Comments 10

La Victoria de China en Ucrania

Jul 31, 2014 Dmitri Trenin

MOSCÚ – Durante una generación, las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Rusia se circunscribieron esencialmente a la esfera histórica. Desde el fin de la Guerra Fría, Rusia ante los ojos de EE.UU. y de gran parte del resto del mundo se tornó en una nación cada vez más periférica; es decir, aparentemente, su importancia y su poder internacional se encontraban relegados al pasado. Hoy en día dichos tiempos han terminado.

Sin duda, el actual conflicto entre EE.UU. y Rusia sobre Ucrania es disparejo, dada la disparidad de poder entre las dos partes. Rusia no es, y ni siquiera puede pretender ser, un competidor por el dominio del mundo. A diferencia de la Unión Soviética, Rusia no se encuentra impulsada por algún tipo de ideología universal, no lidera un bloque de Estados gobernados por la misma ideología, y tiene pocos aliados formales (y todos ellos son pequeños). No obstante, el conflicto entre Estados Unidos y Rusia sí es de importancia para el resto del mundo.

Obviamente, este conflicto es de la más alta importante para Ucrania, cuyo territorio, en parte, se ha convertido en un campo de batalla. El futuro del país más grande de Europa – su forma, su orden político, y sus relaciones exteriores – depende mucho de cómo se desarrolla la pugna entre Estados Unidos y Rusia.

To continue reading, please log in or enter your email address.

To continue reading, please log in or register now. After entering your email, you'll have access to two free articles every month. For unlimited access to Project Syndicate, subscribe now.

Featured

How Not to Fight Income Inequality

Nov 14, 2018 Ricardo Hausmann
Trump’s Diminishing Power and Rising Rage

Nov 12, 2018 Jeffrey D. Sachs
Why Freedom of Assembly Still Matters

Nov 13, 2018 Jan-Werner Mueller
Are You Buying Oil from Saudi Arabia?

Nov 12, 2018 Peter Singer
A Concert of Indo-Pacific Democracies

Nov 12, 2018 Brahma Chellaney

new comment has been posted. new comments have been posted.

0 Comments on this paragraph, 9 in all 9 Comments on this article

Fred Eidlin Aug 10, 2014

A key assumption underlying Trenin's prognosis may be mistaken. His argument rests on the assumption that hostility towards Russia will solidify, if not intensify over the long run. In fact, just the opposite may happen.

Although the U.S. has succeeded in unifying the western alliance in the short run, in the long run this "success" may, in the long run, lead to greater disunity than existed before the crisis. If sanctions do not lead to demonstrable success, if they damage European economies, without tangible benefit, quite an opposite development may ensue.

Businesses, governments, and other players may end up viewing such policies as mistaken, and resenting the consequences. Differences may emerge that will aggravate already existing tendencies towards disunity within the alliance. Failure in Ukraine may end up as another nail in the coffin of the New World Order that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

U.S. policy will certainly be vindicated if, as Trenin puts it, Ukraine becomes "internally united, genuinely democratic, and firmly tied to European and Atlantic institutions; [if] it is generously helped by these institutions and prospers as a result; and [if] it evolves into an example for Russians across the border to follow." While such an outcome is logically possible, it is difficult to see how this can actually come about.

There are too many reasons why U.S./E.U policy in Ukraine is likely to fail, and why Ukraine is likely to be added to the list of unsuccessful U.S. ventures into the affairs of other countries.

The U.S. and E.U. do not have the means to be generous with Ukraine. Even if they did, the crisis playing out in Ukraine goes beyond the means of the West to be of significant assistance.

If the West fails to realize the results Trenin mentions, disappointment will result. "NATO is looking for a reason for its existence in tense relations with Russia." http://russian.rt.com/article/43840 What if Moscow fails to provide a reason for NATO's existence by not taking the bait?

As after the 2008 war in South Ossetia and Georgia, Moscow's response to western hostility has been restrained and measured. Its emphasis has been on getting back to business as usual. If Russia can avoid playing the role of enemy, the sanctions and hostile rhetoric may fall flat.

Little augers well for western efforts to succeed. The current financial bailout package for Ukraine was put together with great difficulty, and is not sufficient to meet the country's minimum needs. It is not clear how Ukraine will secure the rest of the funds necessary to avoid financial and economic collapse. The largest component of the aid package comes from IMF loans, bringing harsh austerity measures. Experience with IMF programs in other crisis-plagued countries suggests that austerity may increase the risks of social unrest and political instability.

