nye188_Sergei KonkovTASS via Getty Images_russia hacker

Politics

Normas de conducta en Internet para Estados Unidos y Rusia

Mar 5, 2019 Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

CAMBRIDGE – La respuesta de Estados Unidos a la ciberinterferencia rusa en la elección presidencial de 2016 ha sido débil. El presidente estadounidense Barack Obama había avisado a su par ruso Vladimir Putin que habría repercusiones, pero cuestiones de política interna relacionadas con la elección de Donald Trump impidieron una respuesta eficaz. Puede que eso esté por cambiar.

Hace poco, funcionarios estadounidenses reconocieron en forma anónima que Estados Unidos utilizó ciberoperaciones ofensivas para impedir que una “granja de trolls” del Kremlin interfiriera en la elección legislativa de 2018. Aunque de esa clase de operaciones se habla poco, pueden indicar un modo de disuadir interferencias en la elección presidencial estadounidense de 2020. Pero atacar granjas de trolls no será suficiente.

En la prevención de ciberataques, la disuasión mediante amenaza de represalias sigue siendo una táctica crucial, aunque subutilizada. Los sistemas eléctricos de Estados Unidos no han sido blanco de ataques, pese a que según informes, están infiltrados por China y Rusia. La doctrina del Pentágono es que ante eventuales daños se responderá con cualquier arma que elija el gobierno, y parece que en ese nivel la disuasión funciona.

To continue reading, register now.

Subscribe now for unlimited access to everything PS has to offer.

As a registered user, you can enjoy more PS content every month – for free.

Already have an account? Log in

Secure your copy of PS Quarterly: The Year Ahead 2023

Our annual fourth-quarter magazine is here, and available only to Digital Plus and Premium subscribers. Subscribe to Digital Plus today, and save $15.

Subscribe Now

new comment has been posted. new comments have been posted.

0 Comments on this paragraph, 2 Comments on this article

j. von Hettlingen Mar 7, 2019

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. highlights the intricacy of negotiating a cyber arms-control treaty, because cyber arms are not conventional weapons. They are “non-weapons” whose deployment depends on a “single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user....It will be difficult to prohibit the design, possession, or even implantation for espionage of particular programs.” Given these premises it is difficult to enforce a cyber disarmament treaty.
Unlike nukes, it is impossible to ban cyber arms. Verification of weapon stockpiles made nuclear arms control during the Cold War possible. But it would be “virtually impossible” to verify a stockpile of cyber arms, because dual-use biotechnology capabilities are widespread and so easy to conceal that even the most intrusive and disruptive monitoring procedures would be inadequate to the task. And “stockpiles could quickly be re-created.”
The author says, the US “responded weakly after Russian cyber operations.” Economic sanctions, diplomatic expulsions and indictments were no consolation for putting up with a disastrous Trump presidency. America’s best tactic for preventing cyber attacks in the future is to strengthen its “deterrent threat of retaliation.” But deterrence alone, “will not be enough,” the US still needs diplomacy to deal with Russia.
Although it will be problematic to negotiate a cyber arms control treaty, this should not make diplomacy “impossible.” There have been “some hints” of Russian interest in some form of cooperation with the US on cyber issues. One month after the 2018 Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki, the Kremlin proposed – for the third time in two years – a treaty to prevent "cyberattacks on critical infrastructure." But Russia would only ban certain types of cyber attacks – on civilian targets, such as electrical grids.
For years the US has resisted Russia’s offer to negotiate a cyber warfare convention akin to the one that regulates chemical warfare. Its main objection has been that a cyber arms control treaty, unlike a ballistic missile treaty, is inherently unverifiable. In the cyber realm, weapons can not be identified and counted, and attribution is extremely difficult. Hence, no country can be assured whether the others are abiding by the terms of an agreement.
It comes as no surprise that US officials are understandably skeptical of the sincerity of the Kremlin’s overtures while it continues its reckless cyber operations against the US. From Washington’s perspective, these malign activities go way beyond traditional peacetime intelligence gathering. Russia takes advantage of the West’s democratic openness, and exploits its weaknesses and flaws by stoking social unrest and destabilising the liberal order.
The author says, “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable, it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” He says the US should “draw a line between the permitted soft power of open persuasion and the hard power of covert information warfare. Overt programs and broadcasts would continue to be allowed. The US would not object to the content of Russia’s open political speech, including their propagandistic RT television network. But it would object when Russia promotes its views through covert coordinated behavior” and manipulates public onion.
Given the “poor state” of US-Russian relations, and “the differences between American and Russian values,” it is still possible to overcome ideological hostility, that led to constructive interactions during the Cold War. But Trump is the problem – the “legitimacy” of his relationship with Russia makes negotiations difficult.
The author proposes a “professional or military-to-military dialogue,” because Russia and the US need to recognise that despite their significant differences, they have to talk to each other to “avoid dangerous escalation” in cyberspace.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.

https://prosyn.org/YGLX7Gjes

Normas de conducta en Internet para Estados Unidos y Rusia

Secure your copy of PS Quarterly: The Year Ahead 2023

New Comment

Contact us

Log in/Register

Normas de conducta en Internet para Estados Unidos y Rusia

Secure your copy of PS Quarterly: The Year Ahead 2023

Edit Newsletter Preferences

Set up Notification