改善巴塞尔

罗马—巴塞尔协议本是为了保护储户和普罗大众免受银行不当行为的伤害,但也加重了2008年金融危机所触发的经济颓势。在整个危机中,随着商业信心的蒸发,银行被迫出售资产、削减信贷,以维持巴塞尔协议规定的资本要求。信贷冻结导致了GDP和就业率的暴跌,而资产大甩卖则造成了进一步的衰退。

我和卡马西(Jacopo Carmassi)的最新研究《设置银行监管权正逢其时》(Time to Set Banking Regulation Right)指出,巴塞尔银行规则允许大型国际银行使用过度杠杆、承担过多风险——在某些案例中,银行可以累积相当于权益资本四五十倍之多的总负债——这不但埋下了危机的种子,而且颇为讽刺地起到了火上加油之效。

危机过去后,世界领导人和央行行长改善了银行监管,最主要的措施就是修订巴塞尔审慎规则。不幸的是,新的巴塞尔III协议及其后的欧盟资本要求指令(EU Capital Requirements Directive)并没能纠正国际审慎规则的两大主要缺陷——即对用银行风险管理模型计算资本要求的依赖以及对监督者缺乏可问责性。

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