Macron’s Reform Train Will Not Be Derailed
French President Emmanuel Macron was elected with a clear mandate to reform the French economy, and he has not hesitated to target politically sensitive institutions such as the national railway. But if Macron acquiesces to ongoing protests by France's unions, the rest of his reform agenda will become vulnerable.
PARIS – French President Emmanuel Macron received plenty of praise in the international media for his recent speeches in Washington, DC, and Brussels. But for the French, what really matters is Macron’s management of domestic problems, of which there are many, not least rolling strikes by railway workers across the country.
Until the end of June, employees of the French state-owned railway company SNCF plan to strike for two out of every five days to oppose the Macron government’s planned reforms to the company. But the reforms are sorely needed. The SNCF’s operating costs are 30% higher than those of comparable railway systems in neighboring countries, and its performance is poorer.
The SNCF’s higher operating costs stem partly from flawed, politically motivated investment decisions made in the past. For example, there has been undue emphasis on expanding high-speed-rail networks at the expense of maintaining existing tracks that are still widely used.
But the company also suffers from obsolete and costly labor arrangements, which allow train drivers to retire at the age of 52, even though they are no longer subjected to the life-shortening rigors of operating coal-fired steam engines. As it happens, the life expectancy among SNCF drivers has increased substantially since these pension regulations were put in place in 1920.
Moreover, SNCF employees and their family members have access to free travel on SNCF trains. This is one reason why the French railway system brings in just €10 billion ($12 billion) per year, even though it costs €24 billion annually to operate. The difference is essentially financed by the federal government and the regions, at a cost of some €3 billion in additional public debt each year.
Given its drain on public budgets and its deteriorating performance and reliability, the SNCF is an obvious target for reform. And to that end, Macron has proposed a strategy to shore up the French railway system for the long term. Notably, one thing he has not proposed is any change to current SNCF workers’ employment status or benefits.
Instead, Macron’s government has introduced changes that will affect only those employed by the SNCF after January 1, 2020. For them, his program does imply an end to lifelong job security, and a shift to a more modern, flexible employment arrangement. There will also have to be a re-evaluation of the specific constraints on SNCF workers and supervisors, many of which have not been updated since 1920. And newer employees will need to be incorporated into the French general health-insurance and pension systems.
Beyond that, Macron wants to open up the railway system to allow new operators to compete against the SNCF. Similar reforms have reduced operating costs and increased the overall supply of trains by 32% in Germany, 30% in the United Kingdom, and 53% in Sweden. In Italy and Sweden, more railway competition has reduced ticket prices by 15%.And, in Germany, competition lowered the government’s expenses by 20%. Each kilometer of regional traffic now costs the state-owned railway operator, Deutsche Bahn, €15, compared to €23 for the SNCF.
At the same time, liberalization of the railway sector promises to improve the quality of service, both in terms of travel time and punctuality. As matters stand, traveling from Marseille to Nice takes 25 minutes longer than it did 40 years ago; and, on average, 22% of French inter-city trains, along with 18-25% of high-speed trains, suffer delays, compared to just 10% of Deutsche Bahn trains.
Given this dismal state of affairs, it is worth asking why French railway unions are staging such a large-scale protest against reforms that would only affect new recruits in the future. In fact, what looks like a unified strike movement actually comprises two major unions with different demands and motivations. On one hand, there is the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT), which is open to dialogue with the government, but wants more employment and social-security guarantees for SNCF workers who will be hired by new operators after the system is opened up.
On the other hand, there is the more radical General Confederation of Labor (CGT), which insists on maintaining the status quo. Its reasons are twofold. First, the SNCF is a CGT stronghold, and to allow different contractual arrangements for new recruits would weaken the union’s influence at the national level. Second, the CGT wants to use this strike as a starting point for derailing Macron’s entire reform agenda.
But Macron was elected with a clear mandate to overhaul the French economy. Though he has proved flexible on the timing and method of introducing competition, he will likely defend his red lines, particularly those relating to new SNCF recruits as of 2020. After all, he knows what the CGT knows: that his railway policy could make or break his credibility as a reformer.