It is difficult to see how Ukraine can achieve internal unity. Disunity has been a permanent source of political strife and paralysis since Ukrainian independence. The current crisis is likely to aggravate such problems, which threaten the integrity of the state.

The current confrontation with Russia has helped forge impressive national unity. Yet, it is unclear how solid and long-lasting it will be, and how much of the population it embraces. It is unclear how the public mood will change as the euphoria and high expections of the Euromaidan are disappointed. Moreover, the public is far more polarized than it has ever been, and willingness to compromise appears lower than ever.

Regional differences have plagued Ukraine from the outset. The Euromaidan catapulted one part of the country into power, disenfranchising the rest of it. The Ukrainian Army may defeat the rebels in the east, yet it remains unclear how the Government can win their loyalty of these regions to the new.

As for Russia's relations with other countries, much depends on how the crisis plays out. European and Japanese motivations to maintain good political and economic relations with Russia are strong. If nothing worsens relations further, such motivations are likely eventually to have their effects. Moreover, it is already clear that, regardless of Europe and the U.S., there are many important countries that will not go along with the project of isolating Russia.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Stefan Siewert Aug 7, 2014

Russia had the best era in its history full of drama and turmoil, a Golden age of prosperity and stability. Growth rates from 1998 – 2008 were 7 per cent. Measured in constant (2009) roubles, data indicate that the economy-wide average wage tripled from about 6,700 roubles per month in 2000 to over 19,000 in 2008 (Rosstat). Because of the appreciation of the rouble, real income per capita in current US dollars increased tenfold. GDP per capita narrowed to the upper half of the OECD. Total GDP set off from a dismal 271 billion USD in 1998 to 2 trillion USD in 2012 (IMF). The benefits of growth trickled down to all parts of Russian society. This performance shaped self-confidence of the population and legitimacy of the elites.

A more detailed narrative tells a controversial story about these impressive figures. Ian Morris calls it the “paradox of development, “ and Mark Elvin the “high-level equilibrium trap”: When a country thinks it is in a golden age, it stops focusing on progress.

Russia is still within a century-long wave-like development pattern of oscillation between external-induced shock therapy and inward turning, leaving a legacy of ambivalence towards modernity. The beginnings of the particular eras are personalized with their rulers: Peter and Catharina the Great, Alexander II of Russia and Lenin. The socialist revolution was nurtured from the gap between West’s advancement and Russia’s limited industrialization within a huge territory. A trade-off between the need of market and civil-society institutions versus economic growth allowed super power status, an arms race and an ideological confrontation with the rest of the world. After 70 years, the modernization impulse was exhausted and the Soviet Union has imploded beyond repair.

Jelzin started in 1991 a new cycle with a trial-and-error phase of ambitious market-oriented and democratic reforms. The objective was to set up the missing institutions and capacities, necessary to modernize the country and compete in global markets. The societal cost of these demanding institutional innovations were high: loss of national identify, demographic collapse, hardships of economic restructuring and social misery. The Russian default of 1998 demonstrated the extent to which the entire social edifice was overstretched by the challenges of modernity.

Putin’s reign of 1999 started as a turning point towards consolidation within this cycle. Unfortunately, relief came also by a parallel global commodity boom. Due to the outstanding cost-benefit profile, incentives favoured the integration of the inherited resource-intensive economy into world markets. As a pathway to a dual economy, any activity other than exporting commodities was not profitable or perceived as not profitable. Russia developed some high-value activities outside the country. London- named Londongrad by the oligarchs’ -became a centre for serving Russia’s needs in IPOs, business dispute settling and financial engineering with the value of transactions reaching 100 billion USD a year. It is estimated that the oil and gas rent reached about 30 per cent of Russia’s GDP. Many companies took debts abroad, larger than their market capitalization.

The governing elite, increasingly consisting of former KGB and military with their particular worldviews, exploited the results of the fortuitous set of circumstances and vindicated blind eyes to corruption and increasing dependency on hydrocarbon extractions. Russia’s economic modernization was limited to islands consisting of export pipelines, retail and consumption, and stayed ossified und inefficient, with disappointing investments in human capital and a deteriorating physical infrastructure.

