Paul Lachine

欧洲的永久危机

雅典—塞浦路斯援助协议是欧元区危机发展的分水岭,因为解决银行问题的责任从纳税人转移到了私人投资者和储户头上。但让塞浦路斯银行储户承受巨大损失违反了存款保险保证,而这一保证又是欧洲银行联盟方案的组成部分,与此同时,资本管制的加强进一步削弱了货币联盟的基础。那么,欧洲在搬起石头砸自己的脚吗?

德国和其他欧元区核心国放出的信号是,欧元区内部债务共同化绝无可能,对国家和金融机构的援助(bailout)必须由其债权人的“自救”(bail-in)来平衡。存款安全的日益不确定将推高利率、加深欧洲衰退,可能还会导致资本从欧元区疲软外围国流出,流向核心国。

这或许将是一个意义深远的变化。解决债务危机、回归内部和外部平衡的德国模式依赖于赤字国的财政整固和结构性改革。但是,如果所有国家同时尝试通过减支和增税改善其财政和外部平衡,那么所有国家都将失败,因为一国的紧缩意味着对其他国家产出需求的减少,反过来导致国内和外部失衡持续。“自救”债权人会放大这一趋势。

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