Macron’s Internationalism and the New Politics
French President Emmanuel Macron initially described his new political movement as being “neither on the right nor on the left,” and now says that it is “on both the right and the left.” But he won't be able to fudge it indefinitely: sooner or later, he will have to pick a side with which to ally.
WASHINGTON, DC – French President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to the United States last month was a study in contrasts. Despite the friendly dynamic, Macron’s agenda and rhetoric were almost diametrically opposed to US President Donald Trump’s. But Macron’s leadership is subject to an even more fundamental challenge; how he manages it could point the way forward for liberal-democratic politics.
Addressing the US Congress in English, Macron articulated a staunchly internationalist worldview, calling for stronger international institutions, a recommitment to the rules-based system of international trade, and a general embrace of globalization. With regard to Iran, he reiterated the need to preserve the 2015 nuclear deal, from which Trump has just withdrawn, though he did call for complementary agreements on topics that the existing agreement does not address.
Macron has also signaled that he will pursue a pan-European campaign for the 2019 European Parliament election. As a democrat, he believes that the deepening of the European Union must go hand in hand with the development of a truly European political space.
At a time of much hand-wringing over the decline of liberalism, the future of social democracy, the rise of nationalism, and the backlash against globalization, Macron’s unapologetically internationalist stance is notable. In fact, Macron has taken a leap into the unknown of the West’s “new politics,” a terrain no longer defined entirely by competition between large center-right and center-left parties. But is politics really turning the page on the traditional right-left cleavage?
It would be wrong to describe Macron, who served as a minister in his predecessor François Hollande’s Socialist government, simply as a centrist. Although he has moved toward the center, he did not join one of the small traditional centrist parties, but instead created his own “movement.”
Early on, Macron described that movement – which he called En Marche ! – as “neither on the right nor on the left” – avoiding the term “centrist.” Now, he says it is on “both the right and the left,” signaling his desire to win over traditional center-left and center-right voters.
If the traditional left-right divide is blurring, however, the question is what will replace it. With globalization at the center of political debate in most countries, it may seem that the answer is a division between cosmopolitan and parochial forces.
According to this interpretation, Macron leads France’s pro-globalization (and pro-European) movement, and those who oppose him, on the right or the left, are linked by a shared opposition to economic openness. And, indeed, the far right and the far left are espousing similar economic messages.
Meanwhile, existing center-left and center-right political parties – in France and throughout the West – tend to comprise internationally oriented factions and those who are more suspicious of globalization. If globalization is becoming the main electoral cleavage in Western countries, these two camps, the logic goes, are likely to split and form new political families.
Yet, while I believe there will be some movement in this direction, the traditional left-right cleavage seems unlikely to disappear. Traditional parties will continue to debate issues concerning income distribution, including the progressivity of tax systems and the proper scope and aims of social policy. The globalization “platform” alone will not be robust enough to define a large political party.
This means that in the coming years, Macron will have to align himself more closely with either the center-right or the center-left. The particular circumstances that enabled his electoral victory in 2017 – a discredited center-left, and a center-right candidate disqualified by scandal – will not reproduce themselves. He will have to become an internationalist left-leaning leader or an internationalist right-leaning one.
Only one of those appears to be a tenable option. The traditional policies of the center-right would not easily be compatible with a strong internationalist bent. If globalization, in its various dimensions, is to be backed by a popular majority, it will have to be accompanied by modernized social policies that provide effective help to those who need it. At a time of continuous economic disruption, this will be all the more important.
Economic openness demands social solidarity. That does not means protecting specific jobs from trade competition or technological innovation. It means assisting people to adapt to continuous change, by providing all citizens with the necessary resources, such as education, accessible health care, and transitional support. In short, a popular pro-globalization stance must be accompanied by a new social contract – backed by public resources – that appeals to a large majority. Otherwise, the siren song of neo-nationalism will be difficult to resist.
While completing the necessary tax and labor-market reforms on which he has embarked, Macron will need to address this challenge. In the current political paradigm shift, those who favor openness will outshine nationalist unilateralism only by adopting as their primary objective a modernized approach to social solidarity.