With the fast-economy growing fast, incentives for following on Jelzin’s risky and demanding path of structural, institutional and social reforms were lost. After “low hanging fruit” of basic economic reform and prudent macroeconomic policies were picked up, the reform process slowed down in the face of popular indifference, bureaucratic inertia, and political resistance and manoeuvring. Missing institutional constrains similar to those in Australia or Norway, the Dutch disease and the resource curse worked their way. After 2000 structural reforms stopped by and large. While becoming richer, the country missed the chance to exploit windfalls to move up the global value chain.

Growth slowed down before the financial crisis of 2008 as an indication that Russia’s business model exhausted itself again. (When this happened in the 1970-ies, the Soviet Union started to export commodities, delaying change for many years.) The leadership did what it could to encourage change without addressing the underlying systemic problems of the post-Soviet state-let style of development. The list of failed initiatives to generate momentum from Russia’s newly-won soft and hard power is frustratingly long: the German-Russian partnership for modernization in 2008, the use of state-owned Gasprom as an instrument of foreign policy, the new-built town of Skolkovo as the Russian respond to the Silicon Valley, the Eurasian Union as a challenger to European Union for global influence, the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a counterweight to NATO, an attempt to copy the US government that made huge investments in the development of nanotechnology in the 1990s, a state program to enter the global aviation market, and other unsuccessful attempts to approach the technological frontier besides defence and aerospace. Billions were spent, but the declared results not achieved.

Sadly, as a downside of a “managed democracy”, Russia does not have an institutional landscape as in advanced Western democracies for a smooth replacement of the governing elite. The protests in December 2012 by urban middle-class dweller were brought under control, but proved the possibility of a regime change from the bottom. In order to strengthen legitimacy, Russia’s “securocratic” regime moved to the right and switched public attention beyond economic growth. In a kind of delayed reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and skilfully exploiting the fragile national identity after the traumatic loss of superpower status, Putin promoted the vision of neo-Soviet authoritarian empire. From now on, the regime relied increasingly on nationalism, positioned Russia as a moral superior defender of conservative values and, recently, started a populist media campaign against Ukraine’s Euromaidan.

In the wake of Crimea’s annexation, President Putin gained approval ratings of up to 86 per cent. At the same time, the economic results of Putin’s statecraft went into the negative: “Putin’s seizure of Crimea has weakened the Russian economy, led to China getting a bargain gas deal, revived NATO, spurred Europe to start ending its addiction to Russian gas and begun a debate across Europe about increasing defence spending”.

Russia follows its own logic of historic development. As many times before, the country is on the eve of a new development cycle. The current national political equilibrium in support of Putin’s time in power is not stable at all. We are on the eve of the end of Putin’s era. A window of opportunities will open, where the cooperation with the West for identifying new opportunities will be appreciated. The success and deepness of these upcoming reforms will define Russia’s development trajectory for a decade and more. Latest in five years, Russia will be a very different country.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Jean-Louis Piel Aug 6, 2014

Most of this Trenin's article is brilliant .
Except the end.
He doesn't apply to China the same framework that he uses for USA or European Union or Japan.

China is bound to EU and to US. During more than 2,200 years the indirect or direct bound between the West and China has existed. China has never had to use Russia to be connected to the West . The Silk Road has never been through Russia which exists as empire only since the XVIIIth century. The Silk Road has existed through Central Asian countries and Iran.
China is investing in Europe .
The management of this mad dog Russia will be taken care between China, EU, USA and Turkey.
This Russia could disappear as many empires or states have disappeared during the last centuries .
The Mongol one has left almost nothing compare to the Roman Empire , etc.
Russia is too small to survive in this new environment of 7,5 billions human beings when they are only 110 millions ethnic Russians leaving in a backward country with no advances technology creativities , with no allies.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
hari naidu Aug 3, 2014

Let’s visualize a contrarian viewpoint which ultimately re-confirms the original EU-Russia compact which Putin dislodged after Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and its decision to forge EU association.

.Currently (summer break) talks are underway to make Merkel lead an organized political mission to Moscow to dissuade Putin from committing economic/financial Hara-Kiri (suicide).

.There is no q’ Berlin is culturally closer to Moscow - going all the way back to Catherine The Great (a Prussian Princess).

