Arab Fathers and Sons

The deaths of Yasir Arafat and of Sheikh Zayd, the long-standing ruler of the United Arab Emirates, continues the generational change that began in 1999-2000, when the leaders of Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Syria died in quick succession. Across the Middle East people are younger, and their political leaders older, than the world average. The gradual replacement of one generation of elites by another may be one of the key factors in determining whether or not effective reform takes place in the Arab world.

At present, four political generations co-exist on the region’s socio-political map. The outgoing leadership generation – that of Arafat, King Hussein or Hafiz al-Assad, King Fahd and President Mubarak – was born before 1935 and has determined events in the Middle East since the 1970’s.

These leaders came of age and began their careers during the era of decolonization. They were weaned on Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism, and the crucial political event for them was the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Members of this generation sought a strong Arab leadership that would create a balance of power with Israel. They also believed in – or at least toyed with – forms of socialism and étatism, and did not consider democracy or civil rights to be priorities.

The next generation was born between 1935 and 1955, and in many respects represents a generation “in between.” Most benefited from the economic growth and expanded educational opportunities associated with the oil boom of the 1970’s. At the same time, political participation remained blocked by the previous generation, which never intended to give up power voluntarily. Unsurprisingly, many in this generation grew dissatisfied, and not a few began to look for Islamic alternatives to the prevailing political systems.

Rather than determining events in the coming two or three decades, this generation is likely to be sidelined by the next cohort, born between 1955 and 1975. This is the generation of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, Jordan’s King Abdullah and Morocco’s King Muhammad VI. Some call this the “generation of sons” – sons of leaders who led their states for decades.

This age cohort was not much influenced by the Arab-Israeli wars or the East-West conflict. Instead, their political education included the Gulf War of 1991 and the Arab-Israeli peace process of the 1990’s, with its crises and breakdown. Jailed West Bank Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti is as representative of this group as the leaders of Syria and Jordan.

Subscribe to PS Digital
PS_Digital_1333x1000_Intro-Offer1

Subscribe to PS Digital

Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.

Subscribe Now

Members of this generation are better acquainted with notions of globalization and economic reform than with socialism and revolution. Except for the Palestinians, they have never known their countries other than as independent and comparatively stable states. In the Palestinian territories, the jil al-intifada , the generation of the (first and second) Palestinian uprising, will likely become the founding generation.

But it is the fourth group that underscores the relevance of generational issues in the Arab world. Even when combined, the first three generations make up barely one-third of the entire Arab population. Almost 60% of all Arabs are younger than 20, with roughly 70% below the age of 30.

This raises a key question: what happens to these Arab “baby boomers” if the generation now coming to power clings to it as tenaciously as the generation of Mubarak, Assad, and Hussein?

The political generation of Bashar al-Assad, King Abdullah, and Gamal Mubarak – son of Egypt’s ailing president – forms a less coherent picture than that of the outgoing leadership. In that elder generation, many had pursued military careers, and many of their aides and collaborators were engineers and civil servants.

The socio-professional profile of the new elite is broader. Economists, bankers, and entrepreneurs as well as of technology or communication experts are common. There are also more traditional politicians: personalities who see themselves as representatives of particular social or economic interests, not as apolitical technocrats.

This new leadership elite is in many ways more cosmopolitan than its predecessors; their average level of education is higher; a few have foreign degrees. Women also play a somewhat greater role.

Developments in Morocco, Bahrain, and Jordan certainly seem to suggest that this changing of the guard can help soften rigid political structures and allow for broader participation. But generational change need not be accompanied by economic reform and steps towards political liberalization – witness North Korea under Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il.

Indeed, experience gives little reason to presume that a modern way of speaking, willingness to liberalize the economy, and an urge for technological development automatically translates into a democratic opening. It is more realistic to expect that the new Arab elites will make use of their states’ authoritarian institutions, both to overcome resistance to their economic agendas and to consolidate their newly acquired power.

This is anything but a risk-free path. Without a significant increase in opportunities for political participation, including genuinely competitive elections, the chasm between a predominantly young population and a ruling elite with a narrow generational base will widen. Such continuing political inertia leaves an increasingly young Arab population prey to the appeal of extremist ideologies, while driving the best and brightest to seek their fortune elsewhere.

https://prosyn.org/mK3U6at