Macron Needs More Than Charm
If French President Emmanuel Macron's appeals to Trump’s vanity were producing positive outcomes for along the way, Macron's efforts might be worthwhile. But to flatter Trump is one thing; to obtain significant diplomatic and trade concessions from him is quite another.
PARIS – For centuries, France and the United States have been friends, allies, and competitors. Both have been world powers; both have been models of liberal democracy; and both achieved democratization through revolution. In fact, France was the first ally of the new US, having provided military support during the American Revolutionary War – the first of many times the countries would collaborate in military endeavors.
On his recent trip to Washington, DC, French President Emmanuel Macron attempted to use this history to reinforce the bilateral relationship today, potentially giving France more influence over US President Donald Trump’s unpredictable administration. But Macron’s affability and bonhomie cannot obscure the fact that the two countries are operating under very different circumstances than in the past, much less ensure any semblance of reliability from the Trump administration.
During the Cold War, General Charles de Gaulle wanted France to serve as a bridge between the West and the East. This implied being a faithful US ally, in good times and in bad, while acting as something of a fair-weather friend to the Soviet Union and China.
Today, Macron wants France to serve as a bridge within the West: between the US and Europe. This might seem to be an easier task, given the two sides’ shared history and values. And, indeed, it is that history and those values that Macron attempted to invoke, as he established himself as a defender of liberal democracy and internationalism, with language and vision marked by American-style optimism.
Nor is this the first time a French president has acted like an American leader. But Nicolas Sarkozy – who literally coined for himself the nickname “Sarko the American” – was more eager to align himself with George W. Bush, especially when it came to foreign policy. Macron, by contrast, is espousing the values and adopting the rhetoric of Barack Obama.
Neither has much in common with Trump, who, in the words of former FBI Director James Comey, acts more like a mafia boss than a US president, and seems utterly disinterested in sustaining US global leadership. The challenge ahead for Macron may thus turn out to be even more formidable than the one confronted by De Gaulle.
If Macron’s visit were a soccer game, it would have included some beautifully executed plays – such as Macron’s speech to the US Congress – before ending in a draw. Beneath the veneer of mutual affection on display in Washington, Macron’s visit was marked by deep disagreements, including over climate change and the Iran nuclear deal.
Macron’s declaration that “there is no Planet B” has not elicited any substantive move by Trump to rejoin the Paris climate agreement. And, despite the mention of a new, enlarged agreement with Iran, Trump continues to embrace the radical visions of his new secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, and national security adviser, John Bolton.
By establishing a friendly public rapport with Trump, Macron may even have put himself at risk. After all, it will not look good if Macron is closely aligned with a Trump who makes catastrophic strategic decisions or ends up in the jaws of the US justice system. Trump is simply too unpredictable for a close relationship with him to be anything other than a political liability.
If that closeness – those appeals to Trump’s vanity – were producing positive outcomes for along the way, Macron’s efforts might be worthwhile. But to flatter Trump is one thing; to obtain significant diplomatic and trade concessions from him is quite another. And Macron seems to have found success on only one of those fronts.
By establishing himself as a voice of reason, moderation, and responsibility, Macron tried to lay the groundwork for his emergence as a real agent of change. He does not want his legacy to comprise simply powerful speeches; he wants to tackle real issues affecting France, Europe, and the world. But it remains far from clear whether his tactics will work, particularly with regard to Trump.
The question is whether the alternative approach to Trump – the far less friendly, more businesslike approach of German Chancellor Angela Merkel – will produce better results. It seems unlikely, but when it comes to securing actual concessions, at least Merkel cannot do much worse.
Macron Takes Aim at European Politics
During his first year in office, French President Emmanuel Macron outlined a series of proposals for reforming European institutions; now he is launching a campaign to shake up the European Parliament election in 2019. Through it all, he has adhered to a coherent philosophy of how politics in the twenty-first century should work.
LONDON – Until the terrorist attack at a market in southern France on March 23, French President Emmanuel Macron had been planning to launch a new European-level political campaign. Though the official rollout has now been postponed, Macron’s latest project remains central to his presidency and to his conception of power.
