The turmoil in the Arab Awakening's aftermath has all but decimated the affected countries’ economies. To enable them to transform their economies alongside their political systems, while avoiding destabilization or collapse, the international community must scale up financial, policy, and institutional assistance.
LONDON – The turmoil following the Arab Awakening has all but decimated the affected countries’ economies. Political assassinations and polarization in Tunisia, civil unrest and a military takeover in Egypt, terrorist attacks in Yemen, sectarian strife and an institutional vacuum in Libya, and civil war in Syria have contributed to a sharp fall in investment, tourism, exports, and GDP growth, aggravating macroeconomic imbalances. For example, Egypt’s fiscal deficit now stands at 14% of GDP, with public debt approaching 100% of GDP. Most of the Arab Awakening countries lack buffers to withstand further economic shocks.
Worse, beyond the removal of individual autocratic leaders, few of the problems that fueled the uprisings have been addressed. Indeed, unemployment is higher today than in 2010. Untargeted fuel subsidies and the public-sector wage bill have increased, crowding out much-needed public investment and relief to poor families, while impeding the development of a dynamic and competitive private sector and limiting new firms’ access to finance. Meanwhile, public-service delivery has deteriorated.
Moreover, the political situation remains unsettled, with transitional or interim governments, unfinished constitutions, and uncertain timetables for future elections. In short, the Arab world’s transition countries are much more vulnerable today than they were at the height of the protests in 2011.
LONDON – The turmoil following the Arab Awakening has all but decimated the affected countries’ economies. Political assassinations and polarization in Tunisia, civil unrest and a military takeover in Egypt, terrorist attacks in Yemen, sectarian strife and an institutional vacuum in Libya, and civil war in Syria have contributed to a sharp fall in investment, tourism, exports, and GDP growth, aggravating macroeconomic imbalances. For example, Egypt’s fiscal deficit now stands at 14% of GDP, with public debt approaching 100% of GDP. Most of the Arab Awakening countries lack buffers to withstand further economic shocks.
Worse, beyond the removal of individual autocratic leaders, few of the problems that fueled the uprisings have been addressed. Indeed, unemployment is higher today than in 2010. Untargeted fuel subsidies and the public-sector wage bill have increased, crowding out much-needed public investment and relief to poor families, while impeding the development of a dynamic and competitive private sector and limiting new firms’ access to finance. Meanwhile, public-service delivery has deteriorated.
Moreover, the political situation remains unsettled, with transitional or interim governments, unfinished constitutions, and uncertain timetables for future elections. In short, the Arab world’s transition countries are much more vulnerable today than they were at the height of the protests in 2011.