.Per capita GDP of Russia is twice or more PRCs; economics will ultimately triumph because of social stake of Oligarchs – meaning Putin may not (finally) survive in the Kremlin on current path.

.China has avoided public statements on Crimea and Ukraine because of CPCs domestic policy constraints; Xi is expounding ways and means to educate Abe’s Japan to acknowledge its war crimes – also seeking aid to ameliorate South China Sea territorial dispute.

.*China’s victory in Ukraine* would imply failure of Putin’s current policy; i.e. emergence of Ukraine as a sovereign entity; and resurgence of EU-PRC economic convergence led by Merkel/Xi.

In other words, there is a limit to which Russian national interest can be bargained to safe Putin’s face now.
US is not the critical player; Berlin is.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Paul Daley Aug 1, 2014

Good article, though Trenin passes over Russia's relations in the Middle East, particularly with Iran and Syria, without much comment. It might also have been helpful to note that both the EU and China may be inclined to convert Russia into a strategic hinterland, if they can manage it. Putin is struggling now essentially to stave off that fate.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
j. von Hettlingen Jul 31, 2014

Mr. Trenin sees "China's victory" in the Ukraine conflict. It's true that a "US-Russian struggle" has re-emerged, as relations between Russia and the US are reaching their nadir recently. Due to the "disparity in power between the sides". Russia can't compete with the US for "world domination", as it did during the Cold War. In 1959 driven by "universal ideology" Russia and China squabbled over which should lead the world communist movement in communist parties across Asia and Africa. Relationship went sour ever since and it only began to warm up under Boris Yeltsin.
Mr. Trenin says, "since the Cold War’s end, Russia had become increasingly peripheral to the US and much of the rest of the world". Not to China! There was a long period of frigidity throughout the Cold War between Beijing and Moscow. Yet it was Stalin, who encouraged and financed Mao Zedong's revolution, recognising the People's Republic in October 1949. In 2009, the two countries celebrated 60 years of diplomatic relations, after a decade of rapprochement.
Over the past two decades closer trade and military ties have been forged as well as agreement on many issues signed. In 2004 Russia settled a long-running border dispute with China, handing over Tarabarov island in the Amur river, and half of another large island, Bolshoy Ussuriysky. Closer relations mean Chinese leaders are loth to criticse Putin in public. The signing of the 30-year gas deal last May – worth about $400bn make the two countries more inclined to support each other.
Mr. Trenin says, "Russia, after all, would find an alliance with China too heavy to bear, and, whatever their ideology or whoever their leaders, Russians remain European". True, of its 142 million inhabitants, only 6/7 million of Russians live in their vast Far East. Politicians in Moscow harbour a deep-rooted fear that China might one day grab back Russia's far east region near Kamchatka, which is the size of Europe and rich in mineral resources, trees, coal and fish. In 1969 the two had fought a brief war in Russia's far east over the disputed Damansky island (Zhenbao), close to Khabarovsk.
Although the Chinese public is pro-Russia and Xi Jinping himself has a good relationship with Putin, Russia see China solely as an important strategic counterweight to the US, with whom both Beijing and Moscow are in conflict over a range of issues. The relationship between China and Russia is no longer one of equals. China's ambition to become a world superpower is likely to place increasing strain on the Sino-Russian relationship, as Russia fears its influence may diminish, a fate the Kremlin is unlikely to accept. The Chinese know that it is they, and not Putin's Russia, who are destined to become the world's newest superpower. In this respect China may not allow a strategic accommodation with Moscow to disrupt Beijing's more important partnership with Washington. After all Washington is still the world's only indispensable partner in international relations.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Tim Almazov Jul 31, 2014

Wouldn't it also be within the interest of the EU to maintain the US-Russian standoff, so as to grow independent from American influence. Also, in the long run it would make more sense to keep buying oil and gas from Russia. Considering its necessity for raw materials, it's better for the EU to do business with someone it has better leverage against (that is assuming the prices of oil and gas from Russia and US are more or less the same).
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Mitchell Polman Jul 31, 2014

"As a result of US pressure, the EU will eventually buy less gas and oil from Russia" -- the EU is buying less gas and oil from Russia because the nations of the EU are tired of their energy supply being held hostage to Russia's political whims. Russia is an unreliable supplier. The nations of the EU are sovereign and make their own decisions.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.