Macron’s “La Grande Marche pour l’Europe” will mimic the program that toppled France’s dominant political parties and transformed his La République En Marche ! movement into a political force in 2017. Over the course of six weeks, he will dispatch ten ministers and 200 parliamentarians to survey the French people’s views on Europe and European issues. The results will then be considered in developing a platform that can beat populist and Euroskeptic parties in the 2019 European Parliament election.
Macron has persuaded all other EU member states (with the exception of Hungary and the United Kingdom) to conduct similar public consultations, which he hopes will lay the groundwork for the EU-level reforms he proposed in major speeches in Athens and at the Sorbonne last year.
To understand the full scope of Macron’s ambitions, we should consider the principles that underpin his worldview and guide his approach to politics. Few are better acquainted with Macron’s thinking than French historian and philosopher François Dosse. Dosse not only taught Macron at Sciences Po in the late 1990s, but also introduced him to his intellectual mentor, French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, for whom Macron worked as a research assistant for two years.
Dosse recently published a book about Macron and Ricoeur titled Le Philosophe et le President. A few weeks ago, I met with him in his Paris apartment to discuss his latest work, and he explained Macron’s approach to European reform as a combination of two fundamental Ricoeurian concepts.
The first is “consensus dissensuel.” This may sound like a highfalutin version of “having one’s cake and eating it.” But, according to Dosse, it is really about drawing strength from the opposition between two conflicting viewpoints, unlike a Hegelian approach, which seeks synthesis between two poles. Macron’s embrace of the Ricoeurian model is evident in his frequent use of the phrase “en même temps” (“at the same time”) when describing parallel domestic-reform proposals.
Similarly, Macron’s vision for Europe seems to reconcile the irreconcilable: his plan is both to preserve member states’ sovereignty and deepen EU integration. Institutionally, this means supporting supranational bodies while also allowing for more flexibility in areas where national governments, rather than Brussels, are better positioned to solve problems.
On defense policy, Macron wants to work within existing EU treaties, and he supports proposals for a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) agreement and a European Defense Fund. But he also hopes to move beyond the current EU and even NATO frameworks to establish a European Intervention Initiative (EII), which would operate alongside British, US, and other allied expeditionary forces.
On migration, Macron wants both to secure Europe’s external borders and ensure that the burden of taking in refugees is shared across the EU. In the short term, he is pushing for an agreement among member states on refugee quotas. But, in the long run, he supports greater harmonization of asylum systems, or even the creation of a central EU asylum agency.
Macron also hopes to reconcile opposite ideas with respect to the euro. While pushing for reforms within France that will reduce the risks of financial contagion, he is also calling for a common eurozone budget and finance ministry to make the monetary union more resilient to future shocks.
Beyond these areas, Macron wants to boost innovation in the digital sphere, by establishing a European version of the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). At the same time, he wants to protect national sovereignty in the digital age through regulations and a common fiscal approach.
The second Ricoeurian concept underpinning Macron’s worldview is the idea of a European “refoundation.” Whereas the first wave of European integration was largely limited to economics, Macron now wants to focus on politics and culture, starting with the European Parliament election next year.
When Macron looks at the EU political stage, he sees stale cartel parties that are just as ripe for disruption as France’s mainstream parties were in 2017. For example, he has mocked the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), asking how any parliamentary group can call itself Christian Democratic when it includes the parties of former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
Macron also recognizes that the decline of the center left in Europe – along with the impending post-Brexit exodus of UK Labour Party MPs – has left a large void that needs to be filled. To that end, he has considered creating a Europe-wide “En Marche !” movement that could nominate its own Spitzenkandidat to the European Commission presidency. In fact, there has already been some talk of positioning European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager for that role.
Initially, the Macronistes had planned to recruit defectors from other party groups, and then ally with the left-leaning Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. But the creation of a European En Marche ! could mean that they will try to edge out the ALDE, too. At any rate, German Chancellor Angela Merkel will insist on a conservative candidate for the Commission presidency, so Macron might try to use that as a bargaining chip for concessions on other issues.
Much remains to be seen, but it is already clear that Macron has brought a new kind of thinking to European politics. In his view, sovereignty in Europe can really be exercised only at the level of the EU. He is taking France from the Fifth Republic to a Sixth Republic that is no longer strictly franco-francaise, but truly European.