分(还有私有化,劳动力市场的“灵活性”等等)。但央行应该独立于什么而存在?答案似乎显而易见:政府。

在这个意义上说,欧洲央行就是个典型的独立中央银行:没有任何一个单一政府为它作后盾,同时也被明确禁止为以它作为央行的任何国家政府作后盾。然而欧洲央行却是发达经济体中独立性最低的中央银行。

核心的难题来自于欧洲央行的“不救助”条款——禁止其援助任何破产的成员国政府。由于商业银行是各成员国政府筹集资金的一个重要来源,而欧洲央行被迫拒绝为那些位于破产国的银行提供流动性。因此欧洲央行是建立在阻止其作为最后贷款人的规则之上的。

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